

Notice of Meeting

Surrey Police and Crime Panel

Date & time
Tuesday, 9
September 2014
at 10.30 am

Place
Ashcombe Suite,
County Hall, Kingston
upon Thames, Surrey
KT1 2DN

Contact
Victoria White or Andrew Baird
Room 122, County Hall
Tel 020 8213 2733 Or 020 8541 7609

victoria.white@surreycc.gov.uk or
andrew.baird@surreycc.gov.uk

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This meeting will be held in public. If you would like to attend and you have any special requirements, please contact Victoria White or Andrew Baird on 020 8213 2733 Or 020 8541 7609.

Members

Dorothy Ross-Tomlin (Chairman)
Terry Dicks (Vice-Chairman)
John O'Reilly
George Crawford
Richard Billington
Margaret Cooksey
Victor Broad
Colin Davis
Charlotte Morley
Ken Harwood
Pat Frost
Beryl Hunwicks
Anne Hoblyn MBE
Vacancy

Surrey County Council
Runnymede Borough Council
Elmbridge Borough Council
Epsom & Ewell Borough Council
Guildford Borough Council
Mole Valley District Council
Reigate & Banstead Borough Council
Spelthorne Borough Council
Surrey Heath Borough Council
Tandridge District Council
Waverley Borough Council
Woking Borough Council
Independent Member
Independent Member

PART 1 **IN PUBLIC**

1 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE

The Chairman to report apologies for absence.

2 MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING

(Pages 1 - 10)

To approve the minutes of the meeting held on (10 June 2014) as a correct record.

3 DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST

To receive any declarations of disclosable pecuniary interests from Members of the Panel in respect of any item to be considered at the meeting.

4 PUBLIC QUESTIONS

To receive any public questions.

Note:

Written questions from the public can be submitted no later than seven days prior to the published date of the annual or any ordinary public meeting, for which the Commissioner will be invited to provide a written response by noon on the day before the meeting, which will be circulated to Panel Members and the questioner.

5 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED SINCE THE LAST MEETING

(Pages 11 - 16)

To note complaints against the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner received and considered since the last meeting of the Police and Crime Panel.

6 RECOMMENDATIONS TRACKER AND FORWARD WORK PROGRAMME

(Pages 17 - 28)

To review the Recommendations Tracker and Forward Work Programme.

7 INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE POLICE AND CRIME PANEL AND MEMBERSHIP OF FINANCE SUB-GROUP

(Pages 29 - 32)

To approve the appointment of Bryan Cross to the PCP and to the membership of the Finance Sub-Group.

8 FEEDBACK ON MANAGEMENT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF CONSTABLE

(Pages 33 - 36)

The Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey, Kevin Hurley, holds bi-monthly management meetings with the Chief Constable, Lynne Owens and appropriate members of her senior team.

- 9 DEPUTY AND ASSISTANT POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONERS' OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REVIEW** (Pages 37 - 52)
- This report sets out details of the work that Jeff Harris, Shiraz Mirza and Jane Anderson have been undertaking and the outcomes they have achieved.
- 10 QUARTERLY POLICE AND CRIME PLAN PROGRESS UPDATE** (Pages 53 - 70)
- The Police and Crime Panel for Surrey scrutinises the work of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Surrey, Kevin Hurley. The PCC published the Police and Crime Plan in March 2013 and issued some additional actions in March 2014. This report provides the first quarterly update for 2014/14, from April 2014 to June 2014, on how the PCC is progressing against the plan.
- 11 PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CRIME PANEL AND THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR SURREY** (Pages 71 - 90)
- To agree a protocol between the PCP and the PCC.
- 12 BUDGET QUARTERLY UPDATE** (Pages 91 - 102)
- To consider the budget update of Surrey Police and the Office of the Surrey Police and Crime Commissioner.
- 13 END OF YEAR FINANCE REPORT** (Pages 103 - 120)
- To scrutinise end of year finances.
- 14 VICTIM SERVICES COMMISSIONING** (Pages 121 - 126)
- To scrutinise the commissioning of services for victims.
- 15 PROJECT SIREN UPDATE** (Pages 127 - 202)
- To receive a report on Project SIREN.
- 16 VERBAL UPDATE ON ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS INCLUDING DEEPCUT**
- Verbal strategic update on ongoing investigations including Deepcut.
- 17 DATE OF NEXT MEETING**
- The next meeting of the Police and Crime Panel will be held on Friday 12 December 2014.

Published: Monday, 1 September 2014

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MINUTES of the meeting of the **SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL** held at 10.30 am on 10 June 2014 at Ashcombe Suite, County Hall, Kingston upon Thames, Surrey KT1 2DN.

These minutes are subject to confirmation by the Committee at its meeting.

Members:

Mrs Dorothy Ross-Tomlin (Chairman)
Borough Councillor John O'Reilly
Borough Councillor George Crawford QPM
Borough Councillor Richard Billington
District Councillor Margaret Cooksey
Borough Councillor Victor Broad
Borough Councillor Terry Dicks
Borough Councillor Charlotte Morley
Mrs Pat Frost
Independent Member Anne Hoblyn MBE

Apologies:

District Councillor Ken Harwood (Vice-Chairman)

26/14 ELECTION OF THE CHAIRMAN [Item 1]

Councillor Dorothy Ross-Tomlin was proposed by Pat Frost and seconded by Charlotte Morley to be appointed the Chairman for the municipal year 2014/2015. The Panel unanimously voted, by a show of hands, to appoint Councillor Dorothy Ross-Tomlin as Chairman of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel.

The Chairman thanked the Panel for their support and stated she was looking forward to working with them over the next municipal year.

RESOLVED: That

1. Councillor Dorothy Ross-Tomlin be appointed as Chairman of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel for the 2014/2015 municipal year.

27/14 ELECTION OF THE VICE-CHAIRMAN [Item 2]

Councillor Ken Harwood was proposed by George Crawford and seconded by Victor Broad to be appointed the Vice-Chairman for the municipal year 2014/2015. The Panel unanimously voted, by a show of hands, to appoint Councillor Ken Harwood as Vice-Chairman of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel.

The Chairman thanked Councillor Terry Dicks for his experience and support over the last two years, and introduced Victoria White as the new Scrutiny Officer who would support the Police and Crime Panel.

RESOLVED: That

1. Councillor Ken Harwood be appointed as Vice-Chairman of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel for the 2014/2015 municipal year.

28/14 APOLOGIES FOR ABSENCE [Item 3]

Apologies were received from Councillor Ken Harwood.

Apologies were also received from the Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner who was attending an Emergency Services Collaboration meeting with the Chief Constable.

29/14 MINUTES OF THE PREVIOUS MEETING [Item 4]

The minutes were agreed as an accurate record of the meeting with the following amendments:

- The last bullet point on page 3 (Item 16/14) should also include a Member's query regarding the number of fraudulent insurance claims being made within the county with people being involved in car accidents on purpose. In addition, a query was made regarding Police action against motorcyclists who were adapting their bikes to be louder.
- Item 17/14, the fifth line of the introduction should read "...the precept for 2015/16."

- Item 17/14 bullet point 6 – clarification was provided regarding the internal auditors who were provided by the District Audit Consortium rather than being a joint committee.

30/14 DECLARATIONS OF INTEREST [Item 5]

None were received.

31/14 PUBLIC QUESTIONS [Item 6]

None were received.

32/14 POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER'S ANNUAL REPORT [Item 7]

Due to the availability of the Assistant Police and Crime Commissioner for Victims Item 8 was taken before Item 7.

The Commissioner provided the Panel with an overview of his first full year Annual Report, with some key areas of success being that arrests were up by 2,800, an 8 % drop in crime, and an increase in the number of constables by 200. The Commissioner had focussed on raising his concerns regarding the funding formula for Surrey Police by commissioning work from Oxford Economics which had been shared with the Chancellor, Home Office and Surrey MPs. Furthermore, he stated that he was uncompromising in his expectations of the Police and had made public statements when there had been cases of wrong doing.

- Members requested that tables provided within the Update on Delivering the Six People's Priorities report be consistent with figures for Financial Year 12/13, Financial Year 13/14 and Financial Year to Date 14/15. The Commissioner informed the Panel that the report was compiled by Surrey Police for Management Meetings with himself and had been provided for information.
- Concern was raised regarding comments made by the Commissioner in the Surrey Advertiser regarding an attack by the Home Secretary on Surrey Police. It was raised that there was no specific reference within the Home Secretary's speech regarding Surrey Police and it was felt that the Commissioner's comments were not helpful. The Commissioner stated that he had spoken to the Surrey Advertiser as he felt that the Home Secretary's comments had been unhelpful in improving police morale in Surrey as reference was made to historic cases on misconduct which were over 30 years old.
- Members raised concerns that the Commissioner had announced within the media that 500 jobs would be lost due to the financial constraints the Force was under. It was felt that this statement would have a detrimental effect on police morale within Surrey. The Commissioner stated that the Force was in the position of losing around £30million, which equated to around 400-500 staff. He felt that he needed to be honest about the affects of the cuts and that he was attempting to consider future budgets as had been suggested by the Police and Crime Panel. He would however, continue to raise awareness of the funding formula and campaign for a change within

central government. The Commissioner informed the Panel that by announcing the potential affect of the cuts on Police he was attempting to influence politicians into taking action with the upcoming General Election in 2015.

- Members were concerned about police morale and particularly whether a 'siege mentality' would begin within Surrey Police. The Commissioner shared this concern and informed the Panel that he was talking to senior officers regularly about how Surrey residents did support the Police.
- Members congratulated the Commissioner on the improving figures for crimes against property, but felt that more should be done regarding crimes against persons. They felt that Zero Tolerance policing would show an increase in the number of people being arrested for these crimes, however despite an increase in reporting there did not appear to be an increase in convictions. It was felt that national figures for these crimes would be helpful to assist with understanding the trend. The Commissioner stated that he felt it was a good indication that people trusted the Police that reporting of domestic abuse and sexual assault was increasing, and that there was a slight increase in the number of people being convicted for these crimes. However, these crimes were under scrutiny by the Police to ensure everything that could be done was being done.
- Members were concerned that there was an expectation that Zero Tolerance policing would show an increase in the number of people arrested on the street rather than raids on houses, as was shown on page 15 of the agenda pack. The Commissioner stated that he felt the photo showed robust policing and that with the other images within the Annual Report showed the work of Surrey Police. He felt that the increase in arrests did show that policing of anti-social behaviour was working. The Panel, however, felt that the figures needed to be integrated further to show what effect Zero Tolerance was having.
- The issue of the noise of motorbikes was discussed and the Commissioner informed the Panel that he had written to the Mole Valley MP, Sir Paul Beresford, about his concern as it was felt that a change in legislation was required. The response to this letter had been forwarded to Councillor Margaret Cooksey. The Commissioner stated that he would write to all MPs about this issue and the need for a change in legislation.
- Concerns were raised regarding the project to see war memorials cleaned up as part of a Probation Service project as some areas had not been attended, and it was felt that the centenary of the First World War was the year to complete this project. The Commissioner informed Members that this was a project that was being funded by his office, and was being arranged by his Deputy. He informed the Panel that he would look into this further.
- Members were concerned by the number of arrests going up as it was felt that crime prevention was more effective.

- The affordability of living within the county as a young Police Officer was discussed as an issue and was being looked into by the Police and Guildford Borough Council.
- Members raised concerns that vulnerable adults were being released in the middle of the night from custody suites without any money or means to get home. The Commissioner stated that this was an area he would continue to monitor and would look into whether Officers could drop people home, if resources allowed.
- The Panel queried whether the Commissioner's office spoke to Housing Associations about the anti-social behaviour of residents. The Commissioner felt that the pilot enforcement team within Reigate and Banstead in the future should have the powers to ensure the Housing Associations did the right thing when residents were being anti-social and affecting the lives of neighbours as it was a particular concern of residents.
- Concerns were raised about the investigation into the death of a seven year old boy in Chertsey during the floods, and whether the Police were keeping the family informed. Furthermore, a new investigation into the Deepcut deaths had been announced and assurances were sought that the investigation would be full and thorough. The Commissioner stated that there would be no cover-up in these investigations, and would ensure that the Liaison Officer for the boy's family was keeping them informed of developments. Regarding the Deepcut investigation he informed the Panel that he has authorised £1.5 million of reserve monies to be spent on the investigation to ensure that all aspects were investigated thoroughly.
- The Commissioner informed the Panel that within Surrey Police there were two full-time Police Federation officers at Mount Browne with offices. These officers provided advice and counselling to Police Officers, particularly when one was under investigation.
- The Panel were informed that the Commissioner had hired a young person to engage, via social media, with the public and he would keep the Panel up-to-date with their work.

RESOLVED: That,

1. The report be noted.

33/14 DEPUTY POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER AND ASSISTANT POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER'S PERFORMANCE MONITORING [Item 8]

The Panel welcomed the Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners to the meeting.

- The Assistant Police and Crime Commissioner (APCC) for Victims informed the Panel that she had made a number of recommendations during the past year on how to improve the victims' experience. She stated that she spent two thirds of her time listening to victims and the

other third feeding back experiences to the services. She had written a number of reports which were given to the Police, courts and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) to consider.

- The APCC for Victims had found that Surrey Police were very willing to listen to her findings and involve her in developing the victim experience, whereas the courts service and CPS had not been as open.
- The APCC for Victims had particularly focussed on the experiences of vulnerable victims, such as those of domestic abuse, sexual assault and anti-social behaviour.
- A particular area of success due to her work had been that perpetrators of domestic abuse were no longer lined up at the back of the court in Redhill during all hearings. Only the accused relevant to the case was present.
- Members queried whether the APCC for Victims felt that with her position within the Police and Crime Commissioner's office whether she felt that she had the influence necessary to effect change to the victim experience. The APCC for Victims felt that her position did give her the ability to raise concerns as she was being listened to more than when she was doing the work as a volunteer.
- The Panel queried what key issues the APCC for Victims had raised in her work. The APCC for Victims stated that there was a need for a greater understanding of domestic abuse and the effect it has on the victim and any children who are involved. Whereas for a victim of domestic abuse recovery can begin when they are away from the abuser, for a victim of sexual assault the recovery is often more difficult as it can take over their life. She felt these differences were important to consider when commissioning services for victims.
- The APCC for Victims stated her belief that the Youth Criminal Justice system should be built upon to enable older people to take part in reparative work. However, she did concede that there was issue that often victims were not interested in restorative justice; however there were highly trained facilitators within Surrey.
- The Victim Satisfaction Survey was taken very seriously within Surrey, with meetings every six months to interrogate the results. The APCC for Victims felt that she was working well with Surrey Police to review the survey results.
- In the next six months the Police and Crime Commissioner would take on the commissioning of victim services and the role of the APCC for Victims was strategic in ensuring the services were right for the victims. Surrey was leading in the area of victim services. The APCC for Victims stated that she worked two days a week and most of her time was used to talk to victims so research was commissioned by the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner and she commented strategically on this work.

- The aim of the APCC for Victims was to make the process of conviction quicker, as domestic violence cases took on average six months while sexual assault took on average 12 months. The court services and CPS were struggling with cuts to budgets but were working to speed up the process.
- The Commissioner informed the Panel that the APCC for Victims had raised the issue of the provision of refuges nationally as there was a situation arising where other counties were closing their refuges which meant victims from Surrey did not have a place to go. The APCC for Victims stated that these were important services which helped people to rebuild their lives. The refuges also helped children who had been caught up with the domestic violence and provided play groups.
- The Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner were assisting refuges to put in bids for funds from the Ministry of Justice, and had submitted eight bids including one for the purchase of school uniforms.
- Members were concerned that the work of the APCC for Victims was more social and queried whether her work was influencing the work of Police Officers on the ground. The APCC stated that she worked more strategically with senior officers, but that her work influenced training available to Police Officers. Furthermore, she regularly spoke to Officers and felt that her work was being appreciated.
- The Commissioner informed the Panel that he had taken the decision to increase the number of days worked by the APCC for Victims from two to three as she had previously been effectively worked one day for free. He further informed the Panel that he aimed to employ a young ethnic minority female for one day a week as there was a different set of values in some communities and he wanted his office to engage with these groups. The Chairman requested that the inclusion of an additional day of work for the APCC for Victims would enable her to attend future Panel meetings.
- The APCC for Equalities and Diversity informed the Panel that his work was ongoing but that he was working on supporting the Police and increasing morale within the Force. He was also working to increase the number of contacts he had across Surrey and Sussex, particularly within the Crawley Mosque.
- Members queried whether the communities that the APCC for Equalities and Diversity worked with wanted to be engaged with or preferred to be more self regulating. The APCC for Equalities and Diversity stated that he had been invited to meetings within these communities and he spoke of the services that were available to them.
- The Commissioner informed the Panel that he had been invited to attend Friday Prayers at a mosque and was looking to attend more meetings at mosques across Surrey. He had also attended a meeting with representatives from organisations which looked at counter-terrorism about young men who had travelled to Syria, along with members of the community.

- The Commissioner stated that the APCC for Equalities and Diversity had been able to educate Police Officers on the different sects within Islam which was assisting them with their work.
- Members queried why there had been a high number of Stop & Search occurrences in Mole Valley in particular and were informed by the APCC for Equalities and Diversity that this would be looked into.

RESOLVED: That,

1. The report be noted.

ADJOURNMENT

The meeting adjourned for at 12.25pm and resumed at 12.35pm, with all those present who had been in attendance with the exception of Councillor George Crawford.

34/14 FEEDBACK ON MANAGEMENT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER AND CHIEF CONSTABLE [Item 9]

The Commissioner informed the Panel that there had been one management meeting with the Chief Constable which was reported on within the agenda pack.

- The Commissioner informed the Panel that he had congratulated the Chief Constable for the Surrey Police's work, however he had raised concerns over the Special Constabulary as they felt that they were a valuable resource.
- The Commissioner intended to look into giving the Speed Watch volunteers more power. Panel Members felt that it would be beneficial for the programme to be a Road Watch scheme which also looked at anti-social parking and cycling, and drivers using mobile phones. The Commissioner felt that these could be considered as he was keen to give more power to volunteers.

RESOLVED: That,

1. The report be noted.

35/14 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED SINCE THE LAST MEETING [Item 10]

The Panel were informed that the outcome of a complaint considered by the Complaints Sub-Committee on 24 April 2014 could be found within the agenda pack. Additionally, five complaints had been received and would be considered at a meeting of the Complaints Sub-Committee on 12 June 2014. The outcome of this meeting would be reported upon at the next meeting of the Panel.

RESOLVED: That,

1. That the report be noted.

36/14 RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMPLAINTS SUB-COMMITTEE [Item 11]

The Panel agreed that, in line with the Panel's Complaints Protocol, the Complaints Sub-Committee was to be re-established to informally resolve noncriminal complaints about the conduct of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner, in addition to conduct matters which were referred back to the Panel from the IPCC.

RESOLVED: That,

1. The Complaints Sub-Committee be re-established for the municipal year 2014/2015.
2. The Complaints Sub-Committee to have the following membership:
 - Councillor Victor Broad
 - Councillor Margaret Cooksey
 - Councillor George Crawford
 - Councillor John O'Reilly
 - Independent Member Anne Hoblyn

 - Chairman (*ex-officio*)
 - Vice-Chairman (*ex-officio*)

37/14 RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FINANCE SUB-GROUP [Item 12]

The Finance Sub-Group was proposed to be re-established to assist the Panel in consideration of budgetary and financial matters.

Members suggested that the new Independent Member of the Police and Crime Panel should have finance experience or skills as the membership of the Sub-Group was lower than would be desired. The Chairman informed the Panel that they would look for a candidate with experience of working within the community and financial knowledge, and that they aimed to appoint a new Member by the middle of July 2014.

The Chairman requested that the Police and Crime Commissioner involved the Finance Sub-Group with the formation of the precept proposals by September 2014.

RESOLVED: That,

1. The Finance Sub-Group be re-established for the municipal year 2014/2015.
2. The Finance Sub-Committee to have the following membership:
 - Councillor Victor Broad
 - Councillor Charlotte Morley

 - Chairman (*ex-officio*)
 - Vice-Chairman (*ex-officio*)

**38/14 FORWARD WORK PROGRAMME AND RECOMMENDATIONS TRACKER
[Item 13]**

The Panel reviewed the recommendations tracker and forward work programme.

RESOLVED: That

1. The recommendations tracker and forward work programme be noted.

39/14 DATE OF NEXT MEETING [Item 14]

It was noted that the next meeting of the Police and Crime Panel would be on 9 September 2014 at 10.30am.

Meeting ended at: 12.45 pm

Chairman

SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

COMPLAINTS RECEIVED SINCE THE LAST MEETING

09 September 2014

SUMMARY

This report sets out all complaints against the Police and Crime Commissioner and his Deputy that have been received since the last meeting of the Police and Crime Panel.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Police and Crime Panel is asked to:

- (i) Note the content of the report.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The Elected Local Policing Bodies (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2012 make Surrey's Police and Crime Panel responsible for overseeing complaints made about the conduct of the Police and Crime Commissioner and the Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner (DPCC).
- 1.2 Where a complaint is received by the Panel¹, a report is produced for the next available meeting, setting out the nature of the complaint(s) received and details of any action taken.

2.0 ANALYSIS AND PROGRESS

- 2.1 The Panel has a responsibility to informally resolve non-criminal complaints about the conduct of the PCC and DPCC, as well as criminal complaints or conduct matters that are referred back to it by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC).
- 2.2 For the above, the Panel agreed at its meeting on 13 December 2012 to delegate informal resolution of complaints to a Complaints Sub-Committee.
- 2.3 However, in accordance with the Regulations, complaints received by the Panel that do not relate to the conduct of the PCC or DPCC (such as operational concerns and policy disputes) are referred to the most appropriate body for resolution instead of the Complaints Sub-Committee.
- 2.4 Appendix A sets out details of **all 5** complaints considered by the Panel since its last meeting and the action taken.

3.0 COMPLAINTS RECEIVED SINCE THE LAST MEETING

- 3.1 **0** complaints have been received by the Panel since its last meeting on 10 June 2014. **5** complaints have been considered by the Complaints Sub-Committee on 12 June 2014 details of which are provided in Appendix A.

4.0 EQUALITIES AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

- 4.1 It is vital that any complaints process is open to all residents and that each and every complainant is treated with respect and courtesy. The Complaints Protocol agreed by the Panel on 13 December 2012 is designed to be an equitable process and will be monitored by the Panel's Support Officer to ensure that it is fit for purpose.

¹ At its meeting on 13 December 2012 the Panel agreed to delegate initial receipt / filtering of complaints to the Chief Executive of the PCC's Office.

5.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.1 The Panel is asked to note the information in Appendix A.

6.0 REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 To allow the Panel to have oversight of complaints made against the Commissioner and his Deputy.

7.0 WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

7.1 Any future complaints will be reported to the next available meeting of the Panel.

LEAD OFFICER: Victoria White, Scrutiny Officer, Surrey County Council

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APPENDIX A

COMPLAINTS CONSIDERED SINCE 10 JUNE 2014

Date received	Nature of complaint	Does the complaint, or an element of the complaint, relate to conduct of a relevant office holder?	Does the complaint, or an element of the complaint, relate to an alleged criminal offence?	Details / Action taken
12 May 2014	A complaint was received stating that the Commissioner had made inaccurate and upsetting comments relating to a former Police Officer in a news article.	Yes	No	<p>A meeting of the Panel's Complaints Sub-Committee was arranged and Members considered the matter on 12 June. Both the complainant and Commissioner were invited to provide additional comments in order to inform the Complaint Sub-Committee's discussions.</p> <p>The Sub-Committee upheld the complaint and informed the complainants and Commissioner by letter.</p>
12 May 2014	A complaint was received stating that the Commissioner had made inaccurate and upsetting comments relating to a former Police Officer in a news article.	Yes	No	<p>A meeting of the Panel's Complaints Sub-Committee was arranged and Members considered the matter on 12 June. Both the complainant and Commissioner were invited to provide additional comments in order to inform the Complaint Sub-Committee's discussions.</p> <p>The Sub-Committee upheld the complaint and informed the complainants and Commissioner by letter.</p>
13 May 2014	A complaint was received stating that the Commissioner had made inaccurate and upsetting comments relating to a former Police Officer in a news article.	Yes	No	<p>A meeting of the Panel's Complaints Sub-Committee was arranged and Members considered the matter on 12 June. Both the complainant and Commissioner were invited to provide additional comments in order to inform the Complaint Sub-Committee's discussions.</p>

				The Sub-Committee upheld the complaint and informed the complainants and Commissioner by letter.
13 May 2014	A complaint was received stating that the Commissioner had made inaccurate and upsetting comments relating to a former Police Officer in a news article.	Yes	No	<p>A meeting of the Panel's Complaints Sub-Committee was arranged and Members considered the matter on 12 June. Both the complainant and Commissioner were invited to provide additional comments in order to inform the Complaint Sub-Committee's discussions.</p> <p>The Sub-Committee upheld the complaint and informed the complainants and Commissioner by letter.</p>
19 May 2014	A complaint was received stating that the Commissioner had made inaccurate and upsetting comments relating to a former Police Officer in a news article.	Yes	No	<p>A meeting of the Panel's Complaints Sub-Committee was arranged and Members considered the matter on 12 June. Both the complainant and Commissioner were invited to provide additional comments in order to inform the Complaint Sub-Committee's discussions.</p> <p>The Sub-Committee upheld the complaint and informed the complainants and Commissioner by letter.</p>

Surrey Police and Crime Panel Work Programme

The purpose of this document is to provide a summary of work due to be undertaken by the Surrey Police and Crime Panel, and work that has recently been completed. It is provided for information purposes at each meeting of the Panel, and updated between meetings by officers to reflect any future areas of work. Members can suggest items for consideration to the Chairman or at the Panel's informal meetings.

Date	Item	Purpose	Contact Officer	Additional Comments
9 September 2014				
9 September 2014	Protocol between the Police and Crime Panel and the Police and Crime Commissioner	As agreed at the PCP's meeting in December 2012, to consider whether any amendments need to be made to the protocol.	Scrutiny Officer	
	New independent member and finance sub-group membership	To approve the appointment of Bryan Cross to the PCP and to the membership of the Finance Sub-Group.	Scrutiny Officer	
	End of year finance report	To scrutinise the draft end of year finances.	Damian Markland/Ian Perkins	
	Project Siren	To receive a report on Project Siren.	Damian Markland	
	Victim Services Commissioning	To scrutinise the commissioning of services for victims.	Katie Kempen/Damian Markland	
	Verbal update on ongoing investigations including Deepcut	To receive a strategic update on ongoing investigations including Deepcut.	Damian Markland	

Item 6

Date	Item	Purpose	Contact Officer	Additional Comments
	+Standing items	<i>Standing items are considered at every meeting of the PCP. These are listed later on in the document.</i>		
Date				
28 October 2014 – Informal meeting with the PCC				
28 October 2014	Informal meeting with PCC	In addition to the informal meeting, the Panel may wish to discuss items to look at in the coming year.	Scrutiny Officer	

Currently unscheduled future items				
Rural Crime – how the PCC intends to tackle rural crime across Surrey			Scrutiny Officer / Damian Markland	Being addressed via Task Group.

Standing Items

Standing item	Complaints	To monitor complaints received against the PCC and / or the DPCC	Scrutiny Officer	
Standing item	DPCC & APCC Performance Monitoring	The PCC has agreed to provide the Panel with the outcome of the DPCC's appraisals as well as progress made by his two APCCs.	Damian Markland	
Standing item	Police and Crime Plan Quarterly Update	To consider progress made against the agreed Police and Crime Plan.	Damian Markland	
Standing item	Budget Quarterly Update	As agreed at the precept setting meeting on 6 February 2013, to allow the Panel to have oversight of the latest financial position.	Damian Markland / Ian Perkin	
Standing item	Feedback on monthly discussions with the Chief Constable	To consider issues raised during monthly discussions between the PCC and the Chief Constable.	Damian Markland	
Standing item	Actions and recommendations tracker	To monitor responses, actions and outcomes against recommendations or requests for further actions, and to	Scrutiny Officer	
Standing item	Draft forward work programme	To provide a summary of work due to be undertaken by the Surrey Police and Crime Panel, and work that has recently been completed.	Scrutiny Officer	



Task and Working Groups

Group	Membership	Purpose	Reporting dates
Complaints Sub-Committee	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cllr Victor Broad • Cllr Margaret Cooksey • Cllr John O'Reilly • Cllr George Crawford • Ind Anne Hoblyn + Chair & Vice-Chair	To resolve non-criminal complaints against the PCC and/or the DPCC.	Report to each meeting of the PCP, detailing any complaints dealt with since the last meeting.
Finance Sub-Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cllr Charlotte Morley • Cllr Victor Broad + Chair & Vice-Chair	To provide expert advice to the PCP on financial matters that fall within its remit.	Reports verbally to the formal precept setting meeting of the Panel in February.
Neighbourhood Policing Task Group <i>(on hold)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ind Anne Hoblyn • Cllr Pat Frost • Cllr Margaret Cooksey • Cllr Ken Harwood 	To monitor any future changes / decisions in relation to the neighbourhood policing model.	Work of Task Group reached natural end and the Group is not currently active.
Rural Crime Task Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cllr Dorothy Ross-Tomlin • Cllr Pat Frost • Cllr Margaret Cooksey • Cllr Ken Harwood • Cllr Richard Billington 	To consider how the Police and Crime Commissioner can better serve rural communities.	Work programme and timescales determined. Next meeting of group, with DPCC, is 18 September 2014.

**POLICE & CRIME PANEL
ACTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TRACKER 09 SEPTEMBER 2014**

The recommendations tracker allows Police & Crime Panel Members to monitor responses, actions and outcomes against their recommendations or requests for further actions. The tracker is updated following each Committee.

Date of meeting and reference	Item	Recommendations/Actions	Responsible officer or member	Comments	Next progress check:
12 June 2013	Feedback On Management Meetings Between The Police And Crime Commissioner And Chief Constable	R13/13 The Police and Crime Panel invite the Chief Constable to comment on her relationship with the Police and Crime Commissioner.	PCP/PCC	Discussions taking place to determine the most appropriate method. Need to ensure that the Panel is sensitive to the operational / strategic split between the Chief Constable and the PCC. Chief Constable has agreed to attend an informal meeting of the Panel on 25/09/14	Finished
10 Sep 2013	Police and Crime Plan Quarterly Progress Update	R19/13 That, once the information is available, the cost of the PCC's Communications Team be shared with the Panel.	PCC	2.2 FTEs – Two full time members of staff and one part time. The total staffing cost, including national insurance and superannuation, is £101,661.	Finished

	Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner's Objectives and Performance Review	R20/13 That the PCC and DPCC consider whether more emphasis needs to be placed on engagement with Young People, and that the Panel be kept informed of progress.		The DPCC has been doing a lot of work in relation to youth engagement, in particular the Junior Citizens Scheme which he is attempting to re-establish across Surrey. A lot of this progress has been reflected in previous APCC/DPCC updates to the PCP as part of the performance monitoring process. OPCC are happy to provide further information on specific questions from PCP.	Finished
29 Nov 2013	Neighbourhood Policing Review	R22/13 That where there is any ambiguity as to whether a potential decision is strategic or operational in nature, the Police & Crime Commissioner ensure that the Police & Crime Panel is made aware of the matter before any decision is made.	PCC	<p>The Commissioner has stated that he is unable to comply with this recommendation on the grounds that he often has to make quick decisions that cannot wait until the next meeting of the Panel. However, the Commissioner highlighted his commitment to publishing key and strategic decisions on his website.</p> <p>The governance framework and decision-making and accountability document is at www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/our-work/governance</p>	<p>Disputed</p> <p>Scrutiny Officer received Framework of Decision-Making and Accountability from the OPCC, to inform PCP's understanding of this area of governance.</p> <p>Update: The revised Protocol will be signed if agreed at the meeting in September.</p>

		R23/13 That the above be enshrined in the formal protocol between the PCC and the Police & Crime Panel, to be agreed formally at the next meeting of the Panel.	PCC/ Scrutiny Officer	The Commissioner has stated that in light of the above comments, he would be unable to support this addition to the protocol.	Disputed Update: The revised Protocol will be signed if agreed at the meeting in September.
	Recommendations Tracker And Forward Work Programme	R26/13 That the Tackling Rural Crime in Surrey task group is set up as outlined in the scoping document.	Scrutiny Officer	The Task Group has been established and an initial meeting with the PCC has been scheduled for 18 September. Update: The PCC is attending a meeting with the Prime Minister on that day and so the DPCC will substitute for him at this meeting.	Finished
6 February 2014	Police and Crime Plan Update <i>Suggested by PCC in response to the Panel.</i>	R3A/14 That the PCC provide the Panel with an overview of how he intends to use the new Victim Services Commissioning funding.	PCP/PCC	Item being taken at September 2014 meeting.	Finished

	Precept setting proposal for 2014/15	R5/14 That in future years the Commissioner look to involve the Panel in the development of his budget and precept proposals, as opposed to the very late scrutiny required by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act.	PCP/PCC	A meeting between the Finance Sub-Group and the OPCC has been arranged for 23 September 2014, to discuss how this arrangement will work in practice, without blurring the lines of responsibility established in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act.	Finished
		R6/14 The Panel receive details regarding expected savings made from collaboration with Sussex Police.	PCC	A workshop is being organised for the Deputy Chief Constable to provide details of the Collaboration project.	In progress
	Recommendation Tracker and Forward Work Programme	R8/14 That the Panel requests a future report on Community Safety Funding within Surrey, specifically in relation to the prevention of duplication of funding.	PCP	Request that the OPCC includes this information as part of the regular finance update at the next meeting of the Panel. Update: OPCC suggest that this happens at the end of the financial year so that there would be a thorough overview of the process and what was funded. Otherwise, could only provide update for FYtD for 2014/15 if PCP would like to see it.	Ongoing

29 April 2014	Police and Crime Plan Quarterly Update	R11/14 The Police and Crime Panel consider how it can work with the Police and Crime Commissioner to improve the way in which victim satisfaction is assessed.	PCC/PCP	The Panel has been provided with an update on victim satisfaction assessment – a letter was sent to the Chairman on 15 May 2014.	Finished
		R12/14 The Police and Crime Panel be provided with an update on the status of the various reviews being conducted by Surrey Police.	PCC	The Panel is awaiting an update on the current reviews. Update: OPCC has suggested this would be most appropriate to happen at the meeting with the Chief Constable and Deputy Chief Constable.	Ongoing
		R13/14 The Police and Crime Commissioner consider whether the way in which anti-social driving is reported can be improved.	PCC	The Panel has received a brief update on anti-social driving. The OPCC's performance team do not hold this data. However, the Insurance Fraud Bureau (www.insurancefraudbureau.org) may be able to assist. IFB is a not for profit organisation funded by the insurance industry, specifically focussed on detecting and preventing organised and cross industry insurance fraud.	Finished

		<p>R14/14 The Police and Crime Commissioner re-examine in-year revised savings for Learning and Development.</p>	PCC	<p>The Panel has received a brief update on the in-year savings for Learning and Development, and has requested a briefing on training opportunities within Surrey Police.</p> <p>The Commissioner would be happy to discuss the training of Police Officers with the Panel at a future meeting if there are any outstanding questions. The Panel may wish to look at the overview of training and development detailed on the Surrey Police Website: http://www.surrey.police.uk/careers/police-officers/what-training-and-development-is-available</p>	Finished
		<p>R15/14 The Police and Crime Commissioner provide more information regarding the variance for Specialist Crime.</p>	PCC	<p>The Panel has received a brief update on the variance for Specialist Crime and would like further detail regarding this variance.</p> <p>The Commissioner and his Chief Finance Officer are more than happy to clarify any specific questions in relation to the above.</p>	Finished

	Budget Quarterly Update	R16/14 The Police and Crime Commissioner examine actions that can be taken to reduce late payments from other public sector bodies.	PCC	<p>The Panel has received an update on late payments by other public sector bodies, and has requested further information.</p> <p>Update: The PCC is content that late payments from other public bodies are not a cause for concern and are not financially significant.</p>	Finished
	Deputy and Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners' Objectives and Performance Review	R17/14 The Police and Crime Commissioner consider the level of detail provided in the Outcome section of the performance monitoring tables, to help improve the Police & Crime Panel's understanding of the Deputy and Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners' work.	PCC	A detailed outcomes section has been added to the reports on the performance of the DPCC and APCCs.	Finished

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

Independent Member of the Police and Crime Panel and membership of Finance Sub-Group

09 September 2014

7

SUMMARY

This report provides details of the process undertaken to recruit a new Police & Crime Panel Independent Member, and puts forward the recommendations of the recruitment sub-group for consideration by the Panel.

RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE RECRUITMENT SUB-GROUP

Members of the Police & Crime Panel are asked to:

- (i) Formally co-opt the recommended candidate, Bryan Cross, to the Panel, for the remainder of the Police & Crime Commissioner's term of office.
- (ii) Appoint Bryan Cross to the membership of the Finance Sub-Group.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

- 1.1 In accordance with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, where a force area consists of more than ten authorities, there will be as many appointed members of the Police & Crime Panel as there are local authorities in the force area, with one from each authority. In Surrey, this equates to twelve members appointed to the Panel by local authorities.
- 1.2 In addition to these appointed members, the Act requires Panels to co-opt two independent non-political members. Independent members have full voting rights on Panel procedures and are usually co-opted to the Panel for a term of four years. As this appointment is to replace a previous independent member, the period will instead be for the remainder of the Police and Crime Commissioner's term of office.
- 1.3 The co-option of independent members to the Panel provides an opportunity to build on the skills and experience offered by the appointed members, and to assist the Panel in discharging its functions effectively.
- 1.4 Following the resignation of one of the Panel's Independent Members, the Panel was required to seek a suitable replacement.
- 1.5 The process for recruiting and co-opting independent members, previously agreed by Surrey's local authorities, is set out in the Panel Arrangements.
- 1.6 In accordance with these arrangements, the recruitment process included public advertisement of the independent member post for a period of two weeks, and the preparation of information packs for interested parties, which set out the eligibility criteria, person specification and the roles and responsibilities for Panel members.
- 1.7 Applications were considered against the agreed eligibility criteria by a nominated sub-group of members, as a result of which a short-list of candidates was invited to interview.
- 1.8 The recruitment sub-group consisted of Cllr Dorothy Ross-Tomlin (Surrey County Council), Cllr Ken Harwood (Tandridge District Council), and Cllr George Crawford (Epsom and Ewell Borough Council).

2.0 ANALYSIS AND PROGRESS

- 2.1 Throughout the recruitment process, members of the sub-group have been mindful of the experience, knowledge and skills required for the Panel to be effective. In particular, financial expertise was desired.
- 2.2 The Panel supports the Police & Crime Commissioner in the effective exercise of their functions and plays a crucial role in promoting openness in the transaction of police business. As such, considering candidates

against the essential criteria set out in the supporting information was of fundamental importance.

- 2.3 Following short-listing, interviews took place on 9 July 2014. In light of the experience, skills and knowledge demonstrated by Bryan Cross, members of the sub-group were in agreement that he would be an effective independent member and would aid the Panel in carrying out its roles and responsibilities.

3.0 EQUALITIES AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

- 3.1 Officers of the host authority ensured that the recruitment process was conducted in accordance with Surrey County Council's policies and its status as a 'Two Ticks' employer.

4.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- 4.1 The Panel is asked to formally co-opt Bryan Cross onto the Surrey Police and Crime Panel for the remainder of the Police and Crime Commissioner's term of office and to appoint Bryan Cross to the membership of the Finance Sub-Group.

5.0 REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

- 5.1 To comply with the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 and to assist the Panel in discharging its functions effectively.

6.0 WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

- 6.1 Once formally co-opted by the Panel, Bryan Cross will serve as an Independent Member of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel for the remainder of the Police and Crime Commissioner's term of office. Bryan Cross will also become a member of the Finance Sub-Group.

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL**FEEDBACK ON MANAGEMENT MEETINGS BETWEEN THE PCC
AND CHIEF CONSTABLE****09 September 2014**

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SUMMARY

The Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey, Kevin Hurley, holds bi-monthly management meetings with the Chief Constable, Lynne Owens and appropriate members of her senior team. These meetings are webcast for all to view. Their main purpose is to ensure the PCC is discharging his statutory responsibility to hold the Chief Constable to account for delivery against the six People's Priorities as set out in the Police & Crime Plan and to provide oversight and scrutiny of Force business.

At the Panel's request, the attached paper summarises the issues raised at the Management Meetings held since the Police & Crime Panel last met.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Members of the Police and Crime Panel note the report.

EQUALITIES AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

No implications.

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Bi-Monthly Management Meeting – 21st July 2014

Agenda items for this meeting were:

- Surrey Police Progress Against the Six People's Priorities
- Policing Mental Health
- Launch of the Joint Enforcement Project
- Review of BME Recruitment, Retention and Progression
- Financial Report – Month 12 – 2013/14
- Annual Update of Surrey General and Specific Reserves Strategy

The main points of note from the meeting were as follows:

- The Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) reported that the number of total notifiable offences (TNOs) had dropped by 923 in comparison to the same time last year. There had also been a 15% reduction in domestic burglary
- Violence with injury had increased - a factor to consider for this increase was the more accurate application of the revised Home Office Counting Rules with respect to assault (no injury) and Actual Bodily Harm (injury)
- The increase in reported incidents of both domestic violence and sexual offences was seen as a positive as it showed that more victims were confident in coming forward
- The detection rate for sexual offences had dropped – an action plan was being developed to address the issues and the DCC would pick this up through his Crime and Performance Board
- The report contained many examples of good work including that of Waverley Safer Neighbourhood Team who was working with two local secondary schools where it had been identified that pupils were taking drugs
- The PCC encouraged the lawful use of stop and search as it was a good tool to use in keeping the public safe. The DCC said that a board called Stopwatch met regularly to review the use of stop and search in Surrey
- Seizures made under the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) had increased, the majority of which was used to fund the Economic Crime Unit. There was a small surplus of approximately £120, 000 and the Assistant Chief Constables had been tasked to look at ways in which the money could be spent
- The number of Special Constables had fallen to 170 and the PCC expressed his concern at this reduction. He suggested that another review needed to take place. The DCC said that the recruitment freeze and natural attrition was a factor in the reducing numbers although this wasn't of concern
- Customer satisfaction had improved in the area of violent crime and racist incidents. 'Actions taken' and being 'kept informed' had also improved. Satisfaction relating to anti-social behaviour remained high
- A new scheme called Pegasus had been launched which would make it easier for those with communications difficulties to contact the Force. Special measures had been put in place to help those with difficulties to be able to interact
- There had been a slight rise in unplanned wastage. The biggest reasons appeared to be officers transferring to other forces and police staff members finding alternative

employment elsewhere, one of the reasons being that they were unsure of their future at Surrey Police due to funding pressures

- Operation Heather related to the deaths of four soldiers at Deepcut Barracks. A further inquest into the death of Private Cheryl James had been granted and a small team had been established within the Force to facilitate the inquest. This would cause significant resource implications as the inquest could last for up to two years. The PCC had therefore granted the use of the Force's reserves to fund this team
- The DCC gave an update on how Surrey was progressing in developing a local declaration following the launch of the National Care Crisis Concordat in February 2014. Four key recommendations had been accepted by the Health and Wellbeing Board and would be progressed. The DPCC expressed his concern about the willingness of other partners to get involved as this wasn't a sole police responsibility
- The DCC said that he had visited the Joint Enforcement Team at Reigate and Banstead and there had been some early successes relating to noise, parking, fly tipping and dog fouling. The PCC welcomed this good news which sent a clear message to the public that these issues were being addressed
- The DCC presented a report on BME (Black and Minority Ethnic) Recruitment, Retention and Progression. The report contained a lot of detailed information and can be found on the PCC's website <http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/2014/07/agenda-and-papers-published-for-july-management-meeting/>
- Assistant PCC Shiraz Mirza suggested the Force could use electronic media for BME groups in their own print to advertise recruitment e.g. Asian TV, newspapers, events in mosques
- The PCC congratulated the Force for managing to bring the Force in budget especially with the challenges that it had faced
- Assistant PCC Mirza suggested that the issue of forced marriage should be addressed in Surrey. The PCC agreed that the Force should be training its officers in this area and in relation to Honour Based Violence (HBV). The DCC agreed to update the PCC on what the Force was doing in relation to these two areas.

The webcast of the meeting, supporting papers and the minutes of the meeting are available on the PCC's website www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL**DEPUTY AND ASSISTANT POLICE & CRIME COMMISSIONERS'
OBJECTIVES AND PERFORMANCE REVIEW
09 September 2014****SUMMARY**

The Panel has requested details of how the Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner and the two Assistant PCCs are performing against the criteria set for them upon appointment.

The attached documents set out details of the work that Jeff Harris, Shiraz Mirza and Jane Anderson have been undertaking and the outcomes they have achieved. The PCC meets regularly with the Deputy and Assistant PCCs to review their work to ensure it is delivering against the People's Priorities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Members of the Police and Crime Panel are asked to note the attached.

EQUALITIES AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

None arising.

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Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner Objectives for 2014/15 and Progress as at September 2014

The PCC holds regular meetings with the Deputy PCC. The following strategic objectives have been set for the Deputy PCC for the year 2014/15.

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
<p>To support the PCC in delivering an efficient and effective police service for Surrey, obtaining best value for money and holding the Chief Constable to account for delivery of the Police & Crime Plan within the budget set for Surrey Police</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Keeping key Force change programmes (e.g. estates) under review 	<p>The DPCC has taken a lead for the PCC on a number of key change programmes. This includes a review of the Salfords custody programme, involvement in the Force estates strategy, the Siren ICT project, the collaboration programme with Sussex and other regional forces and internal reviews.</p>	<p>The Deputy PCC chairs alternate meetings of the Surrey/Sussex collaboration meetings. Business cases are now being progressed in the areas of search management, operational dogs, tactical firearms, public protection and cyber-crime.</p> <p>The programme of estates disposals has recommenced, following the Deputy PCC's review. By taking a slightly revised approach, additional revenue should be achieved.</p> <p>The DPCC is leading a piece of work on behalf of the PCC to establish whether better use can be made of other property assets – e.g. police houses/section houses – particularly where this might support those who wish to join the Force but are prohibited from doing so due to high costs of living in Surrey</p>

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attending regular management meetings with the Chief Constable to assess performance and budgetary information 	<p>The DPCC has attended webcast management meetings and contributed to discussions regarding Force progress against the priorities and budget</p>	<p>Outcomes of discussions can be viewed on the PCC's website. The meetings have allowed open and transparent scrutiny of performance against the People's Priorities: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/our-work/surrey-police-performance/webcasting/</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensuring the PCC is aware of the views of the public, partners, businesses and victims of crime when discharging his key functions 	<p>The OPCC has now arranged Crime Summits in each Borough / District for 2014/15. The DPCC will continue to play a key part at each summit.</p> <p>He has also met and continues to meet with a raft of partner organisations including voluntary, community and charitable groups and private sector organisations with an interest in community safety issues.</p>	<p>One example is progress made on the Junior Citizens Scheme. Whilst 6 boroughs are participating in Junior Citizens, 5 currently are not. The Deputy PCC is meeting individually with leaders from each of these boroughs to explore whether the PCC can help progress a scheme in these areas.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Cooperating with the Police & Crime Panel in its overview and scrutiny role 	<p>When possible the DPCC aims to attend all meetings of the Police & Crime Panel.</p>	<p>The Deputy PCC has continued to attend Panel meetings and updated members on his areas of work, such as engagement with partners and community safety funding.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Acting at all times with integrity and the highest ethical standards, abiding by the Code of Conduct for the PCC and DPCC 	<p>The DPCC continues to abide by the Code of Conduct and has ensured that information about his role and expenses has been published as required.</p>	

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
<p>To develop strong working relationships with relevant partners to facilitate the delivery of the Police & Crime Plan and, in particular, ensure the PCC is able to fulfil his remit in respect of community safety and criminal justice activity</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Represent the PCC or attend in his absence at partnership meetings, e.g. Surrey Leaders, Community & Public Safety Board etc 	<p>The DPCC has represented the PCC at key meetings such as the Community & Public Safety Board and the Criminal Justice Partnership to ensure partners are sighted on the PCC's plans.</p>	<p>The Deputy PCC is a recognised member of the newly constituted Surrey Community Safety Board. He has also contributed views on and attends the newly configured Criminal Justice Partnership which brings together strategic leaders from across the criminal justice (CJ) sector.</p> <p>The Deputy PCC's Cyber Safety Group continues to meet with a view to improving the preventative element of cyber-crime. The OPCC recently funded a project to provide key training schools on online / social media law and ethics. As part of the project substantial data was gathered from a sample of almost 10,000 young people, providing a good overview of current trends in Surrey that will be used to inform future work.</p> <p>The Deputy PCC recently contributed to a partner meeting concerning the introduction of the ASB, Crime and Policing Act and is due to attend an upcoming stakeholder event of Emergency Services Collaboration, ensuring that the views of the PCC are represented.</p> <p>The DPCC has recently been appointed as the final arbitrator for the Community Trigger process.</p>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work with the PCC to set up Local Policing Boards/Summits in each borough and district 	Summits have been held in every district and borough and the Deputy PCC has pushed for better publication of Force activity around Local Policing Boards.	<p>Feedback from the summits has helped shape the Police & Crime Plan.</p> <p>The Force has made improvements to the way it advertises local policing boards as a result of comments by the Deputy PCC.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Build links with Local Criminal Justice Board colleagues 	The DPCC will be attending future meetings of the Criminal Justice Partnership and has met with colleagues from the CPS, Prisons, the Court Service and Probation	<p>At the most recent meeting of the Criminal Justice Partnership, the board confirmed its delivery plan for the coming year, which is very closely aligned to the PCC's Police & Crime Plan. This followed comments from the D/ PCC encouraging better alignment.</p> <p>The Deputy PCC recently facilitated a meeting with CJ partners to discuss difficulties in areas such as court waiting times. This resulted in a commitment to make improvements.</p>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure that the PCC is fully prepared to commission services, particularly services for victims for 2014. 	<p>This is an on-going piece of work.</p> <p>The DPCC is leading on the award of grants and has ensured that a number of grants were made at the end of this financial year using an underspend identified in the budget of the OPCC</p>	<p>A full list of the diverse projects supported by grants awarded by the DPCC has been published on the PCC's website. The Deputy PCC has agreed a strategy for the 2014/15 fund, which was recently shared with the Panel as part of the budgetary papers.</p> <p>http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Grant-Funding-Bids-for-Website.pdf</p> <p>Following the award of a recent grant from MOJ in respect of victims commissioning and restorative justice,</p>

			the D/PCC is leading on a piece of work, with probation and local authorities, to use some funding to fund the clean-up of war memorials by people doing community pay back.
Work with the PCC to ensure Surrey's voice is represented at a national level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Work with PCC staff colleagues to feed into the Government's review of the police funding formula. 	An independent academic organisation has been commissioned to review the funding formula on behalf of Surrey (and hopefully other forces in the region) which will feed into the Government's review.	The work by Oxford Economics has now concluded and has been sent to the Home Office. We await confirmation of the start of the HO review of the funding formula, although it has been indicated that this will not take place until the next parliament.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Seek opportunities to lobby on key issues with partners, e.g. local authority leaders. 	The DPCC will continue to seek opportunities with partners and has also forged links with private and voluntary sector organisations where appropriate.	The Deputy PCC continues to seek to reduce duplication of funding and effort in the voluntary and community sector.
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attend meetings of the Association of Police & Crime Commissioners. 	The DPCC has attended a number of APCC meetings, including specific briefings on issues such as mental health	This work continues.

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Assistant Police & Crime Commissioner (Equality and Diversity) Shiraz Mirza - Objectives for 2014/15 and Progress as at September 2014

Background

The Assistant PCC (Equality & Diversity) was appointed to help the PCC reach out to communities who have historically been 'harder to reach' and to help the PCC build a network of stakeholders from minority groups. It is important that the PCC is able to undertake his role as a bridge between the police and the public of Surrey and the Assistant PCC is instrumental in achieving this aim. Some of the Assistant PCC's objectives are hard to quantify. While it may be difficult to measure tangible outcomes, the value of the Assistant PCC's role lies in breaking down barriers with minority groups and providing a voice for those who would not normally engage with the police or wider criminal justice system.

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
Support the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) in delivering the priorities set out in the Police & Crime Plan for Surrey, with a particular focus on issues affecting minority groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Attendance at Independent Advisory Group meetings (IAG). The IAG promotes community confidence, acting as a 'critical friend' to the Force in relation to major or critical incidents and in relation to the development of policing policy and strategy Meetings with staff groups Taking a political lead on the enforcement project with partners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> At the last IAG meeting a presentation was received on the work being done by Surrey Police and partners on LAGLOs (Lesbian and Gay Liaison Officers) and MACLOs (Muslim and Culture Liaison Officers). The ACC has met with Unison and Fed since the last PCP meeting. At these meetings the disciplinary process, staff survey results and the latest performance figures by the Force. The enforcement project went fully live in mid-June. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> MACLOs are a fresh approach to dealing with racial tension within Surrey. Surrey is piloting this scheme and early IAG involvement is crucial to ensuring the Muslim community don't feel victimised. Concern that police cuts are affecting police morale. Reassurance was given that the PCCs Office is supportive and working to minimise the impact of the cuts on officers and lobby government for a more balanced redistribution of the council tax precept. The project has already begun and is going well.

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
Champion the interests of minority and hard to reach groups in Surrey, ensuring that they receive an excellent service from Surrey Police and other criminal justice partners	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enable and facilitate meetings between Surrey Police and BME groups. • Ensure the PCC reaches and engages with BME groups. • Champions good practice. • Challenges the force on its recording and detection of hate crime. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shiraz has met with Sussex Officers to advise on the Sussex Mosque Engagement Plan. • Met with the Race & Equalities Council and provided information on how crime was recorded in Surrey. • Has attended a session at the Contact Centre to hear how incoming calls are recorded. • Has held numerous meetings regarding Honour Based Violence and FGM. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • This will lead to ensure better community engagement. • Improved understanding within the community on how the Force record hate crimes. • This will provide better understanding when challenging the Chief Constable. • Instrumental in the PCCs Office receiving training on this. Proposal to roll wider.
Help ensure the PCC's business and policies reflect his statutory duty for equality and diversity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Liaise with neighbouring forces and share best practice. • Challenges the force on its advertisement and recruitment of BME groups. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Shiraz attended a joint Surrey/Sussex meeting to look at LG&BT Allies Network promoting LG&BT issues within each Force. • A paper was received at the last meeting. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • As Surrey and Sussex police collaborate further, it is important that they share best working practices. • The Chief Constable provided reassurance that recruitment and retention was improving.
Represent the PCC at meetings and events and encourage minority groups to play an active role in consultation and engagement activity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meets with numerous minority groups, including gypsy and traveller groups, and has heard their views, concerns and complaints, and given reassurance to work with the Force to address them. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Has met with a number of community representatives to hear their concerns and liaise accordingly with Surrey Police. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improved community relations (on going).
Monitor Surrey Police's performance in respect of equality and diversity issues	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receives quarterly Stop & Search figures and has an open invitation to feed in to the Surrey Police's StopWatch group (which monitors stop and search activity) as required. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stop and Search forms now include grid references so S&S can be mapped to show if they relate to crime areas. This is an area that will help identify inequality. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information on Stop and Search, including rights and how to complain, is now available on the Surrey Police and PCC websites. Moreover, the IAG members provide independent public

	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Meets with and challenges the IPCC on its findings.	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Plans in place to introduce triggers for individuals who are stopped repeatedly in the same place/time (a shift worker at Gatwick, for instance).	scrutiny on these issues. Work is underway to prepare a public document detailing the number of stop and searches conducted.
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Assistant Police & Crime Commissioner (Victims) Jane Anderson - Objectives for 2014/15 and Progress as at September 2014

Background – New Responsibilities for PCCs in relation to Victims

Care of victims and ensuring that they are at the centre of the Criminal Justice System is a key priority for the Police & Crime Commissioner. The Panel should note that, with effect from October 2014, all PCCs will be responsible for commissioning certain services for victims of crime. This is currently centrally funded and organised by the Ministry of Justice and most services are provided by Victim Support. In future, funding will come to PCCs and it will be their responsibility to ensure that victims of crime are provided with the services they need in their local areas.

Much of the Assistant PCC's work in recent months has been helping the Office of the PCC prepare to take on its new responsibilities and to ensure that the victims' needs are at the heart of any new services that will be provided. An update on the work the OPCC has undertaken to prepare for these new commissioning responsibilities has been provided as a separate item.

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
<p>Support the Police and Crime Commissioner in delivering his promise to <i>'put victims at the centre of the criminal justice system'</i> and to ensure that <i>'victims will be given a quality service from reporting a crime to giving evidence'</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Following victims' journeys through the criminal justice system and feeding this information back to the PCC and other key stakeholders • Attendance at the Surrey Police Victims Board 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A/PCC has spent time with the Contact Centre, with response teams, with neighbourhood officers and with CID talking and listening to victims • Report written and circulated to CJ partners following consultation with victims of domestic abuse • Report written and circulated to CJ partners following consultation with young victims of domestic abuse • Consultation currently underway with victims of sexual assault • Programme of visits to domestic abuse refuges currently underway • Extended visits to court, to CIAG and to Housing Association to track the handling of 2 ASB cases • Specific issues and problems raised with relevant partners – e.g. delays to trials, failure to disclose documents on time, problems with transport for witnesses, layout of courts 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reports used to inform the PCC's strategy for commissioning services for victims • Specific cases raised with senior police officers • Presentation on domestic abuse findings to Surrey Police leadership conference improved awareness and handling • Information regularly fed into the Victims Care Board held by Surrey Police to inform their dealings with victims of crime. • Both Safer Neighbourhood teams and Housing Association aware of PCC's emphasis on putting victims first • Gave presentation to ESDAS AGM on importance of tackling DA.

Objective	Key actions	Progress as at September 2014	Outcomes
Operate as a member of the Criminal Justice Group in order to ensure that the needs of victims and witnesses are represented in key decision making	Attend meetings of the Local Criminal Justice Group	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Contributed to the review of the Local Criminal Justice Board arrangements in Surrey and Sussex • Ongoing comments and feedback to chairs and strand leaders for the structures currently being established to replace the local Criminal Justice Group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A/PCC ensures the OPCC is sighted on the new Criminal Justice partnership structures and helps identify relevant issues for the D/PCC who attends • A/PCC continues to build relationships with CJS partners so there is a forum for raising victim issues
Champion victims' interests with the judiciary	Forging links with the courts and judiciary in Surrey	Attendance at Surrey Local Criminal Justice Group where these groups are represented	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Feedback from court visits have been fed back to the LCJG for action • Presentation to senior CJP staff on victims' experiences at court – well received by HMCTS, CPS and Youth Services. • Providing written report to Guildford judges on victims' experiences at court, to be followed by meeting.
Ensure that victims are able to benefit from Restorative Justice and contribute to the RJ strategy for Surrey	Help shape an appropriate Restorative Justice strategy for Surrey	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Jane sits on the 'out of court disposals panel' which provides scrutiny of those cases which are dealt with by means such as 'community resolution' • She also sits on the restorative Justice steering group 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A/PCC's attendance at steering group ensures that we have proper oversight of this area of work • Attendance at scrutiny panel ensures victims' perspective represented
Advise the PCC on future commissioning of victim	Offer advice and experience from the victims perspective to inform the	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Office of the PCC has arranged workshops with victims of domestic 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surrey strategy for commissioning will be soundly based and reflect

services and advise on funding provisions required for supporting victims	PCC's strategy	abuse, attended by the Assistant PCC and DA outreach providers, as well as victims <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Surrey is leading for the region on commissioning of victims services. Jane scrutinises and comments on the relevant proposals underpinning the tendering process	the reality of victims' experiences <ul style="list-style-type: none">• A/PCC scrutiny of proposals supports the work of officers• The OPCC has successfully bid for a £450k grant from the MoJ, for partner agencies to spend on helping victims of DA and sexual assault.
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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

QUARTERLY POLICE AND CRIME PLAN PROGRESS UPDATE

09 September 2014

SUMMARY

The Police and Crime Panel for Surrey scrutinises the work of the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Surrey, Kevin Hurley. The PCC published the Police and Crime Plan in March 2013 and issued some additional actions in March 2014. This report provides the first quarterly update for 2014/15, from April 2014 to June 2014, on how the PCC is progressing against the plan.

The attached document provides a detailed update against the plan. In addition, significant areas of work carried out by the Office of the PCC since the last report to the panel include:

- On 17 June, the Reigate & Banstead Joint Enforcement Team was launched, providing a more visible and robust response to anti-social behaviour in the Borough. This new team comprises of staff from Reigate & Banstead Borough Council, such as Borough Community Officers, Environmental Health Officers, Civil Enforcement Officers and Planning Enforcement Officers, who work collaboratively with Police officers from Reigate & Banstead Safer Neighbourhood Team to deal more effectively with anti-social behaviour.
- On 8 July the Commissioner began a public consultation into new methods of dealing with offending. The consultation gives residents an opportunity to tell the Commissioner what they think should happen to people who have committed low-level crimes or anti-social behaviour in their area. The outcome of the consultation will feed into a Community Remedy document which will give victims a greater say in the way their reports of crime and anti-social behaviour are dealt with. The Community Remedy document is a list of actions which would be appropriate for an offender or someone who has engaged in anti-social behaviour to undertake as an alternative to the court process. Victims will see justice more quickly, and offenders will face immediate and meaningful consequences. The consultation had over 800 responses from the community and results are being considered.
- Victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence in Surrey are to benefit from £450,000 of additional funding for support services in the county. This follows a number of successful applications from Police and Crime

Commissioner to the Ministry of Justice, which has been running a competitive process for PCCs around the country to bid for additional funding for victims services in their areas. The OPCC is continuing with the wider work to commission victims support services and an update report is due to be considered by the Police and Crime Panel at its September meeting.

- Between April and June the PCC received seventeen applications for Community Safety Funding. Thirteen of these applications have been recommended for approval, totalling £108,001.
- Dates and venues for all Crime Summits in 2014/15 have now been agreed.
- On 19 June, a public interest report into the termination of the SIREN ICT project was issued by Grant Thornton. The report considered whether the decision taken by the Police and Crime Commissioner, Kevin Hurley, to terminate the project was reasonable, and reviewed the SIREN project from its inception to termination. As this was published as a public interest report, the OPCC was required to hold a public meeting in conjunction with Surrey Police to allow residents and interested parties to ask questions. This meeting took place on Friday 27th June 2014 at 7pm at the HG Wells Conference and Events Centre in Woking.

As Members will be aware, the PCC has not set targets for Surrey Police as he believes that this has the potential to skew activity in an unhelpful way. Surrey Police do, however, continue to monitor their own performance against a number of indicators to help assess whether they are progressing against relevant parts of the Police & Crime Plan. A copy of the latest Surrey Police performance scorecard is attached. It should be noted that this information is for Members' information and it is for the PCC, rather than the Panel, to scrutinise Surrey Police on its performance against the policing elements of the Plan.

The quarterly update and the performance report have been published on the PCC's website: www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk

RECOMMENDATIONS

That members of the Police and Crime Panel note the report.

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Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Surrey – Progress Against Police and Crime Plan Actions – Quarter to end June 2014

Action	Agency	Progress
Take a Zero Tolerance Policing Approach		
Ensure that Surrey Police and partner agencies focus on tackling anti-social behaviour, violence and those who break into homes or steal our property	PCC	On 17 June, the Reigate & Banstead Joint Enforcement Team was launched, providing a more visible and robust response to anti-social behaviour. This new team comprises of staff from Reigate & Banstead Borough Council, such as Borough Community Officers, Environmental Health Officers, Civil Enforcement Officers and Planning Enforcement Officers, who work collaboratively with Police officers from Reigate & Banstead Safer Neighbourhood Team to deal more effectively with anti-social behaviour. Work to roll the pilots out into other areas is ongoing.
Make sure there is a focus on catching criminals and detecting crime	PCC	The PCC continues to hold regular management meetings with the Force at which detection rates are regularly reviewed.
Make sure that Surrey Police is robustly tackling serious crime and organised criminal gangs operating in the county. We will take away their profits from crime	PCC/ Surrey Police	<p>Examples of operations carried out to tackle organised criminal groups (OCGs) are given to the PCC at his management meeting and published online in the meeting papers. As at the end of Q1 14/15, the Force has dismantled 3 OCGs.</p> <p>The Force also updates the PCC on details of assets that have been seized from criminals at the same meeting and again the details are published online. The total POCA seizures to end of May 14 are £298,668.78.</p> <p>The OPCC is working closely with Sussex OPCC and the Force to implement the requirements of the Government’s Serious Organised Crime Strategy.</p>

Ensure that Surrey Police arrests more people who deal drugs on our streets and to our young people and children, in particular in schools and colleges of further education	PCC	As part of the aforementioned Management Meetings the Commissioner receives updates on actions being taken on tackling drugs. The PCC has also recently set up Scrutiny Panels, to look at specific aspects of performance in greater depth. Tackling drugs in schools and colleges was the first in-depth scrutiny topic and the PCC heard in more detail about initiatives and research being carried out.
Review the community safety funding and grants available to partners who tackle local issues to make sure value for money is achieved	PCC	For 2014/15, £627,370 has been allocated to provide financial support to local groups working to deliver projects that meet the People's Priorities. A review of funding provided in 2013/14 has been completed, and the process for 2014/15 improved accordingly.
Work with Surrey Police and partners to reduce deaths, injuries and damage on the roads that are caused by selfish, reckless and anti-social drivers and riders	PCC/ Surrey Police	This is reported on through the bi-monthly PCC management meeting process; activity is shown in the 'People's Priorities' reports. Surrey Police took part in the annual summer drink driving campaign and highlights of this were tweeted regularly by the Roads Policing Unit.
How a robust ethos of zero tolerance is being delivered in Surrey, whilst ensuring standards are maintained and policing is carried out in a reasonable way	Surrey Police	The Force's zero-tolerance policing approach is included in the reporting process for each management meeting, and numerous examples have been evidenced to the PCC and published. The Force has adopted 'Zero Tolerance Policing' as the overarching title of the Force strategy, and wide communication has been carried out internally to reinforce this message and ethos – it is mentioned regularly on the Chief Constable's blog. Maintenance of standards is also evidenced at management meetings.

How Surrey Police is working to reduce crimes of burglary, robbery and violence	Surrey Police	<p>The Force has provided detail as on performance and activity for this through the bi-monthly management meeting process, papers from which are published online. For the end of Q1 14/15:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robbery increased by 0.8% compared to Q1 13/14 • Burglary decreased by 14.8% compared to Q1 13/14 • Violence with injury has increased by 59.2% compared to Q1 13/14 and work is being driven through the Deputy Chief Constable's (DCC) Crime Performance Board (CPB) to tackle the increase. It should be noted that this increase is partly due to the increased reporting of domestic abuse and this is encouraged by the Force. Further details are provided through the management meeting reports.
What Surrey Police is doing to encourage reporting of underreported crimes such as domestic violence, homophobic, racist or other hate crime and sexual offences	Surrey Police	<p>The Force has provided details on activity for this through the bi-monthly management meeting process, papers from which are published online. As an a example the Force introduced Domestic Violence Protection Notices/Orders during the FIFA World Cup. Reports of serious sexual offences and domestic violence for Q1 14/15 are significantly higher than for the same quarter last year.</p>
The improvements being made in solving burglary, robbery, violence and sexual offences	Surrey Police	<p>The Force has provided details on performance and activity for this through the bi-monthly management meetings, papers from which are published online. Performance for Q1 14/15 is as follows:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The burglary detection rate is 20.8% (this is up 10% points from last year) • The robbery detection rate is 34.5% (up from 25.5% last year) • The violence with injury detection rate is 38.5% (down from 41% last year, but up on the end of the previous financial year - 37.5%) • The serious sexual offences detection rate is 16.5% (down from 49.5% last year, but this should be seen in the light of a 119.5% increase in the number of reported offences as compared with Q1 13/14) <p>The Force is continually striving to improve detection rates and is driving this work through the CPB. Updates are reported through the management meetings.</p>

The operations carried out and achievements made in targeting those who deal drugs to young people in schools and colleges of further education	Surrey Police	The Force has provided details on performance and activity for this through the bi-monthly management meetings, papers from which are published online. Work is being carried out with schools and other partners in educating about the dangers of drugs and in providing a hostile environment for drugs-based criminality to occur. A number of examples of good work have been provided.
Joint actions with a wide range of partners to reduce anti-social behaviour and crime in all forms – whether it be working together to reduce town centre violence, business crime, rural and wildlife crime or any other loutish activity	Community Safety Partners	Between April and June the PCC received seventeen applications for Community Safety Funding. Thirteen of these applications have been recommended for approval, totalling £108,001 towards activities and projects that will reduce anti-social behaviour and crime. As detailed previously, the Reigate & Banstead Joint Enforcement Team has been launched and the OPCC is currently working with partners to roll the pilots out on a wider basis.
The support and mechanisms in place to stop people abusing drugs	Community Safety Partners	The Office of the PCC is working with the Surrey Substance misuse group on a new strategy for Surrey for the prevention of alcohol and substance misuse.
Actions to tackle alcohol misuse and alcohol fuelled violence and anti-social behaviour	Community Safety Partners	As above.
Conviction rates at court for people who commit serious crime and drug dealers	Community Safety Partners	The Office of the PCC is working with agencies in the Criminal Justice system to ensure that the victim is put at the heart of the system, including consideration of conviction rates.
More Visible Street Policing		
Continue with my campaign for fairer funding of policing for Surrey tax payers. You pay the highest level of council tax for policing in the country	PCC	As previously reported, independent research commissioned by the OPCC from Oxford Economics was completed and forwarded to the Home Office for their consideration. However, the Government has indicated that it will not review the situation in this parliament.

Ensure Surrey Police and Criminal Justice partners take money and possessions away from criminals and direct this money into visible policing	PCC	The PCC reviews Surrey Police seizure of assets in his management meeting with the Chief Constable. Over £300,000 of assets have been seized this financial year to date.
Lead on collaboration with neighbouring forces to share as many police functions as possible and, in the future, consider amalgamation	PCC	The PCC's of Surrey and Sussex continue to work closely with the Chief Constables of those forces to jointly deliver services wherever possible to make savings and protect front-line policing. The PCC is also involved in discussions between Surrey and Sussex Police to develop a Target Operating Model (TOM) that will allow both forces to work together more effectively.
Develop protocols between neighbouring police forces so that the nearest unit can respond to calls for help regardless of county borders	PCC	Surrey and Sussex are now delivering nearest unit response for major crime and firearms.
The plans for Surrey Police in terms of back office savings and collaboration with neighbouring forces and local authorities.	Surrey Police	The Specialist Crime and Operations commands are operating successfully across Surrey and Sussex. A programme of work has been established to develop and progress Support Services collaboration opportunities with Sussex. Surrey and Sussex Police are continuing to explore collaborative opportunities with our Fire and Rescue partners and South East Coast Ambulance Service. This programme has been being awarded funding support from the Police Innovation Fund. The force has received good feedback from HMIC following the Valuing the Police 4 inspection.
The reviews that Surrey Police is undertaking to make sure that they are as efficient as they can be and what the outcomes of these are in terms of savings	Surrey Police	A number of reviews continue across the force. These are reported on formally through the management meeting process, including associated savings and potential savings.
The number and powers of PCSOs (Police Community Support Officers) and how they are used to support this plan	Surrey Police	The Force Chief Officer Group reviewed the PCSO powers in September 2011 which resulted in 2 additional discretionary powers being included. The full list of Surrey Police PCSO powers is shown in appendix A of the September 'People's Priorities' document. There are 162 established PCSO posts and their good work in delivering the plan is described in the management meeting documents.

How Surrey Police is making best use of the Special Constabulary and other volunteer groups	Surrey Police	There were 172 officers in the Special Constabulary at the end of May 14, all of whom are operational. 71% of Special Constables in Surrey have their independent patrol status and can thus carry out patrols unaccompanied by another officer. This is the highest percentage regionally. The Force is currently looking at ways to increase the number of Special Constables and is due to report back to the PCC on this in September.
Put Victims at the Centre of the Criminal Justice System		
Work with the Criminal Justice System to ensure victims get proper support, whether they are dealing with Surrey Police, courts, probation, judges or voluntary support organisations	PCC	The PCC has published a link to the new Victims' Code on his website: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/2013/12/code-of-practice-on-victims-of-crime/
Monitor how Surrey Police and Criminal Justice partners improve their support for victims of crime and anti-social behaviour	PCC	The PCC recently requested a paper from Surrey Police on how they were implementing the new Victims' Code. This paper can be viewed at: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/04_New-Victim-Code-final.pdf The Assistant Commissioner for Victims has overseen implementation of the new Victims' code and represents the OPCC on the Victims Code Working Group.
Review the community safety funding and grants given to partners who support victims to ensure value for money is achieved	PCC	The OPCC is currently reviewing grants given to support victims as part of a wider project on victims' commissioning. Victims of domestic abuse and sexual violence in Surrey are also due to benefit from £450,000 of additional funding for support services in the county. This follows a number of successful applications from Police and Crime Commissioner to the Ministry of Justice, which has been running a competitive process for PCCs around the country to bid for additional funding for victims services in their areas.

Ensure that we look after those people most vulnerable in our society	PCC	At the January Management meeting where the PCC scrutinises Surrey Police performance the PCC requested and received a paper from Surrey Police on what they are doing to protect vulnerable people. This paper can be viewed at: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Protecting-vulnerable-people-final1.pdf
Work with partners to ensure that those with mental health issues receive appropriate care and protection	PCC	The above paper also included the protection of people with mental health issues.
Monitor Surrey Police performance in answering the phone when you call, whether in an emergency or not, and how they respond to calls for help, getting the call centre and response officers to focus on what the victim needs.	PCC	This is monitored regularly in the management meetings the PCC holds with the Chief Constable. These meetings are webcast and the performance report can be read at: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/02_Update-on-Delivering-the-Peoples-Priorities-v0.6.pdf
How satisfied victims of crime are with the services that Surrey Police provides and what Surrey Police is doing to improve how victims are treated	Surrey Police	The Force strives to provide excellent victim care. Activity and performance is described in the published documents for the management meeting. At the end of Q1 14/15 victim satisfaction was 87.7%, which whilst a decrease of 0.4% points over the same period last financial year, is an increase from the end of year position of 86%. The new Victims Code was implemented in December and the Force reported to the PCC specifically on this in January.
How Surrey Police is treating victims of anti-social behaviour and how it is improving treatment and actions taken	Surrey Police	As reported through the management meetings, Surrey Police seeks to provide excellent care to victims of anti-social behaviour (ASB); performance is strong, being 78.1% at the end of Q1 14/15.
Help ensure that the Criminal Justice system, including courts, witness protection and the judiciary put victims at the heart of everything they do	Criminal Justice Partners	The PCC has meet with CJS partners to discuss performance and improvements that can be made.

Review the funding given to victim support organisations to ensure value for money is achieved and a good quality of support is provided	Criminal Justice Partners	The OPCC is currently reviewing funding provided to victim support organisations as part of the wider project on commissioning of victims' services.
Help ensure that there is support for vulnerable people, such as the young, the elderly, those with mental health issues and troubled families	Criminal Justice Partners	The PCC has provided funding to support vulnerable people including domestic violence support funding, funding for the support of victims of sexual offences. He has also been active in commenting the treatment of people with mental health issues.
Give You the Opportunity to have a Greater Say in how Your Streets are Policed		
Make sure that Surrey Police provides opportunities for everyone to engage about their issues at a neighbourhood level	PCC	The OPCC has asked Surrey Police to make sure that all local areas have engagement opportunities. Local policing boards have been put in place by Surrey Police alongside Facebook boards and local surgeries.
Hold an annual Police and Crime Summit, together with the Council Leader and Chief Executive, in each Borough and District where people can come and take part in discussions about police and community safety issues	PCC	Dates and venues for all Crime Summits in 2014/15 have now been agreed and have been shared with PCP Members.
Ask local councillors, community safety officers and Surrey Police to formalise current engagement arrangements to ensure that there is a regular Local Policing Board that the public can attend in each Borough and District in Surrey	PCC	Local Policing Boards are now in place across Surrey – see the link below.
Publicise the dates and venues for the Summits and Local Policing Board meetings	PCC	The Summits are all publicised on the PCCs website, twitter account and through PCC and partner contact databases. The Local Policing Boards are publicised locally and on the Surrey Police website: www.surrey.police.uk
Give people the opportunity to contact or meet with me or my staff about specific issues, including through surgeries, correspondence or through my web-site	PCC	The PCC continues to engage with residents through face-to-face meetings, Crime Summits, letters and e-mail. As detailed previously, the PCC has also recently invited comments through a public consultation on the Community Remedy Document.

Work with the media to ensure I am visible and available to the public and can make their interests heard	PCC	The PCC continues to be active in local and national media.
Ensure everyone has the opportunity to engage by having a wide range of means of contact and engagement	PCC	In addition to the Policing Boards and Summits, the PCC, his Deputy and Assistants attend a large number of community meetings. The Office of the PCC also responds to e-mails and letters from residents and consults via the PCCs website.
Use social media and other emerging communications channels to engage with young people and those who do not wish to engage via other means	PCC	The Office of the PCC remains active on twitter and has established accounts on YouTube, Facebook and Flickr.
Operate and lobby at a national level on behalf of the Surrey public on issues such as adequate funding for Surrey Police and victim care	PCC	The PCC has been active nationally in raising issues of police funding, training, police officer morale and is on the national working group for victim's commissioning.
Work with the Police & Crime Panel to make best use of its knowledge and expertise on local level issues	PCC	The PCC attends all Police and Crime Panel meetings. The PCC also engages with the Panel on areas of specific interest, such as rural crime and the development of precept proposals.
Making sure that everyone in Surrey is able to engage with the police, councils and other partners about the issues that affect them. I will ensure that existing joint engagement arrangements are formalised, with regular Local Policing Boards in each borough and district	Surrey Police/ Community Safety Partners	Progress has been reported through the management meetings and related documents; each borough and district has set up policing boards which are now advertised on the Surrey Police web-site. These continue to be based on the criteria requested by the PCC, recognising the need for a diversity of approach based on the area; innovative approaches have been used, e.g. Facebook sessions attracting over 1000 participants. Likewise the Force contributes to the PCC's local policing summits. The key issues from each panel are sent direct to the OPCC for information.

Ensuring that issues are picked up and action is taken by the appropriate agency and that themes and learning are identified and acted upon together through joint problem solving.	Surrey Police/ Community Safety Partners	Issues and action plans have been identified through the local policing summits, as collated through the PCC's office. The local policing boards have raised local issues, of a similar theme to panel meetings (e.g. speeding, parking and ASB), and resolution of these many issues forms part of daily business for the relevant Neighbourhood teams. The teams work regularly with partners, including through Joint Action Groups and Community Incident Action Groups. Examples of partnership-working have been included in reports for the management meetings.
Protect your local policing		
Review the police station disposals policy in Surrey to ensure best value is achieved from the Surrey Police estate and any sales of property	PCC	This review has now concluded and the results can be read at the following link: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/2013/10/surrey-police-and-crime-commissioner-concludes-estates-review/
Seek a national role to provide a voice for Surrey on boards and organisations that set police pay and conditions, particularly given proposals to reduce starting pay for police officers, who already struggle financially to live in Surrey	PCC	Kevin Hurley continues to be an active and vocal member on the national PNB (Police Negotiating Board) which deals with police pay and conditions.
Ensure that Surrey Police gets adequate support from national bodies, such as the National Crime Agency, National Fraud Investigation (led by the City of London Police) and Counter Terrorism Units, as well as making sure Surrey Police is doing its part in national policing requirements	PCC	The PCC and staff have attended national seminars and training on national bodies. The PCC is part of the regional crime oversight board. Management meeting papers are received which update on Surrey Police's input into national policing requirements.
Seek to reduce the bureaucratic burden on policing by tackling policies which inhibit us unnecessarily	PCC	The PCC aims to reduce bureaucracy wherever possible and aims not to put additional burdens on Surrey Police including getting rid of targets.

Ensure that the media has a balanced picture of policing activity in Surrey: we will be transparent	PCC	The PCC and his office are active in getting articles in local and national media including newspaper, radio and twitter to get a balanced picture of policing.
Take every opportunity to raise issues affecting Surrey such as budget cuts and police pay and conditions with MPs, councillors, partners, Government and national boards to make sure that they are all able to support your aims	PCC	The PCC continues to speak to MPS and government about funding for Surrey Police and about police pay and conditions.
Use my position as an elected person with the largest mandate in Surrey to give a balanced view of policing and protect those officers who put themselves in personally frightening or emotionally challenging situations every day and support them in tackling the people who blight the lives of the Surrey public	PCC	The PCC is active about speaking up for police officers in media and social media.
Work with the Chief Constable during 2013 to set out a staff and asset transfer scheme, as required by the Home Office, that best meets your 6 priorities	PCC	This has been completed.
Oppose plans for direct entry into the police service at Superintendent rank.	PCC	The PCC has nationally opposed direct entry and taken every opportunity to raise this as an issue with government and press.
What Surrey Police is doing with regard to pay and conditions for officers and staff following Government announcements on pay	Surrey Police	The Force continues to work closely with the Police Federation and UNISON. Full details about the various aspects are included in the PCC management meeting documents.
What the latest staff survey results are saying and how staff are viewing leadership	Surrey Police	Staff survey data is published separately. Wave 17 of the Survey which ran Apr - May had a 44% response rate and the health score remained consistent with the previous wave, with the leadership section showing a slight increase. Going forward the Surrey and Sussex Senior Leadership Team have agreed to develop a joint survey as part of the Policing Together programme.

Ensuring previous skills and training are utilised when officers transfer from other forces	Surrey Police	The Force continues to recognise national qualifications and ensures bureaucracy is minimised when quality assuring 'local' skills from elsewhere. This has been described through the management meeting structure.
I will be Uncompromising in the Standards you Expect from Your Police		
Go out and about within Surrey Police to see what is happening 'on the ground', to listen to the public and victims and feed my observations back into the Chief Constable	PCC	The Assistant PCC for Victims, Jane Anderson, continues her work to meet victims and feed back to Surrey Police. That has included recent qualitative research with victims of domestic violence.
Continue to ensure we have an effective Independent Custody Visiting Scheme, whereby trained people from local communities go into custody to check on the welfare and treatment of those being held in custody	PCC	The Independent Custody Visiting Scheme continues to run well. The PCC is running a "thank you" event for volunteers on 30 October 2014, to recognise their commitment and dedication to the scheme.
Work with the Independent Advisory Group (IAG) and to hear views from minority groups about what they expect from policing	PCC	The PCC, his Assistant PCC for equalities and support offices continue to meet regularly with the IAG and other groups to understand the views from diverse communities in Surrey.
Ensure that Surrey Police has the highest standards through monitoring customer service and complaints	PCC	The PCC's office regularly monitors complaints trends and in the last quarter have carried out dip-sampling of complaints files.
Consider where I can introduce mystery shoppers to provide a check on standards of Surrey Police care for victims and customers	PCC	Complete – considered and not felt to be practical.
Lead by example and give visible leadership for Surrey Police and expect those in leadership roles to do the same	PCC	The PCC, Deputy PCC and Assistant PCCs continue to meet with Surrey Police leaders and show leadership to staff.
Monitor Surrey Police performance in investigating crime to make sure that the best results are achieved	PCC	The PCC monitors Surrey Police performance in investigating crime in the management meetings, the attached report provides more details: http://www.surrey-pcc.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/02_Update-on-Delivering-the-Peoples-Priorities-v0.6.pdf

How the Chief Constable and her senior staff are ensuring high standards, ethics and integrity - from dress codes and standards of appearance through to the service staff are delivering to the public	Surrey Police	Professionalism is important, with work being driven through the People Strategy Board, the Strategic Crime and Incident Recording Group, and the Professionalism and Integrity Board for the Code of Ethics. Good work is reported on through the management meetings.
How many complaints have been received, what the themes of these are and whether complaints are being well managed within required timescales	Surrey Police	Overall details and numbers of complaints are published in the management meeting documents, which are published on-line. For Q1 14/15, we recorded 146 complaints, which is 20% down on the previous quarter. Allegations are also down by 10.5% to 334 on Q4 13/14. The two highest categories are 'Other Neglect or Failure in Duty' and 'Incivility, Impoliteness and Intolerance'. Surrey Police makes a recording decision within 10 days of receiving a complaint and aims to resolve complaints as soon as practicable, comparing favourably against other similar Forces.
Examples of letters of satisfaction received and the issues to which they relate	Surrey Police	Examples of such letters are published in the management meeting documents. Numerous themes are included such as thanks for locating missing family members, support to motorists involved in collisions, and thanks from victims of crime following the successful prosecution of the offender.
How staff are being managed to ensure high standards and good service delivery, including vacancy rates, sickness rates and staff survey results	Surrey Police	This is a wide area; related performance and activity within the Force is included in the management meeting documents. As an example, sickness levels are positive; the percentage of working hours lost due to police officer sickness over the rolling 12 months to end of May 14 remained low at 2.7%. The Force figure equates to an average of 7.1 days per employee
Holding the Chief Constable to Account		
Webcast management meetings holding the Chief Constable to account	PCC	Management meetings are webcast whenever technology allows and can be viewed on the PCCs website.

Finance and Resources		
Surrey Police budget and spend	Surrey Police	This is a detailed area which is specifically covered through reports to the PCC from the Force, in the monthly management meeting process. The recent Valuing the Police report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary concluded it was confident that Surrey Police is on track to achieve its required savings over the spending review period.
PCC budget and spend	PCC	This is a detailed area which is specifically covered through reports to the PCC from the Force, in the bi-monthly management meeting process. The Force is in a position to meet the budget gap for FY 2014/15 through the proposed increase in precept.
Crime and Disorder Reduction Funding		
Allocated funding	PCC	Grant funding is all published on the PCC's website.

Surrey PCC Public Priorities Scorecard

Performance at the end of June 2014

Zero tolerance					
Crime Reduction					
	FYtD Jun 2014	FYtD Jun 2013	Change	FYtD %age Change	EOY 2013/2014
Robbery	58	55	3	5.5%	251
Domestic burglary	662	777	-115	-14.8%	3151
Vehicle crime (excluding interference)	856	1105	-249	-22.5%	4060
Violence with injury	1135	713	422	59.2%	3494
Serious sexual	200	91	109	119.8%	543
TNO	12236	13159	-923	-7.0%	48486

Outcome of Detection and Resolution rate					
	FYtD Jun 2014	FYtD Jun 2013	%point Change	FYtD %age Change	EOY 2013/2014
Robbery	34.5%	25.5%	+9.0%	35.4%	23.9%
Domestic burglary	20.8%	10.8%	+10.0%	92.5%	11.5%
Vehicle crime (excluding interference)	10.0%	8.1%	+1.9%	23.3%	7.2%
Violence with injury	38.5%	41.0%	-2.5%	-6.1%	37.5%
Serious sexual	16.5%	49.5%	-33.0%	-66.7%	30.0%
TNO	27.7%	28.4%	-0.7%	-2.5%	26.9%

Charges / cautions for the Supply or Production of Class A & B Drugs					
	FYtD Jun 2014	FYtD Jun 2013	Change	FYtD %age Change	EOY 2013/2014
Class A and B	49	66	-17	-25.8%	448
Class A	31	25	6	24.0%	219
Class B	18	41	-23	-56.1%	229

Confidence (CSEW)					
	Rolling Year Dec 2013	Rolling Year Dec 2012	%point Change	Rolling Year %age Change	EOY 2011/2012
Police/ councils deal with local ASB and crime issues	70.7%	69.7%	+1.0%	1.4%	69.7%
Confidence in Surrey police	84.0%	84.1%	-0.1%	-0.1%	84.1%

Visible policing					
	FYtD May 2014	FYtD May 2013	Change	FYtD %age Change	EOY 2012/2013
Assets recovered from criminals	£298,669	£161,356	£137,313	85.1%	£3.127m

Victims					
	FYtD May 2014	FYtD May 2013	%point Change	Rolling Year %age Change	EOY 2012/2013
Overall crime victim satisfaction	87.7%	83.6%	4.1%	4.9%	86.0%
ASB victim satisfaction	78.1%	80.0%	-1.8%	-2.3%	80.3%

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

PROTOCOL BETWEEN THE POLICE AND CRIME PANEL AND THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER FOR SURREY

09 September 2014

SUMMARY

At its meeting on 13 December 2012 the Surrey Police and Crime Panel (PCP) agreed the Protocol between it and the Police and Crime Commissioner, a document intended to guide the relationship between the two bodies.

At the time it was agreed that the Protocol would be revisited after 12 months of operation and, following consultation with Panel Members and the Commissioner's Office, this report is recommending some minor changes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. To agree the recommended changes to the Protocol, as set out in Appendix 1 and summarised in Section 2 of this report.

1.0 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

- 1.1 The purpose of the Protocol is to guide the relationship between the PCP and the PCC.
- 1.2 Much of the Protocol's content is based on the principles set out in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act and accompanying regulations. As these have remained unchanged, the formal processes and responsibilities set out in the Protocol remain factually accurate and, as a whole, the document remains fit for purpose.
- 1.3 However, given the formal commitment to review the document, there is nevertheless an opportunity to make some small modifications to provide greater clarity around specific points.

2.0 RECOMMENDED CHANGES

- 2.1 All recommended changes are clearly highlighted in the full Protocol, attached as Appendix 1. In summary, the changes are:
 - Numbered paragraphs and minor wording changes to make the document more accessible.
 - Minor wording and grammatical changes to reflect the fact that both Panel and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner are now fully operational.
 - Recognition that the PCP may, on occasion, commission discrete pieces of work outside of committee to explore specific areas of concern.
 - An understanding that the PCC will inform the PCP when he creates new posts within the Office of the PCC. This is in recognition that some key posts, such as Assistant Commissioners, are not dealt with under the existing legislation despite there being a clear public interest in PCP involvement.
 - Recognition of the arrangements in place for meeting ahead of the precept notification to allow the PCP and PCC to have a constructive dialogue.
 - An understanding that the PCP will be briefed on situations where the PCC is not the formal decision maker but is actively involved in discussions with the Force concerning a significant operational decision.

3.0 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

3.1 The Panel is asked to agree the changes as set out in Appendix 1 and summarised in Section 2 of this report.

4.0 REASONS FOR RECOMMENDATIONS

4.1 To ensure that the Protocol remains up-to-date.

5.0 WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

5.1 Once agreed, the updated Protocol will be signed by both the Chairman of the PCP and the Police and Crime Commissioner.

LEAD OFFICER: Victoria White, Scrutiny Officer, Surrey County Council

TELEPHONE NUMBER: 020 8213 2583

E-MAIL: victoria.white@surreycc.gov.uk

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Appendix 1: Protocol between the Police and Crime Panel and the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey

This protocol concerns the relationship between the Police and Crime Panel (PCP) and the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC).

Given the common aims of both the Commissioner and the Panel to ensure effectiveness of measures aimed at reducing crime and disorder and enhancing public safety, it is vital that they:

- (i) work in a climate of mutual respect and courtesy **in all communications;**
- (ii) have a shared understanding of their respective roles, responsibilities and priorities;
- (iii) promote and foster an open relationship where issues of common interest and concern are shared in a constructive and mutually supportive way;
- (iv) share work programmes, information or data they have obtained to avoid the unnecessary duplication of effort;
- (v) do not disclose any information that is given to them in confidence without proper authority;
- (vi) provide challenge in an open and transparent way.

Whilst recognising the common aims and the need for closer working, it is important to remember that the Office of the PCC and the PCP are independent bodies and have autonomy over their work programmes, methods of working and any views or conclusions they may reach. This protocol will not preclude either body from working with any other local, regional or national organisation to deliver their aims.

~~The Police and Crime Commissioner and the Police and Crime Panel are creatures of statute only recently established. Clearly they will need time to establish themselves and their modus operandi. The proposals now outlined below will need to be revisited in 12 months' time to assess how these are working and to consider whether the scope now identified is appropriate.~~

Comment [D1]: Historical information no longer needed.

.....
**Chairman of the
Police and Crime Panel**

.....
**Police and Crime
Commissioner**

Date

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1. Role of the Police and Crime Commissioner

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1) Directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) and Police and Crime Panels (PCPs) were introduced by the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011. The role of the PCC is to be the voice of the people and to hold the Chief Constable to account.

2) The PCC is responsible for setting priorities for the police force within their area, having regard to needs and demands of communities and ensuring that local and national priorities are suitably funded by setting a budget and for the local performance of the force. He or she will do this by ~~inter alia~~ among other things:

1. ~~representing~~Representing all those who live and work in the communities in Surrey and identifying their policing needs.
2. Setting priorities that meet those needs by agreeing a force level strategy plan for Surrey Police (the ~~police~~Police and ~~crime~~Crime planPlan).
3. Holding the Chief Constable to account for achieving these priorities as efficiently and effectively as possible, ensuring that value for money is achieved.
4. Agreeing the Surrey Police budget and setting the precept.
5. Hiring the Chief Constable and, if necessary, calling upon the Chief Constable to retire or resign.
6. Having regard to reports and recommendations made by the Surrey Police and Crime Panel.

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2. Role of the Police and Crime Panel

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3) The Surrey Police and Crime Panel ~~will be~~ responsible for supporting and challenging the PCC in the exercise of his or her functions, including by publicly scrutinising the actions and decisions of the PCC and in doing so will, ~~inter alia~~ among other things:

- a) Review and make a report or recommendation on the draft Police and Crime Plan.
- b) Hold public meetings to consider the annual report from the Commissioner.
- c) Review and scrutinise decisions, or other action taken, by the Commissioner in connection with the discharge of his functions, including confirmation hearings for senior staff.
- d) Publish all reports and recommendations the Panel makes and send copies to the constituent local authorities.
- e) Receive and record complaints made against the Commissioner and Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner, if appointed, and investigate and promote informal resolution for complaints not of a criminal nature. Complaints of a criminal nature will be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission.

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f) ~~6.~~ When the need arises, in consultation with the PCC, undertake work outside of committee to explore and investigate specific areas of concern, with the intention of informing the Police and Crime Commissioner's future work.

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Comment [D2]: To recognise the importance of pro-active scrutiny that can be achieved via Task Groups and non-Committee based work.

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3. Working Arrangements

4) The detailed working arrangements outlined in the next part of this protocol relate to the 'Special Functions' of the Panel, the general role of the Panel to scrutinise the activities of the PCC and its role to investigate complaints against him/her.

5) The 'Special Functions' of the Panel, which may not be delegated are:-

- a) Review the Police and Crime Plan (Section 28(3) of the Act);
- b) Review the Annual Report (Section 28(4) of the Act);
- c) Review the Precept (Schedule 5 of the Act)
- d) Review Senior Appointments (Paragraphs 10 and 11 Schedule 1 of the Act);
- e) Review the Appointment of the Chief Constable (Part 1 of Schedule 8 of the Act);

6) The proposed timescales for responding to proposals put forward are aimed at ensuring that matters are dealt with promptly. With the agreement of the PCC and Chairman of the PCP these timescales may be amended having regard to particular circumstances.

7) The expectation shall be that the Chief Executive Officer of the PCC should inform the Panel Secretariat, at the earliest opportunity, of indicative timescales of matters likely to be referred to the Panel to enable meetings to be scheduled accordingly.

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4. Police and Crime Plan

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8) The PCC is required to produce a Police and Crime Plan, following consultation.

The PCP is a statutory consultee in relation to the Police and Crime Plan.

[Note: There is an expectation that there will be informal discussions involving the PCC, the PCP and other relevant bodies in the formulation of the key priorities to be reflected in the Plan.]

Process

9) The PCC shall ensure that the Panel is provided with a copy of the Police and Crime Plan or variation thereto at the earliest opportunity.

The PCC shall provide the Panel with details of any public consultation on the Plan or consultation with other partners that has informed the priorities within the Plan.

10) The Panel shall convene a meeting within 15 working days to consider and comment on the Plan.

The PCC shall attend the meeting of the Panel to present the Plan and answer questions.

11) The Panel, having considered the matter at a meeting, may make a report or recommendation to the PCC. Such report should normally be prepared and submitted to the PCC no later than five working days following the meeting.

Where such report suggests amendments to the Plan, the PCC shall be required to consider such recommendation and advise the Panel of his/her decision. Where the PCC decides not to accept the recommendation of the Panel he/she shall provide reasons to the Panel.

Monitoring and Review of Plan

12) Recognising the Police and Crime Plan will need to be a 'living document' and responsive to changing demands and the environment, there is an expectation that there shall be regular reviews of the Plan. Where this results in variations to the Plan, the consultation process outlined above shall be followed.

~~[Note:13]~~ The review of the Plan may be triggered as a consequence of the PCC's Annual Report, which will need to outline the exercise of his/her functions during the financial year and progress in meeting the objectives in the Plan.}

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Monitoring of Performance of the Commissioner

14) As the Police and Crime Plan will be the key document by which the performance of the PCC is to be measured there will be an expectation that the Panel will be provided with regular reports on the performance of the PCC against the objectives of the Plan. Such reports would normally be quarterly, in line with best practice.

Where Performance Monitoring reports identify areas of underperformance, the PCC shall provide an explanation together with any proposals he/she intends to take to rectify the position.

5. Annual Report

15) The PCC is required to publish an Annual Report on the exercise of his/her functions during the financial year and progress in meeting the objectives set out in the Police and Crime Plan.

The Panel is required by statute to review the Annual Report.

Process

16) By July, the PCC shall provide the Panel with a copy of his/her annual report.

The Panel will be required to convene a meeting as soon as practicable thereafter and, in any event, no later than 15 working days of receipt of the report.

The PCC shall be required to attend the Panel meeting to present the report and answer questions.

17) The Panel may accept the Annual Report and/or make a report or make recommendations. Reports/recommendations from the Panel should normally be prepared and submitted to the PCC no later than five working days following the meeting.

18) The PCC shall consider any report or recommendation and advise the Panel of his/her decision. Where the report or recommendations are not accepted by the PCC, he/she shall provide reasons.

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6. Precept

[Note: There is an expectation that there will be informal discussions involving the PCC, the PCP and other relevant bodies in the development of any proposed precept.]

19) The PCC shall notify the Panel of the precept he/she is proposing to levy for the coming financial year, at the latest by 1 February of the relevant financial year. *[Note the latest this must be received by the PCP is 1 February of the relevant financial year.]*

In the interests of cooperative working, informal meetings will be held between the PCP (including its Finance Sub-Group), the PCC and officers, in the months leading up to the precept notification.

20) The proposed precept level shall be accompanied by relevant budget papers (the Medium Term Financial Plan, Budget Requirement and Precept Analysis) setting out how the precept was arrived at, the level of revenue to be generated and how such revenue is to be applied.

21) The Panel shall convene a meeting as soon as practicable and no later than 15 working days following receipt of the notification of the proposed precept, bearing in mind, that the Panel must have considered it before 8 February of the relevant financial year.

22) The Panel, having considered the proposed precept, together with any supporting documentation, may:

- a) agree the precept without qualification or comment;
- b) support the precept and make comments or recommendations concerning the application of the revenues generated;
- c) veto the proposed precept - (this will require a majority of at least two-thirds of the members of the Panel at the time)

~~and~~ Thereafter the Panel will make a report to the PCC (to include, if the veto is exercised, a statement to that effect).

23) Where the Panel supports the precept but makes comments/recommendations these should normally be prepared and submitted to the PCC by no later than five working days following the meeting. The PCC shall consider such recommendations/ comments and advise the Panel of his/her decision. Where the comments/recommendations are not accepted, the PCC shall provide reasons.

24) Where the Panel exercises its veto, it will provide a report to the PCC which will include a statement that the Panel has vetoed the proposed precept and giving reasons and indication as to whether it considered the proposed precept to be too high or too low. The PCC will consider the report and must issue a response, which will include a revised precept (which, if the Panel considered the proposed precept to

Comment [V3]: This puts the arrangement we already have in place into the Protocol.

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be too high, will be lower and, if the Panel considered the proposed precept to be too low, will be higher).

25) The Panel will review the revised precept (at the latest by 22 February of the relevant financial year) and make a report to the Commissioner, which may indicate whether or not the Panel accepts or rejects the revised precept (there is no further veto).

26) The PCC will have regard to this second report and will issue a response by 1 March of the relevant financial year. The Panel accepts that a rejection of the revised precept on its part does not prevent the Commissioner from issuing that revised precept as the precept for the financial year.

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7. Senior Officer Appointments

27) The Panel is required to review proposed new appointments by the PCC of:

- The Chief Constable
- Chief Executive
- Chief Finance Officer
- Any Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner

Senior Appointments (other than the Chief Constable)

28) The PCC shall advise the Panel of any proposed appointment, providing the following information:

- (a) The name of the candidate;
- (b) The criteria used to assess the suitability of the candidate;
- (c) How the candidate satisfies the criteria in (b) above;
- (d) A copy of the candidate's CV or equivalent documentation;
- (e) The terms and conditions of the proposed appointment.

29) The Panel shall then hold a public confirmation hearing within 3 weeks of the notification.

Candidates shall be required to attend the confirmation hearing and may be questioned by the Panel in relation to their appointment.

30) Following the hearing, the Panel will make a report/recommendation on the proposed appointment. The PCC shall consider the recommendation and report back on whether the recommendation has been accepted or not. Where the recommendation is not accepted, reasons should be provided.

Other Appointments

31) The Panel recognises that in order to run an effective office the PCC will need to employ a range of support staff and that, with the exception of Senior Appointments, there is no legislative requirement for consultation with the PCP. However, in the interest of transparency, the PCC is encouraged to inform the PCP Support Officer of their intention to create new posts.

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Comment [D4]: To acknowledge that some key posts, such as Assistant Commissioners, are not dealt with in the existing legislation.

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8. Chief Constable – Appointment and Removal

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Appointment of Chief Constable

32) In relation to the Chief Constable, following the confirmation hearing, the Panel will make a report to the Commissioner, indicating whether it:

- (a) supports the proposed appointment without any comment or recommendation;
- (b) Supports the appointment with some comment or recommendation;
- (c) Vetoes the proposed candidate for the post of Chief Constable - (*this will require a majority of at least two-thirds of the members of the Panel at the time*).

33) Where the Panel exercises its veto, the report will include a statement that it has done so and give reasons. The PCC will then propose a 'reserve candidate' for appointment as Chief Constable and the Panel will conduct a confirmation hearing for this candidate, within three weeks from the day it receives notification from the PCC.

34) Following the confirmation hearing, the Panel will make a report to the PCC, which will include a recommendation as to whether or not the reserve candidate should be appointment (there is no second veto). The PCC will have regard to the report and will notify the Panel as to whether or not he/she accepts or rejects the recommendation.

Suspension/Removal of Chief Constable

35) The process will commence with a notification from the PCC that he/she has suspended the Chief Constable.

The PCC shall notify the Panel if he/she intends to ask the Chief Constable to resign or retire, together with the reasons and a copy of the written explanation provided to the Chief Constable. The PCC shall provide the Panel with a copy of any representations he/she may have received from the Chief Constable in response.

36) Within 30 working days of receiving the notification from the PCC, the Panel must make a recommendation in writing to the PCC. Before making any recommendation, the Panel may consult with the Chief Inspector of Constabulary.

37) Before making any recommendation, the Panel shall hold a meeting, in private, at which the PCC and Chief Constable shall be entitled to attend and make representations.

38) The PCC cannot call upon the Chief Constable to resign or retire until he/she has had and considered the report of the Panel. The PCC may accept or reject the report of the Panel.

[Note: A longer timescale is proposed as the Panel will need to consult the Chief Inspector of Constabulary.]

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9. Suspension of the Police & Crime Commissioner and Appointment of an Acting Police & Crime Commissioner

39) The Panel is responsible for dealing with complaints against the PCC (see ~~later~~ section **10** of this Protocol).

Suspension of the PCC

40) The Panel may suspend the PCC if he/she is charged with an offence which carries a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding two years.

41) The PCC will inform the PCP immediately on being charged with any such offence. The Panel will be required to convene a meeting as soon as practicable thereafter, as the decision to suspend must be taken at a meeting of the Panel and voted upon. The PCC will be entitled to attend for the purpose of making representations.

42) Any suspension of the PCC shall cease if:

- The charge is dropped
- The PCC is acquitted of the offence
- The PCC is convicted but is not disqualified because of the conviction
- The Panel agrees to terminate the suspension.

43) The Panel shall therefore keep the suspension under review and will, should circumstances change, convene a further meeting to consider whether the suspension should continue.

Appointment of an Acting PCC

44) The Panel must meet to appoint an Acting PCC if:

- ~~the~~The PCC is incapacitated and cannot carry out the functions of the office;
or
- ~~the~~The PCC is suspended.

45) The Office of the PCC shall inform the Panel immediately on learning that the PCC is incapacitated. The Panel will be required to convene a meeting as soon as practicable thereafter to appoint an Acting PCC, to be drawn from the PCC's staff at the time. ~~The~~ Panel will have regard to any views submitted by the PCC.

46) The appointment of an Acting PCC shall cease:

- When a new PCC is elected as a result of a vacancy arising
- If the PCC is no longer incapacitated
- If the suspension of the PCC has been lifted.

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The Acting PCC will inform the Panel as soon as he/she learns that his/her tenure will be ending.

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10. Complaints

47) The Panel has agreed that all complaints will initially be dealt with by the Chief Executive of the PCC's Office. With the exception of when the complaint is already being dealt with through criminal proceedings, the Chief Executive will be responsible for receiving, logging and forwarding complaints to the most appropriate body.

48) Where a complaint relates to criminal conduct, the Chief Executive will refer the matter to the IPCC. Where it relates to non-criminal conduct (or the matter has been referred back by the IPCC), the complaint will be referred to the Panel for informal resolution.

49) The Panel can only consider complaints in relation to the PCC and the DPCC. For non-criminal complaints that fall outside of this remit, the Chief Executive will forward the matter on to the most appropriate body.

50) When it receives a complaint, the Panel will arrange for a meeting of its Complaints Sub-committee, normally within four weeks. The Panel will write to both the complainant and the person complained about, setting out timescales and providing details of the informal resolution procedure. The Panel will also invite both sides to submit comments in support of their case.

51) At its meeting, the Complaints Sub-committee will consider the information submitted and determine the most suitable course of action to assist with the informal resolution of the complaint.

This may include:

- Writing a letter of explanation to the complainant;
- Requesting that the PCC or one of his or her staff write a letter of explanation to the complainant;
- Suggesting a change in policy;
- Requesting that the person complained about issue an apology.

52) With the exception of inviting comments from both the complainant and the person complained about, and inviting the latter to attend its meeting to answer questions, neither the Panel nor the Complaints Sub-committee is authorised to conduct an investigation.

53) Once a decision has been made, the Complaints Sub-Committee will notify those involved usually within 5 working days of the meeting. The Panel will be provided with an update on all complaints dealt with by the Complaints Sub-committee on a quarterly basis.

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11. Holding the Police and Crime Commissioner to Account

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54) The Panel is responsible for reviewing and scrutinising decisions or actions taken by the PCC in discharging his/her responsibilities. Whilst an element of this will be undertaken through scrutiny of the Police and Crime Plan and the PCC's Annual Report, there may be other matters that the Panel may consider merit scrutiny. The OPCC will publish details of all formal decisions taken by the PCC on its website. Where the PCC is not the formal decision maker but is actively involved in discussions with the Force concerning a significant operational decision, the OPCC will ensure the PCP remains briefed.

55) The presumption shall be that the PCC will be required to attend all meetings of the Panel (the expectation is that there will be four-six Panel meetings per year) unless advised to the contrary.

56) The Panel's Support Officer shall notify the PCC of the Panel's work programme and meeting dates. In setting the work programme, the Panel should identify what information is required and if any support staff from the PCC's staff need to attend.

57) Where the PCC is required to provide information to the Panel, the Panel should aim to give 15 working days' notice of the date of the meeting and set out the nature of the agenda item and the information required. In exceptional circumstances and when there is agreement between the PCC and Chairman of the Panel, shorter notice may be given for either attendance or information.

58) Where the Panel requires the PCC to attend, it may also request the attendance of the Chief Constable to answer questions which appear to the Panel may be as necessary to enable it to carry out its functions.

59) In discharging its functions the Panel may invite persons other than those referred to above, to assist it in its deliberations.

60) Where, as a result of its deliberations, the Panel makes a report to the PCC, it will publish such report on its website and send copies to the constituent local authorities, except where the information is exempt or confidential as defined in the Local Government Act 1972 (as amended).

61) The Panel may require the PCC to consider the report and upon the Panel at its next meeting (or a particular specified meeting) to advise what action, if any, the PCC proposes to take in response. The response of the PCC shall also be published on the website.

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL**OFFICE OF THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
MONTH 4 2014/15 FINANCIAL REPORT****09 September 2014****SUMMARY:**

This report is to inform the Police & Crime Panel of the OPCC's financial performance at Month 4 for the 2014/15 financial year. This report compares the expenditure and income incurred and received by the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner, against the financial budget approved by the PCC in January 2014, as at Month 4 for the financial year 2014/15.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Police & Crime Panel is invited to note and comment on the financial performance of the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner for Surrey as at Month4 for the Financial Year 2014/15.

EQUALITIES & DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS:

None arising.

Lead Officer: Ian Perkin, Treasurer & Chief Finance Officer

Telephone Number: 01483 630 200

E-mail: Perkin11584@surrey.pnn.police.uk

1. Introduction

- 1.1. Since I reported to the Panel at its February meeting, my original budget of £2,455,485 has been increased by £82.7k to £2,538,222. This increase is accounted for by a transfer of funding from the Chief Constable (£38k) to allow me to strengthen my Communications Staffing and the balance of the increase relates to higher employer pension contributions that had not been notified at the time I set my budget.

In terms of budgetary performance up to the end of July (Month 4), I am pleased to report that spending is well within budget and I am confident that I will be able to manage the resources of the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner within budget throughout the year.

2. Individual Significant Budget Variances

The detail of spending against individual budgets is shown at Appendix A to this report. As you can see, there are no particular areas of concern flagged up by this report, although it should be noted that the Victim Support budget as expected shows very little expenditure at Month 4. This position is not expected to remain and as the financial year progresses and the new Victim Support arrangements come into place from October, the level of expenditure is expected to increase significantly.

	F/Y Budget	Actual Spend to date	% Spend against Budget
Police & Crime Commissioner			
Salary	70,700	23,333	33%
NI - Actual	7,510	2,472	33%
Superann	12,514	4,130	33%
Conferences	2,530	0	0%
Mobile Telephones	300	0	0%
Travel & Subsistance	7,310	784	11%
Training Expenditure - Local	1,500	0	0%
	102,364	30,720	30%
Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner			
Salary	55,550	18,333	33%
NI - Actual	5,420	1,784	33%
Superann	9,832	3,245	33%
Conferences	2,530	56	2%
Mobile Telephones	300	0	0%
Travel & Subsistance	5,580	536	10%
Training Expenditure - Local	1,500	0	0%
	80,712	23,955	30%
Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners			
Allowance	20,384	8,207	40%
Consultants	30,000	34,298	114%
Conferences	1,000	0	0%
Mobile Telephones	200	0	0%
Travel & Subsistance	2,630	175	7%
Training Expenditure - Local	3,000	0	0%
	57,214	42,680	75%
Staff			
Salary	584,500	176,997	30%
NI - Actual	46,080	16,006	35%
Superann	98,113	30,303	31%
Conferences	6,600	1,702	26%
Travel & Subsistance	14,250	3,102	22%
Members Attendance Allow.	4,000	0	0%
Training Expenditure - Local	6,570	0	0%
	760,113	228,111	30%
PCC Roles			
Communications	98,599	7,387	7%
Consultation	58,300	793	1%
Community Safety Fund	677,370	195,225	29%
Independent Custody Visitor Centre	10,170	655	6%
Revenue Contributions to Capital Exp	150	0	0%
Consultants	22,400	507	2%
ACPO Recruitment	15,300	0	0%
Hire of Rooms & Halls	6,630	-414	-6%
Legal Fees	51,000	8,283	16%
	939,919	212,436	23%
Memberships			
Association of Police & Crime Commissioners	25,000	27,334	109%
Other Memberships/Subscriptions	7,500	7,073	94%
	32,500	34,407	106%
Office Running Costs			
Rents	27,540	9,180	33%
Rates	4,700	1,568	33%
Gas	1,050	352	34%
Electricity	1,130	376	33%
Water & Sewerage Services	200	68	34%
Property Maintenance	4,290	1,432	33%
Premises Cleaning & Materials	1,730	576	33%
Corporate Advertising	7,000	0	0%
Adaptations/Improvements & Redecorations	3,060	1,788	58%
Furniture, Equipment & Repair	3,550	574	16%
Photocopying	4,130	0	0%
Mobile Telephones	1,630	0	0%
Postages	1,500	452	30%
Printing	3,060	431	14%
Stationery	2,000	206	10%
Books, Maps & Reading Material	1,020	50	5%
Police Staff Advertising	12,240	0	0%
Catering	2,020	287	14%
Computer Equipment, Software & Consumables	5,040	322	6%
	86,890	17,660	20%
Audit Costs			
Internal Audit	50,000	11,003	22%
External Audit	55,000	36,165	66%
Independent Audit Committee	5,510	1,435	26%
	110,510	48,602	44%
Victim Support	368,000	594	0%
	368,000	594	0%
Grants			
Home Office - Victim Support Grant	0	-197,600	0%
	0	-197,600	0%
Total	2,538,222	441,565	17%

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PCC Actual spend YTD

Month Jul-14

A53	AU -PCC for Surrey	ST/VIC - Victim Services	ST/SPA-Secretariat	ST/CLK-Chief Executive	ST/ADS-PCC	ST/STS-Treasurer	ST/SPO-Deputy PCC	Assistant Police and Crime Commissioners	PCC Grants and Commissioning	AD/ICV - Independent Custody Visitors	AD/COM-Communications	AD/MEM-Audit Committee	AD/CNS-Consultation	Total Spend YTD	YTD Budget	FY Budget	
		022	024	025	026	027	028	029	831	832	833	834	835				
13101	13101	Civilian Employees	0.00	102,526.40	54,520.84	23,333.32	13,963.16	6,413.54	0.00	0.00	0.00	833.32	0.00	219,923.90	242,444.00	727,345.00	
13207	13207	Civilian Overtime	0.00	0.00	817.30	0.00	4,989.96	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	5,807.26	1,000.00	3,000.00	
13701	13701	NI - Actual	0.00	8,017.43	6,113.59	2,472.25	1,874.97	641.58	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	20,903.52	20,778.00	62,337.00	
13801	13801	Superann - Civilian Workers	0.00	16,948.50	10,000.12	4,129.96	3,354.70	1,152.07	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	38,830.31	42,908.00	128,740.00	
13901	13901	Angel - Internal Temp Staff	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	6,000.00	17,000.00	
16013	16013	Health Care Schemes	0.00	(183.52)	(803.77)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(987.29)	0.00	0.00	
16014	16014	Car Hire Cash Alternative	0.00	1,166.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,166.68	3,396.00	10,190.00	
17004	17004	Training Expenditure - Local	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	601.75	0.00	601.75	3,150.00	15,610.00	
17200	17200	Police Staff Advertising	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	3,060.00	12,240.00	
17201	17201	Police Officer Advertising	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	15,300.00	
21000	21000	Day To Day Property Maintenance	0.00	1,068.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,068.00	1,068.00	3,200.00	
21004	21004	Adaptations/Improvements & Redecorations	0.00	1,788.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,788.00	1,020.00	3,060.00	
21101	21101	Contract Annual Service Contracts	0.00	192.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	192.00	192.00	570.00	
21102	21102	Contract Planned Maintenance	0.00	172.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	172.00	172.00	520.00	
21400	21400	Gas	0.00	352.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	352.00	352.00	1,050.00	
21401	21401	Electricity	0.00	376.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	376.00	376.00	1,130.00	
21500	21500	Water & Sewerage Services	0.00	68.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	68.00	68.00	200.00	
21700	21700	Rents	0.00	9,180.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	9,180.00	9,180.00	27,540.00	
21702	21702	Rates	0.00	1,568.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,568.00	1,568.00	4,700.00	
21803	21803	Premises Cleaning & Materials	0.00	576.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	576.00	576.00	1,730.00	
31000	31000	Furniture & Equipment & Repair	0.00	573.99	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	573.99	1,384.00	4,060.00	
31009	31009	Books, Maps & Reading Material	0.00	49.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	49.50	340.00	1,020.00	
31015	31015	Photocopier Rental	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	125.00	500.00	
31102	31102	Catering Subsidy/Management Fee	0.00	172.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	172.00	172.00	520.00	
31105	31105	Catering Services	0.00	114.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	114.50	500.00	1,500.00	
31300	31300	Stationery	0.00	205.51	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	205.51	664.00	2,000.00	
31302	31302	Publicity Marketing & Info	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	7,386.50	0.00	0.00	7,386.50	15,300.00	45,900.00	
31303	31303	Publicity A/C Publications	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	274.63	274.63	13,600.00	40,800.00	
31305	31305	Printing	0.00	430.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	430.98	5,252.00	15,750.00	
31307	31307	Photocopying Charges	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	906.00	3,630.00	
31400	31400	Conferences	0.00	1,702.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	56.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,758.40	4,237.00	13,680.00	
31403	31403	Consultants	0.00	507.40	0.00	0.00	0.00	34,298.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	34,805.50	16,100.00	54,400.00	
31406	31406	Exhibitions And Shows	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	518.29	518.29	3,825.00	15,300.00	
31425	31425	Legal Expenses	1,410.00	4,255.15	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,618.10	0.00	0.00	0.00	8,283.25	17,000.00	51,000.00	
31436	31436	Audit Fees	0.00	36,164.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	36,164.50	18,332.00	55,000.00	
31437	31437	Audit SLA	0.00	11,002.75	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	11,002.75	16,664.00	50,000.00	
31445	31445	Hire Of Rooms & Halls	(414.18)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(414.18)	3,442.00	10,870.00	
31507	31507	Mobile Telephones	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	812.00	2,430.00	
31509	31509	Postages	0.00	451.92	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	451.92	500.00	1,500.00	
31511	31511	Computer Consumables	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	55.00	55.00	
31512	31512	Computer - Equip. Purchases	0.00	86.60	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	86.60	680.00	2,145.00	
31513	31513	Computer Software	0.00	234.98	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	234.98	1,000.00	3,000.00	
31600	31600	Members Attendance Allow.	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,664.00	8,000.00	
31603	31603	Subsistence	0.00	307.25	0.00	9.02	0.00	0.00	(212.54)	655.25	0.00	0.00	0.00	758.98	3,264.00	9,790.00	
31700	31700	Subscriptions	0.00	34,407.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	34,407.20	25,000.00	32,500.00	
31701	31701	Contributions	0.00	65,325.20	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	129,900.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	195,225.20	115,000.00	677,370.00	
31702	31702	Victim Services	0.00	594.30	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	594.30	80,000.00	368,000.00	
31801	31801	Corporate Advertising	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,332.00	7,000.00	
41000	41000	Rail, Flight, Bus, Taxi, Car Parking	0.00	917.47	170.10	301.00	84.60	12.50	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1,485.67	4,928.00	14,790.00	
41104	41104	Allowance - Lease Car Rate	0.00	(28.20)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(28.20)	0.00	0.00	
41200	41200	Allowance - Force Rate	0.00	1,132.35	354.66	474.14	166.60	523.74	174.70	45.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	2,871.19	3,096.00	9,300.00	
41201	41201	Passenger Mileage	0.00	(2.58)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	(2.58)	254.00	800.00	
52105	52105	Revenue Financing Of Capital Expenditure	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	150.00	
Team Total			(196,604.18)	302,420.26	71,172.84	30,719.69	24,433.99	23,954.62	42,679.99	132,350.56	655.25	7,386.50	1,435.07	792.92	441,397.51	694,738.00	2,538,222.00

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

SURREY POLICE GROUP FINANCIAL REPORT FOR MONTH 3 FINANCIAL YEAR 2014/15

09 September 2014

SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to inform the Police & Crime Panel of the Surrey Police Group (i.e. PCC and Chief Constable finances) financial position up to Month 3 for the 2014/15 financial year.

This report compares the expenditure and income incurred by both Surrey Police and the Office of the Surrey Police & Crime Commissioner, against the financial plan approved by the PCC in January 2014 up to Month 3 for the financial year 2014/15, together with other relevant financial information.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Police & Crime Panel is invited to note and comment on the Surrey Police Group Financial Report for Month 3 2014/15.

EQUALITIES & DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS:

None arising.

Lead Officer: Ian Perkin, Treasurer & Chief Finance Officer

Telephone Number: 01483 630 200

E-mail: Perkin11584@surrey.pnn.police.uk

1. Introduction

- 1.1. The revenue out-turn position at the end of Month 3 is an under spend of £1.8m against a predicted three month budget of £53.3m. The revenue budget for the year is £207.2m, a reduction of £406k compared to the 2013/14 revenue budget.
- 1.2. The net capital budget for the year has been set at £10.2m, which includes a £2.2m carry forward from 2013/14. Expenditure to date of £1.7m remains well within budget.

2. Individual Significant Revenue Budget Variances

- 2.1. Detailed at Appendix A is a table that provides the Force and PCC budget, split by function, as per the new Force structure that was implemented on the 1st October 2013, together with other relevant financial information.
- 2.2. East Division: Currently showing an over spend of £244k at month 3, which is caused by CID currently having about 16 PC's above the budgeted establishment. A review of CID proposed an establishment of 65 posts, but the existing budget is only for 45 posts. The over spend is expected to continue throughout the year.
- 2.3. West Division: Currently underspent by £313k as a result of the Safer Neighbourhood teams being under established. The under spend is expected to continue to the year end.
- 2.4. Specialist Crime: has a high level of underspend of £836k, which has largely been caused as a result of the collaborative re-structure that has been undertaken in conjunction with Sussex Police which has resulted in a large number of vacancies in both police officers and police staff. Changes are also taking place in terms of Surrey's manpower contribution to the South East Regional Organised Crime Unit, which will require realignment of budgets to match the new arrangements. The under spending is forecast to continue during the rest of this year.
- 2.5. Operations: Overspent by £118k. Although currently overspent the collaborative re-structure currently being undertaken with Sussex, which has a number of business cases currently being developed, is expected to lead to savings and this unit is expected to be under spent by the year end.
- 2.6. Contact & Deployment: Overspent by £171k, but changes being made as a result of the Contact Review are expected to result in an under spent position by the year-end.
- 2.7. PSD: Overspent by £210k at the end of month 3 as a result of their being over established by 5.3 police officer posts. Police staff pay is underspent as current

vacancy levels are at about 10% of establishment, but expenditure on legal costs is over budget as a result of a number of legal claims being made against the Force. This level of overspend is forecast to continue throughout the year.

- 2.8. Force Improvement: Currently underspent by £847k, this budget is forecast to move into an overspend position as the year progresses to reflect additional police officer spend arising from bringing forward the Neighbourhoods review from October to June. In addition, there will be additional unbudgeted expenditure resulting from the Blue Light Project as more resources are required to move this collaborative project forward. Additional costs have also been incurred in acquiring consultancy services that have worked on the Target Operating Model (TOM) and the Enterprise Resource Planning business case.
- 2.9. ICT: This budget is overspent by £704k, at month 3, with a number of vacancies being filled by external contractors. As the year progresses savings are expected to arise from the appointment of the new joint Surrey/Sussex Chief Information Officer and the year-end forecast is that this budget will be in an under spent position by the year-end.
- 2.10. Human Resources: Under spent by £571k at the end of month 3, by the year-end the budget is expected to be close to balance as spending on probationers and secondees will pick up as the year progresses.
- 2.11. Corporate/Suspense: The under spending of £471k results primarily from staff retiring or leaving and who have been changed against the central corporate budget as they have not yet been allocated to their individual departments.

3. Capital Position

- 3.1. The approved capital programme for 2014/15 is £10.2m.
- 3.2. The most significant capital projects in the programme are: ICAD upgrade (aligning the Surrey & Sussex Command & Control Systems), Niche Developments, Reigate Custody Refurbishment, ICT Infrastructure Renewal, creation of an Electronic Document and Records Management System (EDRMS), Generators for Business Continuity Protection and the Vehicle Replacement Programme.
- 3.3. Capital expenditure up to month 3 is £1.7m, with a further £2.2m being committed in terms of issued orders.
- 3.4. Funding for the 2012/14 capital programme derives from; Home Office Grants £1.4m and Capital Receipts £19.3m (£10.6m above budget).

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Surrey & Sussex

Policing Together

FINANCIAL OVERVIEW AS AT JUNE 2014

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE

BUSINESS UNIT VARIANCES

	YEAR TO DATE			YEAR		
	ACT	BUD	VAR	BUD	F/C	VAR
	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000
North Division	5,244	5,240	4	20,753	21,332	579
East Division	6,053	5,812	242	23,165	23,754	589
West Division	6,771	7,084	(313)	28,295	27,513	(782)
Specialist Crime	11,641	12,478	(836)	49,935	48,289	(1,646)
Operations	4,248	4,130	118	16,722	16,033	(689)
Contact & Deployment	3,914	3,743	171	14,966	14,861	(106)
Sub Total	37,871	38,485	(614)	153,836	151,782	(2,054)
ACPO	352	318	33	1,315	1,738	423
DCC	976	968	8	3,797	4,215	417
PSD	818	608	210	2,435	2,969	534
Diversity	48	55	(7)	220	193	(27)
Strategic Planning	41	41	(1)	166	173	6
Force Improvement	257	1,104	(847)	3,713	4,224	511
Sub Total	2,492	3,094	(601)	11,647	13,512	1,865
SBS	359	393	(33)	1,570	1,373	(197)
ICT	4,733	4,029	704	10,734	10,602	(132)
F & S	2,936	2,936	(0)	11,744	11,511	(233)
HR/Fed	2,262	2,833	(571)	11,100	11,060	(40)
Sub Total	10,290	10,191	99	35,148	34,546	(601)
Corporate/Suspense	554	1,025	(471)	4,098	3,791	(308)
PCC	228	504	(276)	2,538	2,493	(45)
Sub Total	782	1,529	(747)	6,637	6,284	(353)
Unallocated coding						
TOTAL	51,435	53,299	(1,863)	207,268	206,124	(1,144)

BALANCE SHEET

BALANCES

	31/03/14	1/05/14	VAR
	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000
Police Staff Pension Reserve	2,080	1,080	(1,000)
Insurance Reserve	2,970	3,383	413
Ill Health Reserve	1,673	1,531	(142)
Healthcare Reserve	290	290	0
OPR Reserve	0	0	0
Employee Retention Reserve	900	900	0
General Balances	11,193	12,447	1,254
TOTAL	19,106	19,631	525


CAPITAL EXPENDITURE

	£ 000
Approved 14/15 Capital Budget	7,918
Projects carried forward	2,233
Total	10,151
Spend to date	1,711
Ordered	2,186
Un committed	6,502
Revenue funded	(248)
Total	10,151


Financing	£ 000
Grant	1,460
Other funding	0
Receipts	19,247
Underspend	(3,200)
Borrowing	(7,356)
Total	10,151

MRP £'000	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15
	357	719	706	693

CASH FLOW




OVERTIME



ACCOUNTS PAYABLE

	0 - 30 days	31 - 60 days	61 - 120 days	Over 120 days	Total
Amount Due £ 000	1,315.9	(335.2)	530.3	353.0	1,864.0
% of Total Amount	70.6%	(18.0%)	28.4%	18.9%	100.0%
No of Invoices	126	51	39	262	478
% of Total Amount	26.4%	10.7%	8.2%	54.8%	100.0%

ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE



COST TYPE VARIANCES

	YEAR TO DATE			YEAR		
	ACT	BUD	VAR	BUD	F/C	VAR
	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000
Police Payroll	23,858	24,783	(925)	100,502	100,493	(9)
Police Overtime	1,140	961	179	3,843	3,969	125
Staff Payroll	16,710	17,628	(918)	69,300	65,813	(3,488)
Staff Overtime	481	277	204	1,108	1,246	138
Agency	280	77	203	306	643	337
Training	184	321	(137)	1,143	1,301	157
Other Payroll Costs	1,238	1,241	(4)	3,552	4,393	842
Sub Total	43,889	45,289	(1,400)	179,755	177,857	(1,898)
Premises	1,793	1,760	34	7,588	7,495	(93)
Transport	1,660	1,451	210	5,807	6,100	293
Supplies & Services	6,776	7,383	(607)	24,452	25,770	1,318
Financing	183	174	10	696	702	6
Sub Total	10,413	10,767	(354)	38,543	40,068	1,525
Income	(1,628)	(2,232)	604	(8,927)	(8,747)	180
Grants	(1,239)	(526)	(713)	(2,103)	(3,053)	(951)
Sub Total	(2,867)	(2,757)	(110)	(11,029)	(11,800)	(771)
TOTAL	51,435	53,299	(1,863)	207,268	206,124	(1,144)

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL**OFFICE OF THE POLICE AND CRIME COMMISSIONER
2013/14 YEAR-END FINANCIAL REPORT****09 September 2014**

13

SUMMARY:

This report informs the Police & Crime Panel of the OPCC's financial performance for the 2013/14 financial year. The report compares the expenditure and income incurred and received by the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner, against the financial budget approved by the PCC in January 2013 for the financial year 2013/14.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Police & Crime Panel is invited to note and comment on the financial performance of the Office of the Police & Crime Commissioner for Surrey for the Financial Year 2013/14.

EQUALITIES & DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS:

None arising.

Lead Officer: Ian Perkin, Treasurer & Chief Finance Officer

Telephone Number: 01483 630 200

E-mail: Perkin11584@surrey.pnn.police.uk

1. Introduction

- 1.1. I am pleased to report that careful use of the resources at the disposal of my office have led to the achievement of an under spend of £240k on a total 2013/14 budget of £1.9million. This welcome achievement was obtained despite the staff in my office having to cope with additional work load, which resulted from the transfer of new responsibilities from central government to Police & Crime Commissioners.

2. Individual Significant Budget Variances

- 2.1. Police & Crime Commissioner: Underspent by £9.1k. Despite attending a large number of external meetings I have underspent my travel and subsistence budget by £6k, as I always travel by standard class when using the train and when travelling by road I drive myself in my own vehicle and only claim the allowed mileage allowance. In addition I have not fully utilised my Conferences budget or used at all my small training budget.
- 2.2. Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner: Underspent by £5.8k. Similarly to me, the Deputy PCC achieved a budget saving against his travel and subsistence budget of £6.2k and underspent his Conferences Budget by £2k. This has more than offset the increase in salary which I approved for my deputy and which I reported to the Police & Crime Panel last year.
- 2.3. Assistant Police & Crime Commissioner: Overspent £4.3k. This overspend arises directly from my decision to increase the hours worked by the APCC (Victims), which I reported to the Panel last year.
- 2.4. Staffing Budget: Underspent £31.8k. As a result of increased productivity from my existing members of staff, the budget of £35k, for the additional temporary member of staff that I thought would be needed to help cope with some of the extra work that my office is now undertaking as the role of PCC expands proved not to be needed.
- 2.5. PCC Roles: Underspent by £158.5k. The Legal Services and ACPO recruitment budgets contributed to this underspend, as no Chief Officer recruitment took place during the year and the number of legal issues my office had to deal with in 2013/14 was below average. The biggest contribution to the over spend was derived from savings on the Communications and Consultation budgets. In the first full year of my term of office, it became clear that the significant increase in media and public interest generated by my work as PCC was not subsiding and that a bigger team would be required to support this. This larger team (1 FTE increased to 2.2 FTE posts) was not in place until June 2014, too late to make full use of the budget for 2013-14. A series of county-wide projects are now in place which will be supported by the communications budget during 2014-15.

2.6. Office Running Costs: Underspent by £34.3k. A number of additional costs were incurred during the year which was unexpected. I was given advice that a number of trees close to my office building had become unsafe and needed to be removed and this was done at a cost of £3,520. To accommodate the additional staffs that were needed to undertake the duties associated with my new Victim Support responsibilities, I decided that the most economical way of providing this accommodation, was for me to give up my own office and move to a smaller office in the building. The purchase of additional furniture, computer points etc., led to an overspend on the Furniture, Equipment and Repair budget of £8.2k, while the adaptations to modify my old office for use by several people gave rise to an overspend of £1.1k. All these overspends were more than compensated for by underspends on Advertising, Photocopying, Mobile Phones, Postages, Printing, Staff Advertising and Computer Equipment/Software budgets.

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	F/Y Budget	Actual Spend	Difference
Police & Crime Commissioner			
Salary	70,000	70,000	0
Civilian Overtime	0	0	0
NI - Actual	7,700	7,440	260
Superann - Civilian Workers	8,500	8,400	100
Conferences	2,500	504	1,996
Mobile Telephones	0	205	-205
Travel & Subsistence	9,000	3,001	5,999
Training Expenditure - Local	1,000	0	1,000
	98,700	89,551	9,149
Deputy Police & Crime Commissioner			
Salary	50,000	53,750	-3,750
Civilian Overtime	0	0	0
NI - Actual	5,500	5,204	296
Superann - Civilian Workers	6,100	6,450	-350
Conferences	2,500	0	2,500
Mobile Telephones	0	155	-155
Travel & Subsistence	8,000	1,737	6,263
Training Expenditure - Local	1,000	0	1,000
	73,100	67,296	5,804
Assistant Police and Crime Commissioner			
Allowance	15,000	17,922	-2,922
Consultants	0	0	0
Conferences	0	0	0
Mobile Telephones	0	228	-228
Travel & Subsistence	0	1,178	-1,178
Training Expenditure - Local	0	0	0
	15,000	19,328	-4,328
Staff			
Salary	370,540	406,142	-35,602
Civilian Overtime	35,000	19,941	15,059
NI - Actual	40,080	38,731	1,349
Superann - Civilian Workers	44,700	48,871	-4,171
Angel - Internal Temp Staff	35,000	0	35,000
Conferences	7,500	1,847	5,653
Mobile phone/Blackberry	0	0	0
Travel & Subsistence	19,200	8,066	11,134
Members Attendance Allow.	0	825	-825
Training Expenditure - Local	5,500	1,220	4,280
	557,520	525,643	31,877
PCC Roles			
Communications (833)	59,500	6,939	52,561
Consultation (835)	55,000	8,083	46,917
Community Safety Fund	709,000	710,244	-1,244
Independent Custody Visitors	10,000	7,698	2,302
Consultants	45,000	50,480	-5,480
ACPO Recruitment	15,000	0	15,000
Hire of Rooms & Halls	6,500	2,466	4,034
Legal Fees	50,000	5,548	44,452
	950,000	791,458	158,543
Memberships			
Association of Police & Crime Commissioners	30,000	19,750	10,250
Other Memberships/Subscriptions	3,200	7,055	-3,855
	33,200	26,805	6,395
Office Running Costs			
Rents	27,000	27,000	0
Rates	4,600	4,596	4
Gas	1,030	1,032	-2
Electricity	1,100	1,104	-4
Water & Sewerage Services	200	204	-4
Property Maintenance	4,200	7,720	-3,520
Premises Cleaning & Materials	1,700	1,704	-4
Corporate Advertising	12,000	0	12,000
Adaptations/Improvements & Redecorations	3,000	4,065	-1,065
Furniture, Equipment & Repair	3,700	11,964	-8,264
Photocopying	14,000	4,271	9,729
Mobile Telephones	3,500	757	2,743
Postages	2,000	960	1,040
Printing	3,000	367	2,633
Stationery	2,000	1,704	296
Books, Maps & Reading Material	1,000	207	793
Police Staff Advertising	12,000	0	12,000
Catering	2,000	837	1,163
Computer Equipment, Software & Consumables	9,300	4,558	4,742
	107,330	73,051	34,279
Audit Costs			
Internal Audit	42,000	46,142	-4,142
External Audit	55,000	57,810	-2,810
Independent Audit Committee	8,500	3,145	5,355
	105,500	107,097	-1,597
Victims grant	0	-420,469	420,469
Victims expenditure		28,289	-28,289
Carried forwards to 14/15		392,180	-392,180
	0	0	0
	1,940,350	1,700,229	240,121

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

SURREY POLICE GROUP FINANCIAL REPORT FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2013/14

09 September 2014

13

SUMMARY:

This report informs the Police & Crime Panel of the Surrey Police Group (i.e. PCC and Chief Constable finances) financial position for the 2013/14 financial year. The report compares the expenditure and income incurred by both Surrey Police and the Office of the Surrey Police & Crime Commissioner, against the financial plan approved by the PCC in January 2013 for the financial year 2013/14, together with other relevant financial information.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The Police & Crime Panel is invited to note and comment on the Surrey Police Group Financial Report for the Financial Year 2013/14.

EQUALITIES & DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS:

None arising.

Lead Officer: Ian Perkin, Treasurer & Chief Finance Officer

Telephone Number: 01483 630 200

E-mail: Perkin11584@surrey.pnn.police.uk

1. Introduction

- 1.1. The year-end out-turn position was a small underspend of £310k, on a gross revenue budget of £207.7m. This welcome outcome was achieved despite the gross revenue budget having been set £1.1m lower than the 2012/13 budget and despite Surrey Police having absorbed unbudgeted revenue costs, arising from the cancellation by the PCC of the (Siren), Crime, Intelligence, Case and Custody System.
- 1.2. The net capital budget for the year was set at £17.4m, which included a £6.4m carry forward from the previous year. Expenditure for the year at £13.4m remained well within budget and a substantial amount of funding has been carried forward to finance the 2014/15 capital programme.

2. Individual Significant Revenue Budget Variances

- 2.1. Detailed at Appendix A is a table that provides the Sussex Police Group budget, split by function, as per the new Force structure that was implemented on the 1st October 2013. The structure re-coding work was not completed until after the end of the financial year, so that although this section of the report provides some narrative on individual budget headings, there remained until the end of the financial year inherent mismatching of expenditures and budgets at a functional level. However, Panel members will want to note that police officer numbers and pay are not managed at a functional level but are in fact managed at whole Force level.
- 2.2. North Division, East Division and West Division: Overall these budgets were overspent by £647k. This overspending arose primarily as a result of Surrey Police having to cope with the widespread and extensive flooding that affected Surrey during the early months of the year, resulting in the need for additional overtime to be worked and additional expenditure being incurred in relation to flood related issues.
- 2.3. Operations: This budget was overspent by £558k at the year-end. The function is shared with Sussex Police and has been under the command of a Sussex Police Assistant Chief Constable since October 2013. As with other functions additional overtime was incurred in response to the flooding crisis, plus additional flood related expenditure was incurred as a result of receiving mutual aid from other police forces and from having to hire additional vehicles, catering equipment and other flood related items.
- 2.4. Specialist Crime: This function which was underspent by £996k at the year-end is shared with Sussex Police and since October 2013 has been under the command of a Surrey Police Assistant Chief Constable. The under spend is primarily due to police officer pay being underspent by £381k, police officer overtime under spending the

- budget by £46k and police staff pay being underspent by £381k. In addition the Income budget was over achieved, with additional income arising from the Immigration Service and within Criminal Justice.
- 2.5. ACPO: This budget delivered an under spend against budget of £77k at the year-end. This budget covers both the ACPO Team and Corporate Communications.
 - 2.6. PSD: The Professional Standards Department came in under budget by £140k, predominantly from vacancies in police staff.
 - 2.7. Service Quality: Delivered an under spending against budget of £219k, which arose primarily from police staff vacancies, savings on postage and equipment, plus additional income from the Data Bureau.
 - 2.8. Force Improvement: Achieved a year-end underspend against budget of £329k, due to the over achievement of budgeted savings.
 - 2.9. Contact & Deployment: Ended the year £278k above the budget. Police officer expenditure was within budget but police staff expenditure was overspent by £200k as a result of additional expenditure being incurred in the Contact Centre and the Force Control Room. Additional non-staff costs were incurred as the result of a vehicle recovery contractor ceasing to trade. An increasing problem of dealing with stray horses in the County led to additional expenditure of £23k being incurred to help manage these events.
 - 2.10. Central Neighbourhoods: The year-end position is an over spend of £197k. This department needs to be seen alongside the three divisions, as it has elements that will be discontinued in 2014/15 following the restructure and review.
 - 2.11. Shared Business Services: The budget was underspent at the year-end by £113k, due to police staff vacancies throughout the year.
 - 2.12. Finance and Services: The budget was overspent by £452k at the year-end due to the estates improvement plan being delivered earlier than expected and because of historic billing of gas and electricity that related to previous years. The Joint Transport Service (Sussex and Surrey fleet) commenced half way through the year and is operating at a lower cost than was the case in the first six months of the year. There were underspends within the Joint Insurance Service, the Finance Department and the Joint Procurement Service (Surrey & Sussex).
 - 2.13. Human Resources: HR achieved an under spend of £772k, arising from having fewer probationers and as a result of a significant saving being achieved within the Learning and Development budget following a review which generated a number of vacancies and a reduction in non-employee costs.

- 2.14. Corporate/Suspense: Overspent £423k at the year-end primarily as a result of injury benefit payments to police officers. The number of injuries and amounts paid have gone up over the last few years so it may be necessary to review the adequacy of the current budget being set to cover these cases.

3. Capital Position

- 3.1. The approved capital programme for 2013/14 of £17.4m is detailed in Appendix B.
- 3.2. The most significant capital projects were Salfords Custody Suite, Niche RMS, the current vehicle replacement programme, and the ICT infrastructure renewal. The Salfords Custody Suite opened for operational use in November 2013. The first stage of Niche went live in November 2013 with the second stage successfully implemented in February 2014.
- 3.3. Expenditure for the year was £13.4m with orders committed for a further £2.7m at the year end. The year-end programme variance of £4m was reviewed by the Capital Strategy Board, which approved, where appropriate, the carry forward of capital budget to finance on-going capital schemes.
- 3.4. Funding for the 2012/14 capital programme was derived from; Home Office Grants £1.4m and Capital Receipts £22.4m (£10.5m above budget).

4. Reserves

- 4.1. At the start of the year general reserves stood at £9.3m and specific reserves stood at £8.2m. The budget incorporated a movement of £1.5m into the general reserve. General reserves at the year-end are £11.2m, with some minor movements on the specific reserves which stand at £8.1m.

5. Accounts Receivable

- 5.1. Accounts receivable balance at the year-end was £0.7m; this includes £0.2m over 90 days old, being 23% of total debtors. 64% are under 30 days old.

6. Accounts Payable

- 6.1. Accounts payable held 396 invoices and credit notes under query at the year-end of which 210 are more than 120 days old and another 23 are over 60 days old. The total net value of outstanding invoices and credit notes is £642k, of which £554k are not due for payment. 86% of invoices have been held for less than 30 days with a further 11% held for less than 60 days.

7. Cash

- 7.1. With capital receipts significantly exceeding capital expenditure during the year the cash balance at the 31st March 2014 was £26.5m.

8. Efficiency Savings

- 8.1. The report at Appendix C sets out the year-end position with respect to the Force's Efficiency Plan which shows that achieved savings exceeded the savings target of £3.7m by £0.5m.


- 8.2. A few savings plans that were not in the budget were initiated in year, for example the Criminal Investigation Department, Custody and Human Resources Reviews, which delivered more savings than the schemes that slipped in the year and the additional cost associated with the implementation of the recent Divisional restructure.

FINANCIAL OVERVIEW AS AT MARCH 2014

INCOME AND EXPENDITURE						
BUSINESS UNIT VARIANCES						
	YEAR TO DATE			YEAR		
	ACT	BUD	VAR	BUD	F/C	VAR
	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000
North Division	22,467	22,630	164	22,630	22,467	164
East Division	22,776	22,118	(658)	22,118	22,776	(658)
West Division	30,230	30,077	(153)	30,077	30,230	(153)
Operations	16,555	15,997	(558)	15,997	16,555	(558)
Specialist Crime	48,684	49,649	966	49,649	48,684	966
Sub Total	140,711	140,471	(239)	140,471	140,711	(239)
ACPO	3,854	3,931	77	3,931	3,854	77
PSD	2,222	2,363	140	2,363	2,222	140
Strategic Planning	147	162	15	162	147	15
Diversity	201	214	13	214	201	13
Service Quality	1,950	2,169	219	2,169	1,950	219
Force Improvement	2,052	2,380	329	2,380	2,052	329
Sub Total	10,427	11,219	793	11,219	10,427	793
Contact & Deployment	14,421	14,144	(278)	14,144	14,421	(278)
Central Neighbourhoods	2,048	1,851	(197)	1,851	2,048	(197)
Sub Total	16,469	15,995	(474)	15,995	16,469	(474)
SBS	1,995	2,108	113	2,108	1,995	113
ICT	11,151	11,131	(20)	11,131	11,151	(20)
F & S	12,439	11,987	(452)	11,987	12,439	(452)
HR/Fed	9,937	10,708	772	10,708	9,937	772
Sub Total	35,522	35,934	414	35,934	35,522	414
Corporate/Suspense	2,540	2,115	(423)	2,115	2,540	(423)
PCC	1,700	1,940	240	1,940	1,700	240
Sub Total	4,240	4,055	(183)	4,055	4,240	(183)
TOTAL	207,369	207,674	310	207,674	207,369	310



BALANCE SHEET			
BALANCES			
	31/03/13	31/01/14	VAR
	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000
Police Staff Pension Reserve	2,080	2,080	0
Insurance Reserve	2,832	2,970	138
Ill Health Reserve	1,648	1,673	25
Healthcare Reserve	290	290	0
OPR Reserve	460	0	(460)
Employee Retention Reserve	900	900	0
General Balances	9,340	11,193	1,854
TOTAL	17,550	19,106	1,557

CAPITAL EXPENDITURE	
Approved 13/14 Capital Budget	£ 000 10,720
Projects carried forward	6,647
Total	17,367
Spend to date	13,431
Ordered	2,667
Un committed	1,438
Revenue funded	(169)
Total	17,367




Financing	
Grant	1,416
Other funding	0
Receipts	22,366
Underspend	4,112
Borrowing	(10,527)
Total	17,367

MRP £'000	11/12	12/13	13/14	14/15
	357	719	706	693



ACCOUNTS PAYABLE						
		0 - 30 days	31 - 60 days	61 - 120 days	Over 120 days	Total
Amount Due	£ 000	554.4	73.2	4.7	10.2	642.5
% of Total Amount		86.3%	11.4%	0.7%	1.6%	100.0%
No of Invoices		121	42	23	210	396
% of Total Amount		30.6%	10.6%	5.8%	53.0%	100.0%



COST TYPE VARIANCES						
	YEAR TO DATE			YEAR		
	ACT	BUD	VAR	BUD	F/C	VAR
	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000	£ 000
Police Payroll	98,076	98,635	558	98,635	98,076	558
Unsocial Hours	1,116	1,260	144	1,260	1,116	144
Police Overtime	4,432	3,671	(761)	3,671	4,432	(761)
Staff Payroll	68,882	70,149	1,267	70,149	68,882	1,267
Staff Overtime	1,449	1,154	(295)	1,154	1,449	(295)
Agency	1,146	349	(797)	349	1,146	(797)
Other Payroll Costs	4,683	4,154	(530)	4,154	4,683	(530)
Sub Total	179,785	179,371	(414)	179,371	179,785	(414)
Premises	8,826	7,893	(933)	7,893	8,826	(933)
Supplies & Services	25,997	25,390	(607)	25,390	25,997	(607)
Transport	4,796	4,935	139	4,935	4,796	139
Financing	767	781	14	781	767	14
Sub Total	40,386	38,999	(1,387)	38,999	40,386	(1,387)
Income	(9,884)	(8,593)	1,292	(8,593)	(9,884)	1,292
Grants	(2,923)	(2,103)	820	(2,103)	(2,923)	820
Sub Total	(12,807)	(10,695)	2,112	(10,695)	(12,807)	2,112
TOTAL	207,363	207,674	310	207,674	207,363	310



GLW105

C3 - Capital Report
Month 12 - Mar -14

		Strand	Prior Year Re-Phasing C/f	Current Year Budget 2013/14	Total 13-14 Budget	Rev Cont Sp Grants	Actual Spend YTD (Excl. capitalised) Apr-13-Mar-14	Capitalised in Year	Variance YTD	O/S Orders	Actual Spend YTD plus O/S Orders	Bal of Year Forecast Mar-14-Mar-14	Full Year Forecast	Fc to Bud Variance	% Spend	RAG
Code		ICT Infrastructure Renewal / Business Continuity														
6021	DESKTOP REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME	ACO	0	225,000	225,000	38,867	43,375	220,297	195	413	264,086	0	263,673	196	130.83	
6022	LAPTOP REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME	ACO	0	0	0	2,502	-2,463	25,767	-20,802	9,103	32,407	0	23,304	-20,802		
6023	ACCRUALS/FORCE SPEND	ACO	0	0	0	0	-7,150	6,955	194	0	-194	0	-194	194		
6024	NETWORKS/CABLING - ICAD UPGRADE	ACO	0	0	0	0	11,203	23,850	-35,052	791	35,843	0	35,052	-35,052		
6025	IP PHONES	ACO	0	0	0	0	3,271	5,111	-8,382	1,291	9,673	0	8,382	-8,382		
6026	IT PERIPHERALS - PRINTERS	ACO	0	0	0	73,399	22,157	76,042	-24,800	6,335	104,534	0	98,199	-24,800		
6027	HOMA	ACO	0	700,000	700,000	0	4,770	823,667	-128,437	710,260	1,538,697	0	828,437	-128,437	118.35	
6028	HTCU/POLIT	ACO	0	0	0	0	0	2,603	-2,603	0	2,603	0	2,603	-2,603		
6029	ICCS	ACO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
6032	PLANNED SERVER REPLACEMENT	ACO	0	310,000	310,000	0	20,668	63,363	225,969	12,213	96,244	0	84,031	225,969	27.11	
6052	HARDWARE - FIREWALLS	ACO	0	0	0	0	0	13,500	-13,500	0	13,500	0	13,500	-13,500		
6055	ICT IMPROVEMENTS	ACO	0	500,000	500,000	0	321,880	64,578	113,543	716,588	1,103,046	0	386,457	113,543	78.13	
6083	PROJECT SUPPORT COSTS	ACO	0	0	0	0	0	4,200	-4,200	0	4,200	0	4,200	-4,200		
Sub-Total			0	1,735,000	1,735,000	114,768	417,711	1,329,933	102,124	1,456,994	3,204,638	0	1,747,644	102,124	94.48	
Code		Fleet Annual Replacement Schemes														
6201	VEHICLE REPLACEMENT	JTS	553,143	1,711,815	2,264,958	28,468	1,592,754	668,883	31,789	875,738	3,137,375	0	2,261,637	31,789	98.61	
Code		Specific Capital Schemes														
6301	UNALLOCAIED - BUDGET ONLY		0	906,609	906,609	0	0	0	906,609	0	0	0	0	906,609		
6364	MOBILE DATA 2009/10	DCC	315,001	0	315,001	0	32,222	0	282,779	200	32,422	0	32,222	282,779	10.23	
6371	ENABLING NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICING BASES	DCC	0	83,741	83,741	0	48,320	0	35,421	0	48,320	0	48,320	35,421	57.70	
6377	SALFORD CUSTODY SUITE	DCC	4,559,177	0	4,559,177	0	4,522,764	0	36,413	0	4,522,764	0	4,522,764	36,413	99.20	
6378	DIGITAL AUDIO INTERVIEWING EQUIPMENT	ACC SC	425,000	0	425,000	0	23,375	0	401,625	7,791	31,166	0	23,375	401,625	5.50	
6390	OPR ESTATE RESTRUCTURE	DCC	43,719	0	43,719	0	27,956	0	15,763	6,786	34,742	0	27,956	16,763	63.94	
6395	MIDAS MOBILE FINGERPRINT ID	DCC	6,600	0	6,600	0	6,600	0	0	0	6,600	0	6,600	0	100.00	
6396	SUPPORT SERVICES IT DEVELOPMENTS	ACO	119,181	0	119,181	0	117,525	0	1,656	100	117,625	0	117,625	1,656	98.61	
6397	E-Business/Integration Technologies	DCC	57,060	0	57,060	0	164,757	0	-107,697	0	164,757	0	164,757	-107,697	288.74	
6399	Remote Access	DCC	107,988	0	107,988	0	100,000	0	7,988	0	100,000	0	100,000	7,988	92.60	
6404	Firearms Licensing Scanning	ACC Op	75,149	0	75,149	0	17,446	0	57,703	4,723	22,169	0	17,446	57,703	23.22	
6405	Police National Database	DCC	35,130	0	35,130	0	7,463	0	27,668	0	7,463	0	7,463	27,668	21.24	
6407	Internet Cafe	ACO	0	0	0	26,000	15,520	0	10,480	0	15,520	0	15,520	10,480	59.69	
6408	Niche RMS	DCC	0	4,118,528	4,118,528	0	3,909,504	0	209,024	32,403	3,941,907	0	3,909,504	209,024	94.92	
6409	Generator for Business Continuity	ACO	0	232,360	232,360	0	181,859	0	50,501	18,553	200,412	0	181,859	50,501	78.27	
6410	Reigate Custody Refurbishment	ACO	250,000	0	250,000	0	0	0	250,000	0	0	0	0	250,000	0.00	
6411	Steria Storm Command & Control System	ACC LP	0	1,054,850	1,054,850	0	0	0	1,054,850	0	0	0	0	1,054,850	0.00	July
6412	CHC Voice Recording	ACC LP	0	86,000	86,000	0	0	0	86,000	0	0	0	0	86,000	0.00	July
6413	Burpham TFU Base	ACC Op	0	78,428	78,428	0	79,693	0	-1,265	36,616	116,309	0	79,693	-1,265	101.61	Oct
6414	Information Architecture	ACO	0	350,000	350,000	0	23,750	0	326,250	101,350	125,100	0	23,750	326,250	6.79	Oct
6415	Virtual Desktop Infrastructure	ACO	0	152,525	152,525	0	0	0	152,525	0	0	0	0	152,525	0.00	Oct
6416	Apex application Migration	ACO	0	209,866	209,866	0	106,205	0	103,661	125,866	232,071	0	106,205	103,661	50.61	Oct
6418	eRecruitment	ACO	100,000	0	100,000	0	36,321	0	63,679	0	36,321	0	36,321	63,679	36.32	
Specific Capital Schemes Sub-Total			6,094,005	7,272,907	13,366,912	26,000	9,421,279	0	3,971,633	334,388	9,755,667	0	9,421,279	3,971,633		
Totals			6,647,148	10,719,722	17,366,870	169,236	11,431,744	1,998,816	4,105,546	2,667,120	16,097,680	0	13,430,559	4,105,546		

March 2014
STRATEGIC CHANGE / SAVINGS PLAN
2013/14 TO 2017/18

L & D ICT Comms Finance HR FIT

MONTH 12		2013/14 In-Year Budgeted Saving	2013/14 In-Year Revised Forecast	2013/14 In-Year Variance	2014/15 Forecast Savings	2015/16 Forecast Savings	2016/17 Forecast Savings	2017/18 Forecast Savings	5 Year Forecast	4 Year Forecast
PROJECT	View	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s	Full Year £000s
Closed Projects										
SSD Main Review	Y	0	82	82	4	0	0	0	86	4
Crime Management Review	C	0	0	0	17	32	0	0	49	49
Estate Management	Y	61	25	(36)	34	104	0	0	163	138
Corporate Communications 2011	Y	70	70	0	15	0	0	0	85	15
Senior Police Staff Leadership Review	Y	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	25	0
Health and Safety Review	Y	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	30	0
Diversity Review	C	1	0	(1)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secretariat Review	C	41	28	(13)	0	5	0	0	33	5
ICT OSR review	Y	57	57	0	55	0	0	0	112	55
Enterprise Programme - CMU	Y	9	9	0	18	21	43	0	91	82
Functional Command Savings - Vehicle Recovery	Y	(15)	(15)	0	15	0	0	0	0	15
Functional Command Savings - Offender Management	Y	16	16	0	5	0	0	0	21	5
Functional Command Savings - Switchboard	Y	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	25	0
Service Quality Review Phase 3	Y	19	(29)	(48)	0	0	0	0	(29)	0
National Collaboration Air Support	Y	200	200	0	0	0	0	0	200	0
SBSC Structural & Skills Review	Y	0	32	32	21	1	3	0	57	25
Functional Command - Force Control Room	Y	191	240	49	43	0	0	0	283	43
Joint Procurement	Y	16	47	31	21	1	0	0	69	22
Specials Review	C	0	(12)	(12)	11	0	0	0	(1)	11
Secretariat 2013	C	0	1	1	1	0	0	0	2	1
Divisional Implementation 2013	C	0	(225)	(225)	0	0	0	0	(225)	0
Salfords	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COG Initiative - CID Project 2013	Y	0	355	355	1,755	78	392	0	2,580	2,225
Closed Projects Total		746	961	215	2,015	242	438	0	3,656	2,696
Operational Performance										
COG Initiative - Resource to Demand	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COG Initiative - Productivity	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Proactive Review Cashable Savings	C	0	0	0	35	0	45	0	80	80
COG Initiative - Neighbourhood Review	C	0	0	0	1,261	1,742	0	0	3,003	3,003
Neighbourhood Reinvestment	C	0	0	0	(897)	(897)	0	0	(1,794)	(1,794)
COG Initiative - Custody	Y	0	409	409	553	0	0	14	976	567
Operational Policing Total		0	409	409	4,857	845	45	14	6,170	6,761
Partnering										
Support Services Transformation	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Emergency Services Collaboration Programme	C	0	(45)	(45)	0	0	0	0	(45)	0
Partnering Total		0	(45)	(45)	0	0	0	0	(45)	0
Police Collaboration										
Bilateral Collaboration Programme	C	0	0	0	45	0	0	0	45	45
Major Crime	C	386	0	(386)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tactical Firearms	C	132	0	(132)	0	0	0	0	0	0
Forensics Investigation	Y	487	588	101	0	0	0	0	588	0
Joint Transport Service	Y	44	(40)	(84)	149	45	6	0	160	200
Joint Insurance	-	16	16	0	14	0	0	0	30	14
Joint Procurement Contract Saves	Y	0	19	19	485	0	0	0	504	485
Mobile Data (MDT)	C	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Contact - Surrey	C	0	(72)	(72)	48	497	13	72	558	630
Police Collaboration Total		1,065	511	(554)	741	542	19	72	1,885	1,374
Continuous Improvement										
Estates Reconfiguration: Services Facilities & Co-location	-	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Estates Reconfiguration: Red	-	20	0	(20)	31	206	18	0	255	255
Estates Reconfiguration: Amber	-	386	130	(256)	349	184	(18)	18	663	533
Estates Reconfiguration: Green	-	319	545	226	15	(17)	(42)	(18)	483	(62)
ACO 10 percent non staff saves	Y	342	342	0	177	0	0	0	519	177
ACC 10 percent non staff saves	Y	317	317	0	211	0	0	0	528	211
DCC 10 percent non staff saves	Y	46	46	0	20	0	0	0	66	20
Support Services Continuous Improvement Programme	Y	115	76	(39)	1	0	0	0	77	1
Non staff costs - Overtime	Y	297	297	0	0	0	0	0	297	0
Learning and Development Review	-	0	298	298	677	0	36	0	1,011	713
HR Savings Plan (incl Occupational Health Savings)	Y	0	251	251	83	178	15	0	527	276
of which Occupational Health Contribution	C	0	0	0	90	0	0	0	90	90
Finance Savings Plan	Y	0	37	37	261	1	0	0	299	262
ICT Savings Plan	C	0	0	0	671	0	0	0	671	671
Corporate Comms Saving Plan	C	0	0	0	81	0	0	0	81	81
Non staff costs - Officer Allowances	Y	30	30	0	0	0	0	0	30	0
Continuous Improvement Total		1,872	2,369	497	2,577	552	9	0	5,507	3,138
Total Savings		3,683	4,205	522	10,190	2,181	511	86	17,173	12,968
Financial Confidence RAG Green = on plan & saving will be achieved Amber = Some movement to deadline or saving possible Red = Saving figure or timing likely to be subject to change										
Total Savings Plan		4,205			6,285	2,181	511	86	13,268	9,063
Surplus / Deficit brought forward					0	0	0	0		
Total Savings Plan including previous year's variance					6,285	2,181	511	86		
Previous Forecast	0	4,283	6,298	2,093	511	86	13,271	8,988		
Movement from previous month		(78)	(13)	88	0	0	(3)	75		
MTFP Period 11										
Savings Target MTFP	0	3,681	6,938	5,003	8,441	3,606	27,669	23,988		
Variance between Savings Target & Savings Plan		524	(653)	(2,822)	(7,930)	(3,520)	(14,401)	(14,925)		

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

REPORT ON COMMISSIONING VICTIMS' SERVICES IN SURREY

09 September 2014

SUMMARY

All Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) will take responsibility for commissioning support services for victims, some services from October 2014 and some from April 2015. The services will help victims to cope and recover from their experience of crime.

This paper updates the Police and Crime Panel on the current work of the OPCC and responds to specific queries that members have raised.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Members of the Police and Crime Panel note the report.

EQUALITIES AND DIVERSITY IMPLICATIONS

Victims' services raise a range of equality and diversity implications. The OPCC is ensuring that commissioned services respond to diversity and equality requirements and comply with the Equality Act.

LEAD OFFICER: Katie Kempen, Senior Policy Officer, OPCC

**TELEPHONE
NUMBER:** 01483 630 200

E-MAIL: Katie.kempen@surrey.pnn.police.uk

Background

All Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) will take responsibility for commissioning support services for victims, some services from October 2014 and some from April 2015. The services will help victims to cope and recover from their experience of crime. PCCs' remits will include commissioning specialist services, such as domestic abuse services, from October 2014. PCCs will also take over management of the services currently provided by Victim Support in April 2015. Some services, such as the Homicide Service and Witness Service will continue to be commissioned by the Ministry of Justice. The Police and Crime Panel received a paper in April 2014 which outlined the OPCC's approach to commissioning. This paper follows on and responds to specific questions raised by the Panel.

Current progress

Victim referral, assessment and non-specialist support services

Victim Support currently provides a national service which delivers victim referral, assessment and non-specialist support services. If you are a victim of a designated crime at present, your contact details will be passed to Victim Support. Victim Support will contact you, assess your needs and provide some support services if required. If you are a victim of certain other crimes, notably domestic abuse or sexual violence, you may receive a specialist service from smaller, local agencies.

The OPCC for Surrey will take responsibility for commissioning the services provided by Victim Support from 1 April 2015. The OPCC is collaborating with the OPCCs for Sussex and Thames Valley. It has developed a specification for services which was published and has involved an open, tender procedure under OJEU rules. The deadline for submissions has passed and the OPCCs involved are evaluating bids. The OPCCs expect to award a contract for this service at the end of October.

Specialist services

The OPCC for Surrey will take responsibility for commissioning specialist services in Surrey from October 2014 onwards. For some victims, more specialist support is needed to help them cope and recover. A local needs assessment, significant interaction by the OPCC with service providers, victims and partners as well as existing research has identified a number of early priorities which will be funded through grants. These include:

- Support for victims of domestic abuse – including specialist Outreach support and Independent Domestic Abuse Advisors.
- Support for victims of sexual assault and rape – including specialist Outreach support, including Independent Sexual Abuse Advisors.
- Support for young victims / witnesses at court.

Local charitable organisations and public sector partners have been invited to apply for grant funding to deliver specialist services. The OPCC has engaged with key service providers and partners in order to ensure that bids respond to

the needs identified. The grant application window has closed and grants will be assessed in September.

Budget

The Panel requested the budget for 2014/15 and how this will be proportioned across boroughs and districts.

The OPCC will receive £395,200 for the final two quarters of 2014/15. The Ministry of Justice has indicated that it would like the OPCC to spend at least £126,343 of this on restorative justice and at least £26,279 on domestic abuse services, although this is not formally ring-fenced.

The OPCC will not agree the allocation of grants until after the Police and Crime Panel meeting so it is not possible to give a breakdown of how the budget will be spent in this report. The grant application form asks applicants to specify which boroughs and districts will be covered and this will be used to assess bids.

Where the OPCC has engaged with providers on services to plug gaps in provision, it largely expects that these services will be available to the entire county. The services will be provided according to the number of victims that require support. For example, the OPCC anticipates that a bid to cover Independent Sexual Violence Advisors, who support victims of rape and sexual assault, will cover the entire county. The proportion of service which is provided to each borough and district will be dependent of the level of victimisation in each area. This mirrors current arrangements and has been discussed when engaging with local stakeholders.

The OPCC can provide a full breakdown of spending across boroughs and districts once bids have been assessed.

Additional funds provided by the Ministry of Justice

The Ministry of Justice allocated a £12m pot of money for PCCs to compete for additional funds in their area. Surrey received a disproportionately high amount of funding, approximately £450,000, ensuring that victims in the area receive enhanced services in 2014/15.

The Panel has asked whether this is a one-off fund and, if so, what will happen to the provision of services after this point.

The competed fund is a one-off pot of money. It has provided a much needed boost to funds. All bids for funding were assessed by the Ministry of Justice and evaluated whether services were sustainable.

The OPCC was successful in a range of bids and therefore will see a range of responses to this challenge:

Some bids were for one-off projects that would not necessarily lead to on-going funding requirements. For example, the Rape and Sexual Assault Centre put forward a successful bid to reduce counselling waiting times from six to eight months to six to eight weeks. Another bid sought to provide Refuge clients with

essentials such as towels and bedding which can provide a one-off enhancement to services if the project does not continue to attract funding. Surrey County Council put forward another bid, a development programme for young victims of domestic abuse, which enabled a pilot of the service to take place.

Other bids sought for pump priming money which would get a project up and running. For example, a project by a refuge which seeks to set a bank of volunteers to assist clients and their dependent children when living in refuge and while settling in the community after their leave refuge. Whilst the project required a paid post for 2014/15, it is anticipated that the paid post will be replaced by a volunteer at the end of the funded period.

Other bids sought to increase the current service provided. For example, domestic abuse outreach services sought to increase their service provision in response to increased need as have the Rape and Sexual Assault Referral Centre. These providers are engaging with the OPCC regarding their on-going funding requirements. It should be noted that the OPCC will receive £395,200 for the final two quarters of 2014/15. In contrast, Surrey received just £86,280 in 2013/14 for all specialist support services from the Ministry of Justice, split across domestic abuse outreach providers and the Rape and Sexual Assault Referral Centre. Furthermore, the Rape and Sexual Assault Referral Centre has received approximately £60,000 additional funding from the Ministry of Justice. It is therefore likely that the new funding arrangements will allow for increased capacity to continue.

Borough and district input

The Panel asked what input the boroughs and districts have in how the money is allocated and spent.

The OPCC has engaged with partners throughout the development of specialist services and boroughs and districts have fed into these discussions. Boroughs and districts were interviewed as part of the needs assessment for the region and they have been asked to approach local providers of support services to place bids for funding.

The OPCC also sits on the Domestic Abuse Commissioning Group which seeks to bring a range of partners together to commission domestic abuse services across the county. This group includes representation from districts and borough and is a forum for discussion and deliberation.

Effect on established organisations

The Panel asked what the impact on commissioning will be on organisations like East Surrey Domestic Abuse Services (ESDAS). The OPCC has sought to build on good practice already in place. As such, the OPCC has worked with current providers to understand their needs and how to respond to them. The fruit of this engagement is already evident by Surrey's success in the Ministry of Justice competed funds where providers, such as ESDAS, attracted additional funding.

The Ministry of Justice previously funded ESDAs (on behalf of the four domestic abuse outreach providers in Surrey) and the Rape and Sexual Assault Support

Centre. The OPCC has engaged with both providers and is developing on-going plans for service provision for them. It is expected that the providers will put forward bids for specialist funding which cover local commissioning priorities. As previously noted, the OPCC will have additional money in contrast to previous commissioning arrangements and these providers may gain additional funds from the process.

The OPCC is a member of the Domestic Abuse Commissioning Group which brings together partners, such as local authorities, who commission domestic abuse support services. The OPCC recognises that it must work in partnership to get the best services and value for money for residents. The OPCC intends to work with this group in order to ensure that residents in the county continue to receive high quality outreach services.

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SURREY POLICE AND CRIME PANEL

Project SIREN overview

09 September 2014

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SUMMARY

The purpose of this report is to provide members of the Surrey Police and Crime Panel with an overview of the SIREN IT project. The report outlines the history of the project, its termination, the findings of the audit carried out by Grant Thornton and the actions being taken by Surrey Police and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner to address the audit's recommendations.

The full Public Interest report produced by Grant Thornton has been included as **Appendix B**.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Members of the Police and Crime Panel are asked to note the report.

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1. Background

- 1.1 The SIREN (Surrey Integrated Reporting Enterprise Network) project was concerned with the design, development and implementation of a core suite of ICT products including custody, case and intelligence for Surrey Police. SIREN sought to replace Surrey Police's existing crime, intelligence and custody suite (CIS) which had been in operation since 1992 and was no longer considered fit for purpose.
- 1.2 The procurement process began in 2008 and a contract to develop the system was signed with MEMEX Technology in May 2009. However the project experienced a number of delays and setbacks and, in the summer of 2012, the recently appointed Chief Constable Lynne Owens raised her concerns with the Police Authority that SIREN was no longer the best option for the Force. However, due to the period of 'Purdah' in relation to the pending Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) elections, the Police Authority was unable to formally consider the matter prior to its disbandment.
- 1.3 On the first day of office, the Chief Constable briefed the PCC on her concerns and the PCC subsequently took action which led to the termination of the contract. The PCC also negotiated with the developer to secure release from the contractual liability to pay any further support costs, preventing further financial loss. Nonetheless, taking all known costs into account it is believed that the total cost of the project was at least £14.86m, with no benefits delivered.
- 1.4 A timeline showing key events relating to the SIREN project is attached as **Appendix A**.

2. Audit findings

- 2.1 Upon the formal termination of the SIREN IT project on 9 April 2013 the decision was referred to the Surrey Police and PCC's appointed auditors, Grant Thornton, due to the significant impact on the accounts. Grant Thornton then exercised their statutory powers to issue a report in the public interest, independent of both bodies.
- 2.2 The report, published on 19 June 2014, considered whether the decision taken by the PCC to terminate the project was reasonable and reviewed the SIREN project from its inception to termination, considering the arrangements in place in respect of project and programme governance. The full public report is attached as **Appendix B**.
- 2.3 Although the audit report acknowledged that the initial decision to replace CIS with SIREN was reasonable and that it matched the ambitions of the Force at the time, the auditors identified a number of issues that arose

during the delivery of the project that ultimately lead to its failure. The main findings were:

- The project management approach adopted was not properly understood by the Force and the methodology ultimately proved ineffective.
- There was a failure to recruit, retain and allocate appropriately skilled and experienced resource to the programme, with substantial changes in key roles.
- Scope and cost were poorly controlled.
- There was a failure to understand the controls, checks and balances needed to deliver effective governance
- Benefits of the project were overstated and never delivered
- Progress reporting was rose tinted, overly-optimistic and not always representative of actual progress made by the project – attributed by some to a cultural aversion to “giving the boss bad news”.
- Project reporting was not subject to sufficient scrutiny and there was not sufficient or significant intervention from any of the scrutiny functions in response to the long-term red-rated status held by the project.

3. Police response

3.1 The audit report put forward a number of recommendations and these are set out in **Appendix C**, including responses from both Surrey Police and the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner. These responses were also detailed at the statutory public meeting held on the 27th June 2014.

3.2 Some of the actions being taken by the Police to address the recommendations in the report include:

- A new joint procurement team with Sussex Police with better risk assessment of large contracts, consideration of break clauses in key contracts, and senior level oversight.
- Tenders which are over the European procurement threshold (OJEU level) will be evaluated with a risk register prior to further consideration.
- Improved governance of change programmes, including a new joint Head of Change working across both Surrey and Sussex.

- Improved training of all officers and staff managing change programmes.
- The Force's People Strategy Work Programme will actively promote a culture of reporting "bad news" upwards.

3.3 The OPCC will oversee the implementation of all the proposed actions and will, where relevant, look to embed the recommendations of the report in its own areas of work.

4. Additional steps taken by the PCC

4.1 At the Commissioner's request a copy of the audit report was sent to every PCC in England and Wales to help prevent similar failings being repeated elsewhere.

4.2 Whilst the audit report itself doesn't attribute the failure of SIREN to any one individual, the PCC is firmly of the view that there was nevertheless a failure of the former Chief Constable who ultimately had responsibility for the project. It is the PCC's view that the Chief Constable had a vision for an ambitious and high-risk tailored ICT system but did not ensure that the Force had the capability to deliver that system. Had the former Chief Constable still been in post, the PCC has indicated that he would be seeking to hold him to account.

4.3 In light of the above, the PCC has written to the Mayor of London, the Deputy Mayor for Policing and Crime in London and the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service, to bring his concerns to their attention.

5. Niche

5.1 On 7th June 2013, the PCC, advised by the current Chief Constable Lynne Owens, decided to procure an alternative solution to SIREN, known as Niche. Niche has subsequently been implemented in line with planned timescales and Surrey Police now have a robust crime, intelligence and custody suite in place.


5.2 This new system is "off-the-shelf" rather than bespoke and has the benefits of being the same as the systems in place in Sussex, Hampshire, Thames Valley Police and 10 other police forces. Already the benefits of shared intelligence with Sussex have been seen, with an arrest taking place on the first day of Niche being in place where a wanted burglar from Sussex had travelled into the Surrey area.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 Members of the Police and Crime Panel are asked to note the report.

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SIREN ICT Project Timeline



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Public interest report

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**Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey
Chief Constable for Surrey**

Audit 2012/13

Termination of the SIREN ICT project

The contents of this report relate only to the matters which have come to our attention, which we believe need to be reported as part of our audit process. It is not a comprehensive record of all the relevant matters, which may be subject to change, and in particular we cannot be held responsible for reporting all of the risks which may affect the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner or Office of the Chief Constable or any weaknesses in their internal controls. We do not accept any responsibility for any loss occasioned to any third party acting, or refraining from acting on the basis of the content of this report, as this report was not prepared for, nor intended for, any other purpose.

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Summary report

Introduction

1. On 28 January 2013 Grant Thornton was appointed auditor to the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey (the PCC) and the Chief Constable for Surrey (the Chief Constable), by the Audit Commission under Part II of the Audit Commission Act 1998 (the 1998 Act), to audit the accounts of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Surrey and the Chief Constable for Surrey. Section 8 of the 1998 Act requires the auditor to consider whether, in the public interest, to report on any matter coming to their notice in the course of the audit in order for it to be considered by the body concerned or brought to the attention of the public.
2. This report concerns the decision taken by the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Surrey to terminate the SIREN ICT project. The SIREN project had incurred a cost at termination of £14.86m and the decision to terminate has attracted considerable public and press interest. We are issuing this report in the Public Interest under section 8 of the 1998 Act due to the scale of the cost involved, the significance of the findings and the high level of interest shown by the public in the subject matter.
3. As the report is issued under section 8 it will be required to be dealt with in accordance with section 10 of the 1998 Act which requires our report to be considered by the PCC and the Chief Constable within one month at a public meeting.

Our responsibilities

4. External audit is an essential part of the process of accountability for public money. Appointed external auditors operate within the duties and powers given under the Audit Commission Act 1998 and the Code of Audit Practice (the Code) approved by Parliament. The Code determines the nature, level and scope of external audit work. Under the Code, the external auditor provides:
 - an independent opinion on a public body's accounts; and
 - an independent value for money conclusion as to whether a public body has put in place proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in its use of resources.
5. The Code of Audit Practice identifies that proper arrangements for securing economy efficiency and effectiveness include the following:
 - planning finances effectively to deliver strategic priorities and secure sound financial health;
 - reliable and timely financial reporting that meets the needs of internal users, stakeholders and local people;
 - commissioning and procuring quality services and supplies that are tailored to local needs and deliver sustainable outcomes and value for money;
 - promoting and demonstrating the principles and values of good governance; and
 - managing risks and maintaining a sound system of internal control.

6. We are required under Section 5 of the Audit Commission Act 1998 to satisfy ourselves that the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable have each made proper arrangements for securing economy, efficiency and effectiveness in their use of resources. We are also required by the Audit Commission's Code of Audit Practice to report any matters that prevent us being satisfied that the Police and Crime Commissioner and Chief Constable have each put in place such arrangements. Our audit for 2012/13, undertaken in accordance with the Code of Audit Practice, concluded that we had a matter to report: our findings in relation to the decision to terminate the SIREN ICT Project raised questions about the effectiveness of the arrangements for project management, governance and the production of information to inform decision making.

Context

7. Surrey Police Force (the Force) was part of Surrey Police Authority (the Authority), the predecessor organisation to the office of the PCC and the office of the Chief Constable. The Force was ambitious in its drive for improvement and understood that genuine transformative change often required innovation which, inherently, carried greater risk. This ambition was fully supported by the Authority at the time. The Force responded to the significant financial challenges brought about by the economic downturn in 2008 with transformative workforce re-engineering and estates rationalisation programmes. In its July 2013 report "Surrey police's response to the funding challenge", Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabularies (HMIC) reported that:

"The force has worked very hard to limit the impact of the cuts on its frontline workforce in a way very few other forces have been able to achieve. It has protected its crime fighting capability by driving cost reductions and savings in other areas. It is one of only four forces in England and Wales where the number of offices in frontline roles is planned to increase, and the only force in which the total number of police officers will increase over the spending review period. Crime in the county has fallen more than in most other force areas and satisfaction among victims of crime is above average for England and Wales."

8. This report is not intended to stifle innovation or properly-managed risk in the public sector. We recognise that risk is often a necessary factor in identifying and implementing transformative change programmes and innovative solutions to the challenges, financial or otherwise, facing many public sector organisations. This report should assist the PCC and Chief Constable, as the successor bodies to the Police Authority, to identify and understand the lessons that can be learned from the SIREN ICT project such that actions can be put in place to mitigate risk when undertaking similar large scale projects in the future.

Background

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9. In February 2005 the Authority made the formal decision to replace the Force's existing crime, intelligence and custody suite (CIS). By 2007, in seeking to replace CIS, the Force had developed the 'Enterprise' programme: a larger scope of work encompassing the replacement of CIS and enhancements to many other business functions. The majority of the Enterprise programme comprised the Surrey Integrated Reporting Enterprise Network (SIREN) project. SIREN was concerned with the design, development and implementation of a core suite of ICT products including custody, case and intelligence for Surrey Police Force.
 10. In February 2012, the current Chief Constable was appointed. In September 2012, following informal representations the previous month, the Chief Constable formally expressed the view that the on-going programme to replace the Criminal Intelligence System may no longer represent the best long-term option for the Force and for the public, in light of changing external and strategic factors. This view was raised with the Chief Executive, Treasurer and some Members of the former Police Authority, including the Chair. The Chief Constable wished to put the matter before a formal meeting of the Authority and obtained legal advice that asserted this could be done, but for "noting only" (i.e. no decision could be made), and only in a confidential (not public) meeting of the Authority. The Chief Executive also sought legal advice to inform her decision as to whether or not this issue could be put before a formal meeting of the Authority. Informed by that advice, the Chief Executive reached the view that due to the commencement of the PCC election purdah period the issue should not be considered by the full Authority prior to its dissolution. The Chief Constable immediately raised the issue with the PCC following his election in November 2012. The PCC was also promptly briefed on the SIREN issue by his Chief Executive and Treasurer.
 11. On 9 April 2013 the PCC, taking into account the view expressed by the Chief Constable, took the decision to terminate the SIREN project. In making this decision, the PCC also took account of an independent review he had commissioned from Mazars LLP. At the point of termination the project was forecasting a revised implementation date of August 2013. This was 4 years later than the original planned implementation date of September 2009 envisaged during the project's initiation. The SIREN project involved a significant amount of public money and the decision to terminate has attracted considerable public and press interest. Citing potential benefits through collaboration with other regional forces as a driver for termination, the PCC said in his press release:

"My decision to withdraw from the SIREN project has not been taken lightly, but I believe that this course of action will ultimately be in the best interests of both Surrey Police and the Surrey public. It is right and proper that it will be fully reviewed by the Police and Crime Panel and by Grant Thornton, the Audit Commission's appointed external auditors."

12. In terminating the contract with the developer without cause, the PCC was required to pay, in full, the residual balance of the contractually agreed development costs but negotiated release from the contractual liability to pay any further support costs. The project consumed a considerable volume of Authority and Force resource over the previous 8 years but delivered none of the benefits envisaged in the initial business case. This means the PCC and former Authority have incurred the full cost of the development of a significant ICT product that was, ultimately, never completed or implemented.

Audit approach and scope of this report

13. This report examines the factors that led to the SIREN project being terminated and whether the termination decision, in itself, was reasonable.
14. On 7 June 2013, subsequent to the termination of the SIREN contract, the PCC decided to procure an alternative solution to SIREN from another provider, Niche RMS (Niche). As this decision is closely linked to the one to terminate we have also considered the subsequent procurement decision as part of this review.
15. In considering whether the decision taken by the PCC to terminate the project was reasonable, it was necessary to consider the reasons for termination. One of the reasons cited was that the project may no longer represent the best long-term option for the Force and the public. This was due to changing external and strategic factors and considerations. The report commissioned by the PCC to inform his decision as to whether or not to terminate the project also highlighted significant concerns in the governance and project management of the SIREN project.
16. In considering the reasonableness of the termination decision, it was necessary to consider the external and strategic factors upon which the PCC's decision was based, as well as the other information relied upon by the PCC in forming his decision to terminate. This involved consideration of the arrangements in place in respect of project and programme governance, and whether weaknesses in those arrangements delayed the project to such an extent that it was reasonable to terminate despite having incurred the full cost of the ICT development over the previous 8 years. A detailed review of the SIREN project from inception to its termination was undertaken, as well as a review of the arrangements for terminating the project and procuring a new ICT solution. We have undertaken this review in the context of our responsibilities outlined above in the section headed 'Our responsibilities'.
17. Our review focuses on the SIREN project itself and its subsequent termination. It is not a wider review of the overall management arrangements of the Force or the former Authority or, subsequently, the office of the PCC or the Chief Constable.
18. Our report sets out the findings of our review in four broad areas:
- **Initiation** – the business case and procurement process for the SIREN project
 - **Delivery** – project management and governance of the SIREN project
 - **Termination** – of the SIREN project
 - **The Niche replacement.**

19. Our review considers events which took place both before and after the election of the PCC and the creation of the PCC and Chief Constable as separate corporations sole in November 2012. Prior to this date, the Force was not a separate legal entity, but a part of Surrey Police Authority.
20. In reaching our conclusions, we reviewed documentation produced over the life of the SIREN project and conducted interviews with key individuals involved in the project, including those who now no longer work for either the Office of the PCC or the Force.

Main conclusions

21. SIREN was an ambitious project. It matched the ambitions of the Force at the time and was fully supported by the Authority. It was evident from our review that the staff of the Force and the Authority were genuinely striving to improve their business for the overall benefit of the public. It is also clear that the decision to terminate was supported by a number of external contributory factors which could not have been envisaged at the outset.
22. However, there were a number of significant weaknesses in the arrangements for managing the SIREN project which contributed to the project's delays and, ultimately, its termination. Where established governance arrangements and internal controls did exist they often did not operate as they should have done. This was compounded because the 'checks and balances' which would have alerted the Force and the Authority to these weaknesses did not always operate as they should.
23. The ambitious vision for SIREN was not matched by the skills and experience available to, and deployed by, the Force for a major portion of the project's life. The Force was not experienced in delivering projects of this type and complexity and the chosen supplier, Memex Technology Ltd (Memex), did not make up for this shortfall in terms of managing the risk to delivery. The Force had little experience of using the Agile approach to project management, development and delivery, which was central to the way that SIREN would be delivered. Scope was poorly controlled for a significant period of the project, delays and shortfalls in funding (resulting from missing scope or skill shortages) were identified late in the process and the initial envisaged benefits quickly diminished from the outset and, ultimately, were never delivered.
24. This meant the project was exposed to risks and delays it need not have been, had project governance and management arrangements been fit for purpose and operated as they should have done. In our view this was a key factor that resulted in the project taking considerably longer than planned. This lack of experience resulted in a number of difficulties which were faced by the programme and ultimately led to its failure to deliver a viable replacement for the CIS system or any of the benefits anticipated in the initial business case.

Initiation

25. The fundamental need for change was underpinned by CIS, a key system for the Force, becoming obsolete. This carried associated risks of continued supportability and failure. There is no question that embarking on a replacement programme was needed and the fact that this system was still running at the date of termination of the SIREN project does not deter from this need as the risk of system failure and compliance issues were still present and growing.

- 26. The selection of Memex Technology Ltd (Memex) as the preferred bidder does not by itself appear to be a fundamental reason for the project's ultimate failure. However, we identified weaknesses in the procurement and evaluation process that suggest a lack of experience within the Force when dealing with a one off procurement with this degree of complexity. There is scope for improvement in how such procurements should be carried out in the future.
- 27. The procurement itself considered two routes to market – the competitive dialogue procedure and the restricted procedure. The latter was chosen. However there is evidence to suggest the former would have been more suited due to the lack of maturity and clarity of requirements. Memex and the two other shortlisted bidders were offered by the Force the opportunity to submit a 'best and final' price. Although this resulted in Memex becoming the cheapest bidder, this approach, as well as being outside the restricted process, may have impacted on the ability to deliver. Based on the evidence made available to us during our review, following our requests for information relevant to the project, we did not identify evidence to suggest that Memex was the wrong choice of supplier, having scored well during the process and being an existing supplier to the Metropolitan Police Service. However, in choosing a 'tailored development solution' rather than an 'off the shelf' solution, the Force chose an inherently riskier option. The Force, supported by the Authority, was of the view that choosing an option that provided the Force with everything they believed they needed was preferable to a generic solution. Having decided to pursue the riskier solution, it was critical that appropriate project management skills and expertise were put in place to deliver it.
- 28. It is worth noting that, following termination, this lesson appears to have been taken on board. The Force subsequently implemented the Niche 'off-the shelf' solution with the benefit of a third party delivery partner.

Delivery

- 29. During the life of the project, in line with recognised good practice and in recognition of the risk associated with the project, Surrey Police and the Police Authority sought a number of independent assurances from a variety of providers. During interviews many key stakeholders referred to these assurances as a key source for their faith in the project's progress at particular points in the project lifecycle. This was an appropriate course of action; it was reasonable for these reports to be relied upon as a source of assurance, albeit the greatest assurance should have been sought from frontline controls and oversight mechanisms in place for the project.
- 30. In addition, throughout the duration of the project and in response to escalating risk and difficulties encountered, the Force did put in place actions aimed at responding to and mitigating those risks:
 - a significant de-scoping exercise was undertaken in 2011, necessary to attempt to bring the project and its scope back under control;
 - an experienced Test Manager was recruited to the team in September 2011. The Test Manager put in place better configuration control and undertook an exercise to align the SIREN system functionality with the Police Activities Glossary (PAG). This approach demonstrated good practice in that it started to control and reduce the scope of the project with a view to simplifying it and bringing delivery back within acceptable risk parameters;
 - a dedicated Project Resource Manager was recruited to the team in September 2011. This had a positive impact on the team, as evidenced by the improved staff survey results;

- the project entered a significant re-planning phase in late 2012/early 2013;
- an independent consultancy review was commissioned with a view to obtaining some assurances over the robustness of future plans and to advise on future options; and
- the Force, prior to termination, enhanced its engagement with senior SAS/Memex executives to set out their expectations for the next phases of the project. The PCC also reinforced this with his own communications;

31. Notwithstanding the above, the lack of suitably skilled resource for a substantial part of the project inevitably impacted on its delivery. Key factors that affected delivery of the project and which led to its ultimate failure are headlined below:

- There was a failure to understand what was required under the Agile project management approach and the use of the Agile methodology was not effective. From the outset there was no experience on the customer side (the Force) of this approach – a key factor in the success of using it.
- From an early stage, there was no acceptance of the iterative project modules delivered. Despite this, subsequent modules continued to be delivered. Neither Memex nor the Force sought to resolve this issue at an early stage. In our view, this contributed to the risk of the project rising above acceptable levels and was fundamental to the project's failure.
- Scope was poorly controlled and a key reason for prolonged timescales and cost escalation. For example, national interfaces, a key element of the project, were not included in the initial scope and budget. In addition, Memex did not take opportunities to assert robust configuration control from the supplier-side.
- There were a substantial amount of changes in the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) and Project Manager roles, along with some dis-functionality of the organisational arrangements below this.
- There was a failure to recruit, retain and allocate appropriately skilled and experienced resource to the programme. The Force failed to recruit for some key roles until very late in the project's life – for example, the key roles of business change analyst and test manager, amongst others.
- Benefits were over stated, quickly diminished from the outset and ultimately were never delivered.
- Governance was set up in accordance with best practice and had senior representatives from both the Force and Authority. However, senior representation, in particular in chairing of the Programme Board, diminished in the latter stages of the project.
- There was a failure to understand the controls, checks and balances needed to deliver effective governance within a project management environment. In some instances, roles that should be delivered by separate individuals appear from the project reports to have been effectively combined and delivered by the same person. This weakened the 'healthy tensions' between these roles that need to exist to safeguard effective governance within the project.
- There was a lack of clarity over what constitutes an issue or a risk. This may have prevented issues from being identified as such and escalated into the wider organisation for resolution.
- Reporting was 'rose tinted' and not always representative of actual progress made by the project. Risk of, and actual, non-delivery was often underplayed and the likelihood of the project's overall success was overly-optimistic. Some project members have attributed this to a cultural aversion to communicating the potential for failure.

- Financial reporting did not provide sufficient granularity on a monthly basis to the Programme Board to enable proper challenge of the financial aspects of the project on an on-going basis.
 - Project reporting was not, in our view, subject to sufficient challenge and scrutiny by programme board members and Force Improvement as part of their Programme Management Office (PMO) assurance role. Given the volume of change taking place in the organisation during the life of the programme, it is unlikely there was sufficient capacity for the Head of Force Improvement to adequately discharge the PMO role. In the two years before termination the project had a Red/Amber/Green (RAG) status of red continuously. Allowing the project to remain rated as such was not in line with best practice.
 - The project did not employ formal critical gateway reviews. When the prospect of terminating the project was raised informally in August 2012 (after the project had been rated red for 16 months), several ex-members of the Authority stated that they were "**shocked**". Had formal gateway reviews been undertaken throughout the project, the prospect of termination, when it arose, may not have been such a surprise.
 - Cost was poorly controlled within the project. The true cost of the project was not well understood and did not include all overhead costs. This was partly because the Force did not maintain adequate time recording or other systems to accurately capture all attributable costs and record time spent by all individuals on the project. The PCC stated he requested on several occasions the cost to date to inform the decision of whether or not to terminate. This was not answered to the PCC's satisfaction and he subsequently included the question as part of the scope of a review commissioned from Mazars LLP.
32. It is apparent that the Force was learning as the project progressed. In the latter stages arrangements did improve, with some critical posts eventually being filled by appropriately skilled personnel. However this was too late to fully recover the position.
33. A fundamental factor in the project's failure was the lack of acceptance of delivered modules from very early in the project. It was evident at an early stage that the Agile approach adopted was not delivering the desired outcomes as none of the project modules were being successfully accepted. Nonetheless, the parties to the project (the Force and Memex) did not quickly enough adopt alternative approaches or otherwise change direction to overcome these setbacks. Failing to resolve this issue at an early stage meant the project accumulated excessive risk and became out of control. This was compounded by the lack of control of scope, a principal cause of the project's failure which allowed the project to move forward on very unsound foundations, extending significantly beyond the original timescales. When the Force eventually moved to the 'Waterfall' methodology (a more traditional approach to delivering projects of this nature), late in the process, it became apparent that there was still a substantial amount of work required to integrate each of the modules and that much of the work carried out prior to this point was of limited or no use without integration.
34. The Enterprise Programme, which was of critical operational importance and committed significant amounts of public funds, was subject to scrutiny via a number of forums within the Force and Authority. The weaknesses in the management of the SIREN project were in part masked by inadequate and rose-tinted reporting which hampered the ability of the Programme Board and wider stakeholders, such as the Authority and the Force's Chief Officer Group, to effectively scrutinise, challenge and act to correct the problems faced by the project.

35. Notwithstanding this, the project status was reported, and remained, red rated for two years prior to its termination. Whilst the high risk nature of the project was acknowledged and notable actions were taken to mitigate these risks, this did not return the project to an acceptable RAG status, suggesting these actions were not sufficiently substantive. Similarly, there does not appear to have been a clear drive or significant intervention from any of the scrutiny functions to put in place a recovery plan, in response to the red-rated status being reported, to move the project rating back to amber or green. This underlines the need for greater, informed challenge from senior representatives with project and programme experience.

Termination

36. The current Chief Constable, on her appointment in February 2012, was briefed that SIREN was, despite the slippage and cost escalation, able to deliver. The case for termination was first proposed a few months later, informally in August 2012 and formally in September 2012, although the Chair of the Authority was reluctant to entertain notions of termination of such a significant project, with such significant investment to date, without a full business case. An options paper was developed through several iterations and, alongside independent reports sought by the Chief Constable and the PCC, the decision to terminate was made in March 2013 with a negotiated settlement ensuing. Accounting for the election and purdah period in Autumn 2012, and the need for the PCC to make a considered decision, in our view the period outlined is not unreasonable.
37. Prior to this, the only other discussion on termination was when SAS acquired Memex in June 2010. The contract provided an option for termination in the event the supplier, Memex, was taken over by another company. After consideration, this option was not exercised.
38. The inclusion of an embedded gateway review process within the project may have provided more opportunity to consider the on-going justification for the project at various key points, particularly when additional funding requests were made in response to delays and slippage. The project arrangements contained no such gateway review process and opportunities to consider earlier termination, or more significant corrective action, may have been missed.
39. At the date of termination in 2013, the need to replace an out-dated CIS system remained. However, various significant internal and external factors had changed from the position at the inception of SIREN in 2005. Strategic factors taken into account include:
- the Force now pursuing much closer collaboration with Sussex Police (who had earlier ruled out Memex for their own system);
 - the Authority's decision to suspend and then terminate participation in the Business Partnering Programme (BPP); and
 - Memex had been unsuccessful in securing any further participating Forces for their product (thus reducing the potential to cost share going forward) and, critically, they lost the opportunity to bid for the Scottish Police Force contract, leaving Surrey Police as the sole customer for the product for the foreseeable future.

Internal factors include the fact that there appeared, according to the independent review commissioned from Mazars LLP, to be only a marginal difference between the cost of the two options being considered (continue with Memex, or terminate and replace with Niche), with timescales for delivery being similar for both solutions.

- 40. The external influences which prompted the decision mostly came to fruition in 2012, meaning the Force was afforded the opportunity to terminate the SIREN project with a credible and realistic replacement to hand. Collaborating with Sussex Police presented an opportunity to proceed with a solution that mitigated many of the shortfalls the Force had encountered with SIREN. Terminating the project earlier, without the alternative options presented from 2012, would have left the Force and Authority with little option but to start from scratch to identify a replacement system. An earlier termination decision could have therefore carried greater risk and uncertainty.
- 41. It is worth noting that the Niche replacement solution has recently been implemented in line with the planned timescales.

The Niche replacement

- 42. The business case for Niche could have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and by much more detailed work on the benefits. Dedicated resource needs to be appointed to ensure delivery of these benefits and road map beyond this financial year. The Force is clear that a separate business case is required to implement this.
- 43. Nevertheless, taking in to account the comparative future costs of both options (completion of SIREN or procurement of Niche), the current strategic vision of the Force to work more closely with regional partners, and the relative risks presented by implementing Niche, in our view the decisions to terminate SIREN and proceed with a different solution are reasonable.
- 44. However, these decisions are only reasonable as an exit strategy from a poorly managed project which, due to the delays encountered, was overtaken by changing external and strategic considerations. The fact remains that the termination decision results in the write off of a significant amount of public money which has been spent on the SIREN project and which has ultimately delivered no benefit to the taxpayer or the people of Surrey. It would have been preferable had the money and resources committed to the SIREN project in the first place been managed and governed effectively such that the intended benefits were delivered and consideration of termination need never have arisen.

Summary

- 45. Overall, SIREN was an ambitious project that was beyond the in-house capabilities and experience of the Force and Authority at the time. Despite this, insufficient third party support was bought in to mitigate these factors and ensure the successful delivery of a project of this scale and complexity. Memex, the chosen partner, in the face of a project moving out of control, did not sufficiently exert their own authority to bring the scope, and the project as a whole, under control. During delivery, there were lots of small decisions which built to a significant increase in time and cost over the life of the project.

46. There was a substantial amount of scrutiny in place, with oversight from the Programme Board, the Force's Strategic Change Board, the Authority's Finance and Performance Panel and the Chief Officer Group. However, this scrutiny was not sufficiently probing or robust, particularly in response to the project status being reported as red for the two years before termination. Effective governance was further frustrated by multiple changes of the SRO and Project Manager through the life of the project. Although the Force had recognised shortfalls and was taking action to improve, critical resource, including a suitable Test Manager, was recruited far too late.
47. In our view, none of the individual decisions taken were reckless – like the termination decision itself, many of them are understandable within the individual circumstances in which they were made. However, in our view a lack of experience of how to manage projects of this scale and complexity prevented effective corrective action being taken when problems first arose. Had this experience been in place (either in house or from a third party supplier), it is arguable a firmer control of the project may have been established from the outset, avoiding the significant delays and cost overruns that eventually resulted in the project's termination and the write-off of substantial public funds committed to date.

Next steps

48. As a report in the public interest issued under section 8 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, there are formal legal requirements with which the PCC and Chief Constable must comply:
- they must consider the report at a public meeting within one month of its receipt;
 - they must publicise, in advance, the meeting and the reason for it;
 - they must publicise after the meeting the decisions taken in response to the report.

Paul Grady
Director

For and on behalf of Grant Thornton UK LLP, Appointed Auditors
19 June 2014

Detailed report

Introduction

49. The detailed report is structured around the following themes:

- **Initiation**
 - Business case, tendering process and procurement
 - Weaknesses in the consideration of risk across the tender options
 - Appropriateness of the chosen procurement route
 - Absence of clause for termination on grounds of convenience
 - Benefits
- **Delivery**
 - Programme and project management
 - Scope
 - Plans
 - Quality
 - Organisation and skills
 - Governance
 - Reporting
 - Assurance
 - Cost
 - Overhead costs
 - Additional staff
 - Opportunity costs
 - Control of costs
- **Termination**
- **The Niche replacement**

Initiation

Business case, tendering process and procurement

50. The fundamental business case for replacing CIS was clearly articulated and well supported. CIS was a key system which the Force believed was becoming obsolete and was no longer fit for purpose. The Force had also identified that the system was subject to increased risk of failure and would no longer be supported by the supplier. Given this context, the decision to replace CIS in 2005 was, in our view, reasonable.
51. By 2007, Surrey Police Authority and the Force had identified a larger scope of work based not only on the replacement system but also encompassing enhancements to many other business functions. The programme was named Enterprise. It was dominated, however, by the SIREN project.

52. The selection of Memex Technology Ltd (Memex) as the preferred bidder does not by itself appear to be a fundamental reason for the project's ultimate failure. However, we identified weaknesses in the procurement and evaluation process that suggest a lack of experience within the Force when dealing with a one off procurement with this degree of complexity. There is scope for improvement in how such procurement should be carried out in the future.
53. The Force undertook a significant scoping exercise to identify the requirements of the new system. A business case was produced which supported the procurement of the ICT aspects of the Enterprise programme through the Official Journal of the European Union (OJEU).
54. There are four main types of contract award procedure available under the public contract regulations:
- **Open** (commodity supply);
 - **Restricted** (where pre-qualification is needed);
 - **Competitive Dialogue** (used where requirements are not fully understood); and
 - **Negotiated** (genuinely unique requirement and rarely used).
55. The Force chose a restricted procurement route. This is commonly used in the public sector but requires the customer to have a clear understanding of their requirements so that tenders can be assessed against these requirements.
56. From an initial field of 14 bidders, nine passed the PQQ assessment. Following receipt of tender, three options were shortlisted:
- **Memex** - a tailored solution;
 - **Niche** - an 'off-the-shelf' option; and
 - **Northgate** - the incumbent provider.
57. The tender evaluation exercise clearly intended to take the relative risks of each option into account. However, in our view there were some weaknesses in the evaluation of the relative risks.

Weaknesses in the consideration of risk across the tender options

58. The three shortlisted tenders each represented differing degrees of risk in terms of ease of implementation. The Memex solution was the highest risk option as it involved the most development of products. The incumbent provider's new system and the 'off-the-shelf' solution represented lower risk options with less or no product development, respectively.

59. From the outset the Force was keen to find a solution that would fit around existing working practices and require the minimum amount of business process re-engineering. The Force had spent considerable time and money developing a detailed User Requirement with which tenders needed to comply. It was unlikely that any supplier was going to be able to meet this requirement in full using an existing product. This meant that some product development was always likely to form part of any solution. It is reasonable to assume that the greater the degree of required product development, the higher the risk that the solution would not deliver to time and budget. The risks associated with the degree of development were enshrined in both the Tender Evaluation Framework and Tender Evaluation Plan. These included:

- an assessment of each solution for compliance with the User Requirement; and
- a weighting within the 'Innovation' section to increase scores for innovation that had already been developed relative to those that had not.

60. The risk management section of the tender evaluation also set out to assess implementation plans, critical path analysis and the use of a recognised or proprietary project management methodology.

61. However, the record of the minutes of the 'Preferred Supplier' day on 12 September 2008 suggests that some of the scoring decisions taken undermined the effective evaluation of the risks associated with the amount of required product development included in each solution:

- **Assessment and scoring of each solution for compliance with the User Requirement:**

Where suppliers had indicated that they were willing to develop their product to comply in full with the User Requirement they were awarded full marks. This meant that suppliers with partial compliance with the User Requirement could still obtain full marks by indicating their willingness to eventually comply with it in full. Consequently, some of the comparison between the amount of product development required by suppliers – a key element of the risk of each option – was lost from the scores.

- **Assessment and scoring of each solution for innovation that had already been developed relative to those that had not:**

At the same meeting there appears to have been some additional consideration regarding the scoring for innovation. Two of the suppliers had their scores increased for "thinking over and above the requirements in their initial bid" and for innovation in relation to any "cutting edge technology forming part of the proposed solution". As a result two of the three shortlisted suppliers, one of which was Memex, scored top marks for innovation. This adjustment to scoring late in the process undermined the ability of the scores to reflect the different stages of development – and therefore the associated risks – for the innovation in each solution.

62. The selection of Memex as the preferred bidder does not by itself appear to be a fundamental reason for the project's ultimate failure. However, it is impossible to say whether the weaknesses in the evaluation of the risks in each solution, as set out above, would have materially affected the outcome of the evaluation exercise.

63. Notwithstanding the above, it is clear that the risks associated with the need to develop part of the solution were understood within the Force. In the Supplier Evaluation and the Assessment of Risk, written on 21 July 2008, the then Director of ICT commented that the "high risk suppliers", which in his assessment included Memex, "all had significant gaps in functionality and would require costly development effort, which in itself introduces the potential for 'scope creep'." As we explore later in this report, lack of control of scope was, in our view, one of the fundamental reasons for the project's ultimate failure.

Appropriateness of the chosen procurement route

64. It is evident from our review that there was some confusion about the exact nature of a restricted procurement process amongst senior officers in the Force and Authority Members in office at the time of procurement. During the later stages of the tender evaluation process the Force appointed third party consultants to carry out a cost clarification exercise which allowed the three short listed bidders the opportunity to provide "best and final" offers in terms of price. This falls outside the restricted process as set out in public procurement regulations, although the Force did obtain independent advice that assured them they were not in breach of EU procurement rules. Following the cost clarification exercise Memex was able to reduce the price of its solution significantly. This meant it was now the lowest price solution prior to the selection of preferred bidders. Given price represented 30 per cent of the overall tender evaluation, this represented a considerable advantage. However, had the restricted procurement route been strictly adhered to, this advantage may not have arisen.
65. As noted above, the restricted procurement route requires the customer to have a clear understanding of their requirements so that tenders can be assessed against these requirements. Despite the development by the Force of the User Requirement, the gap between the User Requirement and what providers had already developed – and thus the real 'product development requirement' of any solution – was unknown, and there was not clarity over the Force's understanding of the precise requirements of the new CIS solution. Given this, and given the scale and complexity of the solution being procured, the competitive dialogue procurement route, which allows for a more iterative approach to identify and agree specific requirements, may have been a more appropriate choice. This would have permitted the cost clarification exercise and the provision of "best and final" offers without deviating from the previously agreed procurement route.
66. In our view, given the scale and complexity of the solution being procured and the lack of certainty over the specific requirements, the Force and Authority should also have considered obtaining third party assistance with the procurement process from the outset.

Absence of clause for termination on grounds of convenience

67. The Force and the Police Authority were clearly aware of some of the risks to which they were potentially exposed and asked for a clause to be included in the contract that allowed for termination should Memex be taken over by a separate corporate entity. However, it is not unusual for contracts of this type to also include a clause for termination on grounds of convenience. Given the level of risk posed by the project it would not have been unreasonable for such a clause, or an equivalent break clause, to be included in the contract. This is particularly pertinent given the supplier insisted on a 'longstop clause' in the contract, which meant that all development monies defined in the contract would be due after a specified period of time, regardless of the delivery progress. The inclusion of a clause for termination may also have led to an earlier focus on termination when significant delays and overruns became apparent. It may also have subsequently reduced the termination costs payable to Memex on exiting the contract.

Conclusions

68. There were weaknesses in the approach used to evaluate risk across the tender options. In addition, the chosen procurement route was not consistent with the nature and complexity of the procurement being sought. Further, the contract agreed with the supplier did not contain a clause for termination on the grounds for convenience.

69. In future such situations, the PCC and Chief Constable should:

Recommendations

1. ***Ensure risk is evaluated appropriately when considering tender options.***
2. ***Ensure appropriate procurement routes are used, aligned with the nature and complexity of the procurement being sought.***
3. ***Ensure contractual clauses for termination on grounds of convenience are considered for large scale, long term procurements.***

Benefits

70. The outline business case for what became known as SIREN was developed using a series of workshops to identify benefits. These ranged from straight forward savings (e.g. termination of maintenance of old systems) through to intangible benefits such as improved customer satisfaction. It was thought the non-cashable efficiency savings may be as high as £31m over a 15 year period (Business Case 3 November 2008, version 5). Conservatively, however, forecast benefits of only £13.6m over a 15 year period were factored into the investment appraisal to offset the costs of Enterprise, leaving a net total investment of £5.2m over the life of the programme.

71. The Business Case (3 November 2008, version 5) forecast benefits up to March 2013 as set out in the following table:

Table 1: Forecast benefits from Business Case dated 3 November 2008 (version 5)

BENEFITS	2009/10	2010/11	2011/12	2012/13	TOTALS
Cashable savings		£140,204	£144,410	£280,671	£565,285
CIS Maintenance savings		£292,311	£306,927	£322,273	£921,511
CIS Training savings	£199,440	£410,847	£423,172		£1,033,459
CIS ICT support cost savings			£50,000	£51,500	£101,500
CIS App savings			£50,000	£50,000	£100,000
NSPIS Case savings		£173,000	£173,000	£173,000	£519,000
TOTAL BENEFITS	£199,440	£1,016,362	£1,147,509	£877,444	£3,240,755

72. This forecast savings of over £3.2m in the first five years, with cashable savings of £565k. Benefits for years 6 to 15 were forecast at a further £10.4m (bringing the total forecast benefits to £13.6m, as stated above).
73. From quite early in the project these benefits eroded significantly, calling into question how robustly they were scrutinised in the first place. A significant proportion of these savings would have been impacted by the late delivery. However, in the case of training (the largest single element in the first 5 years) there were clearly some weaknesses in the assumptions for numbers of trainers/staff, as well as salary costs, which means it is unlikely the envisaged savings would be delivered, even without the delay in the programme. A business case review dated 14 April 2010 concluded that any training savings before 2013 were effectively wiped out and "the benefits predicted beyond 2013 of £400k per annum must also be considered to be at risk".
74. Ultimately, SIREN delivered no benefit: none of the above planned benefits were realised. In real cash terms, officers informed us that approximately £1m had to be found elsewhere in the budget for the period that the project failed to deliver its anticipated benefits. In our view, the identification and quantification of future benefits in the business case could have been more robust, and subject to greater scrutiny.

Conclusion

75. Benefits were over stated, quickly diminished from the outset and ultimately were never delivered.
76. In future such situations, the PCC and Chief Constable should:

Recommendation

- 4. Ensure anticipated benefits are realistic, robustly challenged, fairly stated and achievable.**

Delivery

Programme and project management

77. Programmes aim to bring about change through a series of linked projects which deliver the capabilities required to fulfil the original vision. Enterprise in its original guise fits this category in that the core procurement was supplemented by a number of other interfaces to national systems and required a significant business change effort to become effective.
78. An essential part of any programme is
- having a good understanding of the strategic benefits;
 - understanding how each of the projects will integrate to deliver these benefits; and
 - being able to successfully manage inter-project dependencies and therefore risk to the achievement of the overall programme.
79. The SIREN project formed the majority of the Enterprise programme and comprises the design, development and implementation of a core suite of products including custody, case and intelligence for the Force.
80. Typically, the customer (in this case, the Force) specifies what is needed, undertakes a procurement exercise and awards a contract to the successful bidder. The supplier designs/builds the product and works alongside the customer through testing and implementation then, if successful, moves into formal support. This section examines the management of the project post procurement up to the decision to terminate.
81. It is worth highlighting some of the points made in a draft project document requesting additional funding from the Capital Strategy Board in the summer of 2011. This states the need to re-plan the autumn 2011 implementation date and cites reasons for delay as follows:
- *The organisation had a substantive lack of knowledge and experience regarding the management of large scale IT developments as most police IT systems are 'off the shelf' products.*
 - *The Agile development process did not have all the necessary checks and balances to control a growth in scope as the products progressed.*
 - *The four different products were developed in silos which lead to disparities and gaps between them.*
 - *There was no clear understanding of how far through the development the programme was.*
 - *The business engagement was not uniformly strong.*
 - *The organisation's objectives for the programme changed over the course of the programme's life.*
 - *There has been little stability in the programme leaders. There have been 5 Senior Responsible Officers and 5 Programme Managers.*

82. It is worth noting that the original plan for implementation (as stated in the Business Case dated 3 Nov 2008, Version 5) was to start implementation in September 2009 with an approximate 2 year roll-out. Per the above, this had since been revised to Autumn 2011, and this, too, was now considered in need of re-planning. Moreover, it is clear the Force was aware of some of the key factors contributing to the project's delay and, ultimately, its failure. The developing theme, in terms of reported progress, seems to be eleventh hour changes to major delivery milestones with 'rose tinted' progress reported in the interim, as will be explored further in this report.

Scope

83. The amount of product development required to deliver SIREN carried an increased risk that uncontrolled scope would derail the project. Although up to two years were spent by the Force prior to the procurement process constructing a specification, it is apparent that the scope of SIREN was never fully agreed nor understood by the Force and the programme team.
84. This lack of control of scope was particularly evident during the early stages of the project. Over 140 subject matter experts were involved in the project but appear to have been lightly managed in terms of what was added (controlled and uncontrolled) to the scope. This effectively allowed a 'free-for-all' and scope was neither controlled nor constrained.
85. The document: 'Programme Enterprise User Acceptance Test Strategy – Amendments for day one delivery', dated 26 January 2012, is described as an addendum to the original Test Strategy which was created in March 2011. The following quotes can be found in this document and highlight the uncertainty over scope which had existed throughout the life of the project:
- *"parts of the original Test Strategy were adhered to and parts were not"*
 - *"many of the testing types described were not planned nor factored into the programme schedule of testing activities"*
 - *"Due to lack of a change control process being employed throughout the software development life cycle and iterations of the development, the existing set of use cases have become an unreliable set of input documentation from which to design UAT [User Acceptance Testing] Test Cases and Procedures"*
 - *"The 300 test cases that have already been produced following the direction stated within the original Test Strategy will now be parked in an archive"*
86. This new strategy, from January 2012, had been informed by an exercise to align the required business processes (as described in the Police Activities Glossary (PAG)) with the SIREN system functionality. These were verified with Memex and business representatives through workshops held in January 2012. This approach does demonstrate good practice in that it started to control and reduce the scope of the project with a view to simplifying it and bringing delivery back in to tolerance. However ultimately this decision came too late in the process and was not sufficient to remedy the situation. When Mazars LLP, at the request of the PCC, undertook their final review of the project prior to termination, they reported that the outstanding scope was subject to on-going discussions and still not fully agreed between customer and supplier.

- 87. Another significant factor affecting certainty of scope is that key interfaces to national systems were not quantified in terms of time and cost until September 2010. This is one year after roll-out was originally due to commence. The SRO at the time was particularly frustrated that the IT department was unable to formulate any estimates until this point.
- 88. The lack of control over scope appears to be one of the principal reasons for the ultimate failure of the project. The Force was not sufficiently clear what it wanted SIREN to deliver and this lack of clarity was compounded by the lack of understanding of the Agile methodology. From the supplier side, Memex did not address this shortfall by taking opportunities to assert a more robust configuration control environment. The contractual longstop date later prompted a significant review of scope from both sides.

The Agile methodology

- 89. The Agile methodology requires an agreed set of specifications and an agreed set of user acceptance tests based on these specifications for each of the software modules. It also requires clarity of requirement and rapid feedback from the client. Whilst a detailed user requirement was created by the Force, we can find no evidence that a functional specification for the system was ever formally agreed between the Force and Memex. The absence of this functional specification means it would have been difficult to hold the supplier to account on quality issues and issues over interfaces with national systems. Had the Force been able to successfully implement the Agile approach in the development of SIREN, it could have provided an effective check on the scope of the project and provided a safeguard against escalating costs and slipping deadlines.
- 90. Agile is a recognised industry standard approach. The choice of Agile was understandable given:
 - the amount of product development required during the project;
 - the lack of clarity regarding the specifications and requirements from the new system; and
 - the collaborative approach which was envisaged in the business case.
- 91. The use of Agile was Memex's preferred approach and was included in their tender as the way their solution would be delivered. The Force and its staff had very limited experience of managing projects using Agile, although it should have been aware from the tender that the programme was going to be delivered using an approach with which it had very little experience. The Force's corporate change and project management structures were based on the PRINCE 2 methodology. The project management and team skill sets required to deliver projects using Agile are significantly different from those required for more traditional project management approaches (like PRINCE 2). The lack of understanding of the Agile approach was evident from our interviews of staff. None of the people we interviewed within the Force were able to say which particular variant of Agile was used.
- 92. The Agile methodology delivers iteratively in order to gain early benefit. To achieve this it requires close integration of customer and supplier teams. The programme organisation put in place by the Force was not optimised for this approach. This was compounded by the geographical distance between the Memex team (located in Scotland) and the Force team (located in Surrey).

93. Despite the fact there was no acceptance of the iterative modules delivered, subsequent modules continued to be delivered. Neither Memex nor the Force sought to resolve this issue at an early stage. In our view, this contributed to the risk of the project rising above acceptable levels and was fundamental to the project's ultimate failure. This was compounded by the Force's inexperience with the Agile approach and the weak control of project scope.

Plans

94. During the project's life there were more than 35 different versions of Microsoft project plans. Fourteen of these plans were entitled 'Replan' and related to the period from July to September 2011. We reviewed what the Force believed to be the earliest plan (PE_PP_Dec_0.1) and the latest (SIREN Replan 290911, version 14).
95. The project plans are not of a high quality and do not fully support the reported milestones. It is at times difficult to see how the plan was used effectively to manage the project. Specific areas of concern include the following:
- The structure of the plans initially did not reflect the delivery methodology (Agile). With around 16 different software drops, we would have expected the plans to set out 16 cycles of test and acceptance, and potentially 16 implementation cycles.
 - In some instances the top down structure and logic of plans is questionable. In the October 2011 plan, for example, both Site Acceptance Testing (SAT) and User Acceptance Testing (UAT) are due to be completed (with dates of 3 November 2011 and 12 December 2011, respectively) before the test strategy, with a date of 22 December 2011, is due to be completed.
 - There are a number of activities which do not have predecessors or successors in the plans. These should be clear for all activities and demonstrate the impact on progress when a preceding activity is late. These would also allow the user to determine the critical path and ascertain what contingency was in the plan. The lack of contingency was cited in interview as the reason the project status remained red overall during the final 2 years. It is difficult to see exactly how this was determined from the plans reviewed.
 - On occasion key milestones appear to be linked to the wrong activity.
 - Few activities have resources assigned to them. Assigning resources to activities assists in task ownership and accountability.
 - There are activities not in the plans which might reasonably be expected to be included – e.g. business change activities.
96. It is vital in any project that key critical milestones are identified, defined and agreed up front to allow the Programme Board and wider stakeholders to challenge the team appropriately. The milestones reported were not always hard and were sometimes ambiguous as to exactly what was being delivered. For example, to report that "the D1 development was complete" is a softer and more ambiguous milestone than "D1 has successfully completed its Factory Acceptance Test".
97. We compared the 're-plan' dated 29 September 2011 with the Programme Highlight Report dated 17 October 2011. Given there is approximately 2 weeks between the plan and report one would expect a good correlation with the reported milestones.

Table 2: Comparison of Highlight report dated 17/10/2011 with Plan dated 29/09/2011

Milestones	Plan: 29 Sept 2011	Highlight report: 17 Oct 2011	Comment
<i>Critical project milestones (since last report) baseline / actual</i>			
Finalisation Hothouse commences	25 July 2011	5 Aug 2011	Commencing activities are much softer milestones than completion ones.
All D1 development work complete	27 Sept 2011	30 Sept 2011	Two dates in highlight report show planned and actual although this appears to be beyond the date of the report. It is also one month late.
Memex & Surrey Police commercial meeting	Not found	5 Oct 2011	Planned meetings are an easily achievable milestone and represent a third of the reported 'critical milestones'.
<i>Critical project milestones ahead: forecast dates</i>			
SIREN D1 product delivered to Surrey police	21 Oct 2011	21 Oct 2011	In line with the plan but given the development was only completed on 30/10/11 this cannot be correct. In addition, factory acceptance normally takes place after the development work is complete, adding another 2 weeks before delivery.
Environments and Application ready for testing	27 Oct 2011	24 Oct 2011	Load set up does start 3 days prior to this which questions the logic in the plan.
SAT complete	3 Nov 2011	3 Nov 2011	In line with plan but clearly should be reported as late due to late delivery of D1.
UAT cycle 1 complete	12 Dec 2011	1 Dec 2011	As above and dates reported on highlight report are for a different milestone.
First cycle of testing complete/ready for cycle 2	Not found	8 Dec 2011	
UAT cycle 2 complete	7 Feb 2012	26 Jan 2012	As with UAT cycle 1.

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Milestones	Plan: 29 Sept 2011	Highlight report: 17 Oct 2011	Comment
Release received to be used for training	Not found	9 Feb 2012	
Training preparation	Not found	9 Feb 2012	This is vague – training appears to have commenced much earlier in summer 2011.
UAT cycle 3 complete	16 Mar 2012	8 Mar 2012	As with UAT cycle 1
UAT cycle 4 complete	1 May 2012	23 Apr 2012	As with UAT cycle 1
D1 ready for Go Live	11 May 2012	11 May 2012	On plan until March 12 report when it is pushed back to 18/5/12. In April 2012 it slips again to 31/5/12. In May this is then substantially de-scoped to a read only version (for delivery in June) with original D1 go-live now put back to September.

98. This comparison examines one point in time but, given the plan and report are within a few weeks of each other, the discrepancies are notable. At the point at which the final plan was drawn up the overall status of the project was red but all forecast milestone dates in the plan were shown as green.
99. Subsequent reports show the key milestones above being delivered more or less to planned dates. However, by May 2012 the highlight report reflects a decision to go live in June with a read-only D1 delivery, with the actual date for full delivery now being deferred to September 2012. Subsequently there was further re-planning activity and a further two cycles of testing were introduced. There is also evidence that further scope had to be put back to a later date to attempt to maintain delivery schedules.
100. Prior to the major change in May 2012, all highlight reports from October 2011 to April 2012 reported the milestones in the above table (Hothouse commences, D1 development work complete and Memex/Surrey Police commercial meeting) for progress in the current period, plus additional period achievements. This gives the impression, at a glance, that there was more progress in the period than there was in reality. The milestone progress of the testing cycles again appeared to be showing good progress through cycles 1-4, whereas the narrative showed that a significant amount of failures occurred during this testing and were not fully addressed prior to the next cycle, as they should have been. It would have been more accurate (and less rose-tinted) to have reported that one or more of the initial test cycles had failed and put the date back, rather than introduce two further test cycles. This would have provided a more accurate representation of progress. In interview, the programme director stated he did not believe that putting dates back was an option open to him.

- 101. It is also worth noting that the original roll-out was planned to commence in September 2009. As of the May 2012 Highlight report, the actual planned roll-out of the original D1 scope (a partial delivery) was now planned for September 2012, 3 years behind the original plan. Subsequently, this milestone was also missed.
- 102. The weaknesses in the quality of the initial plans is a concern. Of greater concern is the pattern of inconsistent reporting which presents an inaccurate and overly positive picture in respect of progress. The evidence suggests that as the delivery of milestones was missed, the implications for the delivery of subsequent key milestones were not adequately considered. Moreover, the plans themselves were not being accurately updated to reflect the most recent events. The failure to properly acknowledge or report missed milestones in a timely manner means effective corrective action could not be taken, increasing the likelihood of project failure.

Quality

- 103. There were issues with the technical delivery of the project through its life cycle which delayed implementation and increased costs.
- 104. In line with good practice, the ICT team created four environments within which to support the development. These were:
 - Test;
 - Development;
 - Live; and
 - Training and Practice.
- 105. Memex is of the view that these were not delivered in time to enable the testing to be undertaken earlier in the project, and that this impacted on the testing and acceptance of the developed modules.
- 106. Memex had not previously deployed on the Force ICT team's preferred operating system. They were not, therefore, in a position to provide a specification of the hardware needed to run the software they were delivering. This was a key issue. The ICT team reported that this made designing the infrastructure very difficult and as a result they approached commercial partners for help with designing the delivery platforms. Two industry standard platforms were tried. When neither worked, a bespoke platform for SIREN was developed by a third party provider over time, and at cost to the Force.
- 107. The ICT team expressed the following concerns:
 - Doubt as to whether the product could work in a high availability environment – a core requirement for the Force. The product was a text based database, not Sequel or Oracle based, which meant that it would be inherently inefficient for a high availability system.
 - The product had a memory leak that remained unresolved. It should have used 64mb of memory but instead was requiring between 500mb and 600mb.
- 108. The design of the high availability environment relied upon multiple databases that needed to remain in sync for searching and reporting. The project's final programme director considered that this design complexity contributed to the subsequent platform and performance problems.

109. The delay in testing can also be attributed to the inability of the Force to recruit a suitable Test Manager. This did not happen until September 2011 (two years later than the original planned implementation date). Prior to this, test resource was offered by Memex to help alleviate this problem but this offer was not taken up by the Force.
110. When the new Test Manager came into post he managed a team of 6 test analysts and inherited a test strategy that had been produced by a consultancy company. The Test Manager recalled the following issues as at September 2011:
- The 6 test analysts were not all experienced testers, did not have an in depth understanding of this area and did not have Terms of Reference detailing their role.
 - The requirements against which the testing was being designed were unclear and did not offer traceability on which to design test cases.
 - Only 'front end' testing had been carried out with nothing formally accepted.
 - There had been 15 iterative builds of the product over 18 months.
 - An inadequate change control process and incident tracking system was in place.
 - The final build release version 1.5 was due on 21 October 2011.
111. A series of decisions and actions were then taken that were all appropriate in seeking to address the issues experienced to date. The decision was made that no more iterative builds would be allowed. Arrangements were made for Business Analysts from Force Improvement to work with Memex to produce process maps, mapping the Force's processes to the Police Activities Glossary (PAG). Over a period of approximately 3 months, 212 system process maps were created along with four high level process maps. In parallel, the Test Manager created a revised test strategy (dated January 2012) which would map test scenarios to these agreed processes. In addition, terms of reference were created for the roles of the test analysts and a series of workshops run both for the testing team and wider stakeholders.
112. The Test Manager did not believe that the Agile approach to the development and delivery of the software modules was appropriate, citing as evidence the lack of progress and formal acceptance to date. The 'Waterfall approach' to testing was implemented once the process maps had been agreed. This followed best practice with the classic FAT (factory acceptance testing), SAT (site acceptance testing) and UAT (user acceptance testing) phases. Test plans and scripts were designed and results were documented with metrics. The change control process and incident tracking system were also re-designed.
113. The new test strategy had four user acceptance testing (UAT) cycles, each with testing entry and exit requirements. None of the exit criteria were met for any of the cycles. There were also new interfaces coming online during the UAT cycles, meaning the testing had to revert to factory acceptance and site acceptance testing.
114. Further issues occurred during 2012. The revised implementation date of June 2012 was missed. In July/August 2012 the build was tested but it still had faults and missing functionality. Memex offered version 1.11 of the product for November 2012 but this would only deliver half of the Force's requirements. They also offered version 1.12, which would meet all of the Force's requirements, for January 2013 and advised that it would be best to wait for version 1.12. The Force agreed.
115. Towards the end of the project, the project team exercised the contractual provision to attend FAT. This enabled the testing team to gain a much better understanding and rapport with their counterparts in Memex.

116. At the date of cancellation, it is generally believed by the project team that the latest application could have been released by August 2013. However, each of the technical staff interviewed referred to on-going concerns with the interfaces between the software, the complexity of the coding used and doubts as to the viability of future developments. All technical staff interviewed agreed that the Niche replacement solution should be a more reliable system and should deliver at least the same functionality that would have been provided by the de-scoped Memex product.

Organisation and skills

117. Several SROs, programme directors and project managers were assigned to the project over its lifetime, with police officers predominating in these roles. The appointment of police officers into key project roles was highlighted as an issue of concern from several interviewees. It was clear that, whilst all were experienced and proven police officers, they could not necessarily be expected to have the appropriate skills and experience to undertake a complex ICT project of this magnitude. This view was commonly expressed by serving officers, police staff and Authority members, who attributed the predominance of police officers into key project roles as the general 'police culture' in Surrey.

118. Some key roles weren't filled in the team until it was too late. There were some substantial problems encountered in the recruitment of key posts, including the project manager, the test manager and training managers. The absence of people in these key roles resulted in delays not being arrested and barriers and obstacles not being resolved. An appropriately skilled project manager may have been able to more quickly identify the issues and address the situation with corrective action. The difficulties in finding and retaining suitably qualified staff and the overall lack of clarity about the roles and responsibilities within the project not only acted as barriers to the project's successful delivery, but also weakened the governance arrangements within the programme and project team.

119. A report on Enterprise resourcing in June 2011 cited a number of issues including:

"a lack of skilled resources, high rate of attrition, recruitment issues, low staff morale, overwork by key individuals and a high number of HR issues. This had caused some of the issues such as missing functionality, undeveloped test plans and critically slipping time scales."

120. A memo from the Programme Director to Human Resources (HR) in June 2009 underlines some of these difficulties. It details a failed attempt to recruit a Project Manager at band L (£46-£49k) where 17 applications were received but none met the criteria. The role was advertised again at a higher rate (£57k) which did attract a candidate who was given a contract but subsequently moved on. There were several other project managers who followed but these delays and failure to recruit or retain the right person in the first place underline the lack of experience in resourcing a project of this scale. It was not until September 2011 that a project specific resource manager was recruited to the team.

121. The principal reasons for the difficulties to recruit and retain appropriately skilled staff centre around limits on cost, issues with security clearance and the recruitment process not always accurately targeting the project's needs. In response to this the Force recruited a dedicated resource manager in September 2011. This seemed to address some of the underlying HR issues and in the later stages of the project people were successfully recruited to and retained in key roles. This had a positive impact not only on the progress of the project but also on the morale within the team, as highlighted by the results of the Enterprise staff surveys undertaken in November 2011 and March 2013. Of the 15 questions in the surveys, five are reproduced below. The scores for these questions, recorded in November 2011, were significantly below the Force average. Considerable improvement could be seen by March 2013 in the survey results:

Table 3: Staff survey results

Question	November 2011	March 2013	Improvement (%)
I know what my role entails on a day to day basis	42.4	86.4	103%
My line manager treats me with respect	66.7	85.7	28%
My line manager takes my views and opinions seriously	57.6	76.2	32%
I am given real opportunities to improve my skills	30.3	68.4	125%
I feel trusted and empowered to do my job	48.5	81.8	68%

122. This and interviews with selected team members supports the opinion that the team was developing positively and in the latter stages had recruited some good skills. However, much of this improvement appears to have come too late in the process. It is of particular concern that, as late as November 2011, less than half the team had a good understanding of what their role entailed.
123. When undertaking a project of this nature it is important to ensure that skills are specific to the requirements of the brief and that the people filling those roles are appropriately skilled. The responsibility for these gaps in skills, knowledge and experience falls to the wider organisation and those who appointed them, rather than individuals. An organisation whose core business is not delivering complex ICT projects is unlikely to know or recognise what is required to do so successfully. A thorough assessment of whether the Force and Authority possessed the skills required to deliver and oversee the project from the outset may have resulted in a different outcome.
124. However, it is also important to acknowledge that those leading the project did genuinely try to recover the position and did do a number of things right – for example, the de-scoping exercise and subsequent contract variation agreed by Memex and the Force. It should also be recognised that, even when termination was a real possibility, the team were unwavering in their efforts to recover the situation in the belief that it was improving and could have delivered. It is laudable, given the pressures at the time, that their motivation and belief remained intact. It also appears that throughout the life of SIREN the organisation was learning, albeit it has proved to be an expensive lesson. Some of those lessons have already been implemented in the procurement and implementation of the replacement Niche solution.

Conclusions

- 125. There was a failure to understand what was required under the Agile project management approach and the use of the Agile methodology was not effective. From the outset there was no experience on the customer side (the Force) of this approach – a key factor in the success of using it.
- 126. From an early stage, there was no acceptance of the iterative project modules delivered. Despite this, subsequent modules continued to be delivered. Neither Memex nor the Force sought to resolve this issue at an early stage. In our view, this contributed to the risk of the project rising above acceptable levels and was fundamental to the project's failure.
- 127. Scope was poorly controlled and a key reason for prolonged timescales and cost escalation. For example, national interfaces, a key element of the project, were not included in the initial scope and budget. In addition, Memex did not take opportunities to assert robust configuration control from the supplier-side.
- 128. There were a substantial amount of changes in the Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) and Project Manager roles, along with some dis-functionality of the organisational arrangements below this.
- 129. There was a failure to recruit, retain and allocate appropriately skilled and experienced resource to the programme. The Force failed to recruit for some key roles until very late in the project's life – for example, the key roles of business change analyst and test manager, amongst others.

Recommendations

- 5. ***The Force should ensure that it has properly considered what skills, resources and expertise it has at its disposal to procure and deliver large scale, complex programmes, acknowledging that Police Officers cannot simply be parachuted into a role they have no experience of and be expected to perform. Consideration should be given to:***
 - a. *engaging a third party provider;*
 - b. *engaging with external partners; and*
 - c. *seeking external procurement expertise for elements outside the normal force experience.*
- 6. ***Given change is a constant in the current policing environment the Force should ensure some of their senior officers and staff are formally trained in change management.***
- 7. ***Having undertaken a number of 'lessons learned exercises for SIREN, an independent review of whether learning has been implemented needs to be undertaken.***

Governance

130. The project's high level governance frameworks were appropriately designed and followed existing guidance. There was a programme board in place which was chaired by an ACPO ranked officer as Senior Responsible Officer (SRO) and included Police Authority Members who had some experience over project management. In addition, the project's progress became a standing item on the agenda for meetings of the Authority's Finance and Performance Panel and the Force's Chief Officer Group (COG). Beneath the programme board the structure of the team as initially envisaged was also appropriate. However, there were significant periods during the project's life where the roles and responsibilities did not operate as intended.
131. A core part of ensuring effective governance in a project such as SIREN is the creation of checks and balances within the project and the project team. These generate 'healthy tensions' which are important to ensure the project stays on track and meets its intended objectives. Segregation of key functions, such as project controls and assurance, and also between individual roles within the project, enables them to operate from the correct perspective and fulfil their intended role effectively. We have identified a number of instances within SIREN where this separation of roles does not appear to have been maintained, undermining the effective governance of the project:
- From October 2010 the programme director was effectively the SRO whilst still remaining involved in the day to day delivery of the project. This resulted from wider structural changes to the Force which reduced capacity at a senior level. This meant the formal SRO no longer chaired the programme board meetings, chairing instead the Strategic Change Board which added to its agenda the holding to account of the programme board. This devalued the role of the programme board, compromising its ability to challenge and scrutinise the progress the project was making and escalate issues to the wider organisation.
 - From July 2011 the project manager and business change manager roles appear to have been undertaken by the same person. This is based on the evidence available in the project reports, although the project manager and programme director have since stated that, despite the reporting, this was not the case in practice. For projects which involve a significant amount of business change, the business change manager takes on the role of 'internal customer' for the project as well as responsibility for delivery of the benefits. Project governance arrangements missing this key individual, or not having clarity around this important role, can significantly undermine the project implementation and benefit realisation.
 - Difficulties were encountered in recruiting and retaining to key posts on the team (as discussed in the previous section) including the project manager, testing manager and training manager roles. The absence of people in these roles not only created delays but also undermined the internal checks and balances within the project.
 - One of the key functions in project governance is the role of project quality assurance, often referred to as a Project Management Office (PMO). Within the Force, this role was part of Force Improvement's remit. However, the Head of Force Improvement has stated that Force Improvement was never set up to be a full PMO in the usual sense. Resources allocated to the programme from Force Improvement were intended to be tasked by the programme, leaving the quality assurance aspects of the PMO role to the Head of Force Improvement. The Head of Force Improvement's main role, however, was focused on oversight across a number of other significant change programmes at the same time as the SIREN project. Given the volume of change taking place in the organisation during the life of the programme, it is unlikely there was sufficient capacity for the Head of Force Improvement to adequately discharge the PMO role.

- 132. These findings indicate a lack of understanding of some of the fundamental aspects of project governance and the purpose of various roles within the project team. This uncertainty is reflected in the results of the staff survey in November 2011; as highlighted in the previous section, only 42.4% of the SIREN team felt that they knew what their role entailed on a day to day basis.

- 133. The effectiveness of the Programme Board can be assessed by examining whether the urgency of issues was understood and whether they were dealt with promptly. The issue and risk lists presented to the Programme Board in December 2012 showed the following:
 - a total of 16 open issues
 - a total of 8 risks – 1 very high, 6 high and 1 low risk.

- 134. An issue can be defined as 'a risk that has a 100% probability' – in other words it is a current barrier to progress and is having an impact on the project. By their nature, issues are often beyond the capability of the project team to resolve (otherwise they would have resolved them) and are therefore referred upwards for resolution. Issues may include a shortfall in funding or a skills gap.

- 135. Of the 16 issues in the log, 14 had been identified in 2012 but two had been outstanding since 2010. They were:
 - *"Ent prog 01 - Phase 2 requires more detail to finalise contents. "*
 - *"ICT 01 -staffing required to support may be additional to current resource...5+ additional staff? whose budget? potential £120/130k cost. In addition there needs to be system admin activity within the business teams, which means absorbing tasks into current roles or adding to headcount. "*

- 136. Taking each issue in turn:
 - **Ent prog 01**
In essence, this issue concerns the definition and agreement of what constitutes the scope of Phase 2 of the project. This issue would not fall into the category of 'beyond the scope of the team' as it appears to be an on-going negotiation over what is or isn't included in the scope of the project. However, from the minutes of the board meeting it transpires that phase 2 is at risk because it no longer fits within the funding window. The action requested from the board in response is that this issue is closed and a new one is opened regarding the issue of insufficient funds to undertake phase 2 with a supplementary action to quantify this. This action correctly identified the 'real' issue as opposed to the original presentation which was a statement of work in progress.

 - **ICT01**
The second issue again relates to affordability and from the minutes of the meeting and the narrative accompanying this issue there appears to be both action and progress with requests for funding being escalated through Gold Group and to the PCC, as well as action from the board on ICT to clarify the split of responsibilities.

137. There is clear evidence that the Programme Board were probing issues and taking appropriate action. However both of these issues had been outstanding since 2010, raising questions over the timeliness and urgency of that action. Furthermore, the minutes of this meeting imply actions for each of the nine issues discussed at the meeting, but only one was formally allocated an action owner. This suggests a lack of clarity over who was responsible and ultimately accountable for progressing the actions against each issue.
138. The analysis of the issues and risks reported to the Programme Board also suggests a misunderstanding of what constitutes an issue or a risk. We noted several examples of reported issues which were not issues because they were within the capability of the project team to resolve. Many of these related to core scope which hadn't been determined. Some examples include:
- *"T2 – work is required to establish transition plans. "*
 - *"T7 – ...no existing or out of date process and procedure documentation."*
139. In other cases issues flagged were really risks. For example:
- *"T5 – staff forgetting what they have learned before go-live."*
 - *"PDI 38 – 100+ workarounds which introduces the risk of user error."*
140. Equally, some risks were reported as risks when evidence suggests they had become issues. The highest risk reported was "Ent Prog 01 '...a plan without tolerance'". The comments made regarding this risk indicate that it had in fact become an issue as the project had slipped and the Project Manager had issued an exception report.
141. A review of the minutes of meetings suggests the Programme Board took an informative approach to managing the project rather than taking any active intervention. Discussions held as part of this review indicated there was significant activity: use of Gold groups, briefings at COG, review by Authority members and review of the project team by the Head of Force Improvement. However, none of this was sufficient to recover the programme and bring it within tolerance. Given the project was rated as red for the last 2 years of its existence it is surprising that a more co-ordinated and coherent recovery plan was not implemented to bring the project back into tolerance.

Conclusions

142. Governance was set up in accordance with best practice and had senior representatives from both the Force and Authority. However, senior representation, in particular in chairing of the Programme Board, diminished in the latter stages of the project.
143. There was a failure to understand the controls, checks and balances needed to deliver effective governance within a project management environment. In some instances, roles that should be delivered by separate individuals appear from the project reports to have been effectively combined and delivered by the same person. This weakened the 'healthy tensions' between these roles that need to exist to safeguard effective governance within the project.
144. There was a lack of clarity over what constitutes an issue or a risk. This may have prevented issues from being identified as such and escalated into the wider organisation for resolution.

Recommendations

- 8. ***The 'healthy tensions' between roles required for effective project governance should not be undermined or diluted during project delivery. The Project Management Office should be independent from day to day project activity and play an active role in assuring information is accurate and supported before it is presented to the programme board.***
- 9. ***There should be clarity over what constitutes an issue or a risk. This allows issues to be identified as such and escalated into the wider organisation for resolution.***

Reporting

145. To fulfil their roles effectively, project teams, programme boards and wider stakeholders in the governance arrangements are reliant on having timely and appropriate information which has been independently assured. Highlight reports are a key board level report and need to convey, effectively and efficiently, the progress and status of the project. Board members should be looking at changes to status, probing and challenging the reasons for changes and making decisions on a way forward. Essential core attributes of a highlight report include:

- **Relevance to the period.** Monthly reports should cover progress in the period with planned activity for the next period. Milestones should be selected which are representative of the previous month (should be completed), current activity (should be completed by next meeting) and the future (will be current activity for next meeting possibly with some major milestones which are further in the future).
- **Consistency.** For each monthly meeting there is effectively a three month rolling window where, for example, future milestones (month 1) move into current period (month 2) and are then shown (once) when they are completed in the third monthly meeting.
- **Presence of hard milestones.** 'Hard' milestones are undisputable and should generally be completion milestones as opposed to milestones for starting activities (with some exceptions, for example milestones in respect of the start of roll out and milestones in respect of training).
- **Completeness.** The report should highlight all issues (generally defined as those things which are impacting on the project) and top risks.
- **Financial relevance.** The report should contain the relevant financial information covering budget, actual and forecast spend over the period, as well as the overall status of the full forecast against baseline.
- **Narration and context.** The report should include narrative which supports the reported progress and an indication as to what decisions/actions are required from the board.

146. When followed, these attributes allow project board members to robustly challenge the Project Manager, focus on removing blockages and communicate accurate information to wider stakeholders.

147. One of the main reporting mechanisms from the project was from the programme highlight report produced each month for the Programme Board. In general, the project highlight reports fell short in a number of aspects. We examined a selection of reports covering the 2010/11 period. Below is a summary of our findings, focusing on the adequacy of reporting against milestones.

- **Report date 1 Oct 2010 (footer report date 13 Oct 2010)**
 The milestone 'SP functionality Review Build 8' is reported as being completed on time (6/9/2010) but the accompanying comment, 'Due to bugs, this is still under review' contradicts this. Test Strategy, Test Plan, Training Needs Analysis and LMS Contract milestones are all reported as TBA (i.e. not complete) but without any forecast date for when they might be done. Fifteen milestones forecast for future periods are all green except one which is amber. Overall report Amber.
- **Report date 22 Dec 2010**
 Test strategy and test plan are still reported as current milestones but now have red completion dates of 10/10/2010 – these milestones have now seemingly been completed around the date of the previous report. The 'SP Functionality Review Build Complete' (note this is a hard milestone) now has the actual date of 6/9/2010 highlighted in red with the comment 'Due to bugs, this is still under review (as are all the builds due to lack of acceptance testing)'. In other words, this milestone has still not been completed. Despite there now being a couple of red milestones in the forecast, the start of roll out is still green and 'on track'. All future delivery dates of software build are green, despite none being accepted to date. Four of the forecast milestones actually fall within the current deliverable period but are shown as future milestones. Overall Report Amber.
- **Report 11 Feb 2011**
 Test strategy milestone repeated exactly as in the previous report, and the test plan milestone has inexplicably disappeared. Custody UAT (a future milestone) is shown as on target for 1/12/2010 (2 months prior to the date of the report) with the comment: '1 month. Due to end 28/12/10 but on-going because delay to build. Must be completed by end Feb'. Delivery of Acceptance Manual is reported as delivered to target on 31/1/2011. The 'start of roll out' milestone is still green and considered on track. Two of the forecast milestones fall within the current deliverable period. Overall Report Green.
- **Report 16 March 2011**
 Test strategy milestone is now shown in future milestones with a forecast completion date of 31 March 2011 (the baseline was 23/4/2010 and this was previously reported as complete in earlier reports) with the accompanying comment: 'Delayed due to previous lack of expertise. Now nearly completed by Test manager (with assistance from a consultant)'. Start of Roll Out is reported as being on track. Three of the forecast milestones fall within the current deliverable period. Overall report Amber.
- **Report 19 April 2011**
 Most future milestones are now red. In addition the delivery acceptance manual, which was reported as delivered to plan in the February report, is now a red forecast milestone with a date indicating completion will be 31/03/2011. Start of Roll Out is now rated red and TBC. Overall report is now rated red and does not recover from this rating up to termination.
- **Report July 2011**
 There are no current period milestones reported for SIREN and only one future milestone. All other milestones reported relate to the other three (minor) projects under the Enterprise programme. Again, this does not follow best practice and would make it difficult for board members to gauge process and challenge effectively.

- the Board might reasonably request that re-planning was done.
 - the new plan would be presented to the Board with an impact statement, i.e. time, cost, scope changes.
 - this would either be accepted or rejected by the Board.
 - in the case of acceptance, the new plan would come into being with new tolerance and the project would go back to green or amber (depending on the nature of the change).
 - if rejected there may be a request for a more fundamental change or examination of options available which, in the worst case, would be termination.
153. Without following this process the project could be getting deeper into exception each month without a key indicator highlighting the fact (as it doesn't get higher than red). Once a project reaches red the extent to which it continues to go out of tolerance is difficult to monitor.
154. There were other weaknesses in the quality of the reports. Risks and issues were not explicitly identified in the highlight reports, although risk logs and issues were reported regularly at the board meeting. Again, best practice would require the top risks and all the issues to be reported, along with some suggestion as to what the project required from board members to manage and overcome these.
155. Financial reporting is presented in the highlight reports in financial year periods only. This is not adequate. It does not provide sufficient granularity to properly manage the financial aspects of the project on an on-going basis. To meet a minimum standard the report should have shown monthly actuals, forecast and variations for financial information, reporting against the project budgets and timescales rather than the Authority's financial year. This would have allowed challenge on cost over/underspend, enabling board members to better understand project variances (rather than variances to the Authority's financial years of account), provide robust challenge to such variances and thus add value in this respect. The weaknesses in the financial reporting data were evident in the difficulties experienced by the project team in producing a full cost of the scheme to date to inform the business case for the decision to terminate.
156. In projects, what is reported by the team should be assured by an independent part of the organisation, often referred to as the Programme Management Office (PMO). In the case of SIREN, this was a function of Force Improvement. This body gives members of the board some assurance that the details reported are correct, moving the debate away from the finer points and allowing the focus to be the key issues, risks and decisions. The Force followed best practice by having this assurance function in place for the SIREN project. However, the considerations earlier in this report indicate that this role was not always operating fully effectively.
157. Outside of the Programme Board there were a number of meetings where aspects of the project were subject to scrutiny and challenge. Within the Force regular updates were taken to the Strategic Change Board with more occasional information being reported to the Chief Officer Group. Similarly, updates were regularly presented to the Authority's Financial and Performance Panel with more occasional information being reported to full meetings of the Authority. The Force's Chief Officer Group and the Authority were the bodies ultimately responsible for discharging governance. Whilst the reporting lines appear reasonable, the weaknesses in the quality of reporting may have prevented these governance mechanisms from understanding the true severity of the risk and delays, which in turn may have prevented effective corrective action being identified sooner.

158. Notwithstanding this, the Force and Authority, despite the weaknesses in the quality of reporting, should not have been oblivious to the difficulties being encountered in the project. There does not, however, appear to have been a practice of continually challenging the on-going justification of the project, or the undertaking of any form of Gateway review, which may have prompted consideration of more robust responses to these issues. There were points during the project's life when consideration could have been given as to whether to proceed with the project. The project funding was confirmed by the Capital Strategy Board and the Police Authority as part of the capital programme each financial year from 2009/10 onwards. There were also requests for further funding during the programme's life. However, despite the slippage that had been experienced, the lack of anticipated benefits and the requests for additional funding, the funding continued to be agreed each year. In our view these review points were an inadequate substitute for the sort of built in, structured gateway approach which is envisaged by best practice. Periodic and planned reassessment of the project throughout its life may have resulted in an earlier decision to terminate or at the very least earlier intervention to bring the programme back in to tolerance.
159. This lack of a gateway review process was highlighted by an internal audit review of project management undertaken in 2012:

"One of the seven principles of the Prince 2 methodology requires the on-going justification for the project to be scrutinised and considered at all times. In this respect there is scope in the Corporate Strategic Change Board project process for the inclusion of a gateway (or various checkpoints) together with defined criteria and guidance to demonstrate that this consideration is consistently applied in future projects."

160. Organisational culture may be a factor behind the weaknesses in the quality of reporting. Whilst many of the risks and issues were, in fact, reported, their potential impact on the progress of the programme was either underplayed or misunderstood. With a reluctance to report 'bad news' comes the risk that downside risks are not properly identified, evaluated or understood. Our review identified a number of examples of issues and risks being raised which would indicate that a significant delay in the progress of the project might be expected. Despite this, milestones do not move and the project would often continue to be reported as on-track, with the ultimate go-live date remaining the same. This recurring theme of optimistic reporting may be culturally driven, with some project team members attributing this to an organisational reluctance to acknowledge and communicate the potential for failure. The PCC and Chief Constable may wish to further explore the underlying issues behind the optimistic nature of the reporting which occurred during the project's life.
161. In our view, the quality of reporting contained significant weaknesses which may have hindered the programme board and other senior stakeholder's ability to challenge and scrutinise the information presented. Notwithstanding this, fully effective and robust oversight mechanisms are expected not to take such reports at face value, but to rigorously challenge the assurances and underlying assumptions provided with a view to identifying inconsistencies, contesting assumptions and assessing whether reported and forecast progress is reasonable. These oversight mechanisms did at times provide such challenge. As such, it is reasonable to expect that board members and senior stakeholders could have identified the severity of some of the issues from the information available.

Conclusions

162. Reporting was 'rose tinted' and not always representative of actual progress made by the project. Risk of, and actual, non-delivery was often underplayed and the likelihood of the project's overall success was overly-optimistic. Some project members have attributed this to a cultural aversion to communicating the potential for failure.
163. Financial reporting did not provide sufficient granularity on a monthly basis to the Programme Board to enable proper challenge of the financial aspects of the project on an on-going basis.
164. Project reporting was not, in our view, subject to sufficient challenge and scrutiny by programme board members and Force Improvement as part of their Programme Management Office (PMO) assurance role. Given the volume of change taking place in the organisation during the life of the programme, it is unlikely there was sufficient capacity for the Head of Force Improvement to adequately discharge the PMO role. In the two years before termination the project had a RAG status of red continuously. Allowing the project to remain rated as such was not in line with best practice. There does not appear to have been a clear drive or significant intervention from any of the scrutiny functions to put in place a recovery plan, in response to the red-rated status being reported, to move the project rating back to amber or green. This underlines the need for greater, informed challenge from senior representatives with project and programme experience.
165. The project did not employ formal critical gateway reviews. These may have provided for a more holistic consideration of project progress and identified earlier opportunities for termination or the requirement for more severe corrective action.

Recommendations

10. ***The Force and PCC must be clear that senior management want to and need to hear bad as well as good news, and explore cultural issues which may be a barrier to open and transparent reporting of progress.***
11. ***Budget, forecast, actuals and variance financial reports for projects should be aligned with the reporting period i.e. have monthly granularity.***
12. ***For future projects of similar scale and complexity, the Office of the PCC should recruit an experienced programme and project management specialist to represent them on the programme and project board.***
13. ***Where current and future programme and project boards include employees of the Office of the PCC as members, their roles and responsibilities in the governance and accountability of the project/programme should be clearly articulated.***
14. ***Project delivery processes need to mitigate the potential impact of a 'can do' and positive reporting culture. Appropriate Project Management Resource should be allocated to projects and routine gateway reviews should be undertaken throughout the progress of the project.***

Assurance

166. During the life of the project, in line with recognised good practice and in recognition of the risk associated with the project, the Force and the Authority sought a number of independent assurances from a variety of providers. During interviews many key stakeholders referred to these assurances as a key source for their faith in the project's progress at particular points in the project lifecycle. This was an appropriate course of action; it was reasonable for these reports to be relied upon as a source of assurance, albeit the greatest assurance should have been sought from frontline controls and oversight mechanisms in place for the project.
167. Whilst it is important to understand the (often limited) scope of audit reports when considering what assurance can be gleaned, it is noted that many of the reports (prior to those commissioned for the termination) are reasonably positive in the overall conclusion about the SIREN project. The assurance reports reviewed are detailed in the table below, which shows the timings of these assurances and provides a summary of the conclusion provided.

Table 5: Independent reports relating to the Enterprise programme

Provider	Date	Title	Scope	Conclusion
<i>Internal audit</i>				
NHS South Coast Audit	June 2008	Project Enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme management 	High risk rating in final report.
Mazars (internal audit team)	June 2009	ICT Project Enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project specification • Project plans • Risk assessments • Testing plans • Monitoring of project • Management reports 	Substantial assurance (second highest out of four potential opinions). One significant (equivalent of medium) recommendation and two housekeeping. Good practice noted for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance framework • Adherence to PRINCE II methodology • Effective team structure.

continued.....

Provider	Date	Title	Scope	Conclusion
Mazars (internal audit team)	June 2010	ICT Project Enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project management policy and procedures • Project Plan • Governance • Contract arrangements with supplier • Progress monitoring • Review meetings • Project meetings • Resource allocation • Risk management • Monitoring / reporting of operational and financial performance 	<p>Substantial assurance (second highest out of four potential opinions). No recommendations. Good practice noted for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Governance framework • Adherence to PRINCE II methodology • Effective team structure • Recognition that business case requires review • Project plan • Project risk register • Signed contract in place • Regular supplier update meetings • Monthly revenue and capital reports of the project to the finance and performance panel • Regular scrutiny of the project by the Police Authority.
Mazars (internal audit team)	April 2011	ICT Project Enterprise	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Project plans • Risk assessments • Testing plans • Monitoring of project • Management reports 	<p>Substantial assurance (second highest out of four potential opinions). 3 significant (medium) recommendations relating to financial issues, particularly the control of costs and projected benefits.</p>

Provider	Date	Title	Scope	Conclusion
RSM Tenon	June 2012	Project Management	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluating the adequacy of risk management and control activities for the project. 	<p>Report rated Green/Amber (second highest out of four potential opinions). Opinion given: "Taking account of the issues identified, the Authority can take reasonable assurance that the Force has complied with industry standard project management guidance. However, we are limiting our assurance over the effectiveness of the management of the process, as despite the robust project management framework, the SIREN project continues to suffer from indefinite delays. As no comparable projects (in terms of complexity and size) are currently on-going no evidence can be provided to substantiate that current processes are effective in delivering large scale projects."</p> <p>1 medium and 2 low priority recommendations.</p>
Financial reviews				
Atmaana	June 2008	Investment Appraisal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Investment appraisal of the five supplier responses shortlisted. Plus commentary on technical and programme issues. 	<p>Northgate, Niche and Memex should be selected for the next step in the tender process, with no further involvement required from IBM and Fujitsu.</p>
Triaxa	August 2010	Business Assessment of the SAS Acquisition of Memex Ltd	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> To detail the implications for Surrey Police covering the short term delivery of the Enterprise products, longer term maintenance and support and the possible risks and benefits that the acquisition may entail. 	<p>"There should be little to concern the SPA and much to reassure them."</p>

Provider	Date	Title	Scope	Conclusion
<i>Advice</i>				
Triaxa	January 2013	Independent Review of the Options Open to Surrey Police Regarding Crime, Intelligence, Custody and Case ICT Systems.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Review the current status of the programme, taking account of costs incurred, assessment of the likelihood of a successful implementation of Phase 1 of the project, future costs of ownership and operational risk from using the developed software. 	Memex solution is "borderline fit for purpose in functional terms alone and is unfit for purpose when the most recent performance and availability issues are taken into account". Strongly recommended moving to the Niche system in partnership with Sussex Police.
Mazars (consultancy team)	April 2013	Project Enterprise (SIREN) Review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Technical, operational, financial, strategic and reputational considerations of deciding the way forward with Project Enterprise, together with the governance arrangements applied. 	"... it is evident that there is contradictory information about the status of the programme and SIREN, and gaps in the evaluation of costs going forward. It is also evident that the proposed alternative option of Niche in partnership with Sussex Police has not yet been fully evaluated. On this basis it is therefore difficult for the PCC to make a decision about the way forward for the programme and SIREN."

Conclusion

168. Our review has indicated that there were clear issues with project management, project progress and the overall status of the work. Several of our findings are mirrored in some of the later reports produced by Mazars, RSM Tenon and Triaxia.

Cost

- 169. The true cost of the project was not well understood within the Force. Towards the end of the project, the PCC requested from the Force the current cost-to-date of SIREN on several occasions. The Force was unable to easily determine an accurate figure and there were a number of clarification questions as to what should and should not be included. It was only after several iterations and the assistance of a third party, commissioned by the PCC, that the Force was able to establish an agreed figure. The cost to the end of March 2013 was assessed by the Force and the PCC as £14.32m, with additional negotiated settlement costs on termination of £535k resulting in a total project cost of £14.86m. Of this, the contractually agreed amount paid to Memex over the lifetime of the project was £3.3m.
- 170. The figure of £14.86m was quoted by the PCC in the update to his press release on 11 April 2013. We have no reason to believe this figure was quoted in anything other than genuine good faith, and was the best available assessment of the full cost of the project to date available at the time. We have considered the completeness of this figure. In our view, there are some additional costs that have not been attributed to SIREN but which arguably would provide a truer reflection of the full project cost to the Force. The Force did not maintain systems to record and quantify such costs.

Overhead costs

- 171. The staff costs included in the assessment in April 2013 included wage (or agency fee) plus employer NICs and pension costs. However, no overhead (OH) was added to these figures. Typically OHs for an organisation like the Force could lie between 30-50% of staff costs. The Force confirmed it typically applies an OH figure of 30% to identify the full cost of providing 'Private Hire'. These OHs would account for the cost of management, facilities, HR, IT and other back office and support costs required to facilitate the employment of project employees. Some of these costs are fixed and apportioned and others will be driven by project needs, such as HR recruitment and IT support. The time spent by Project Board Members and Finance and Performance Panel Members alone in scrutinising the project is likely to amount to several hundred thousand pounds. The consideration of the specialist consultant advice and legal advice which was sought at various points in the project (for example the SAS takeover of Memex, and events leading up to termination) would also attract OH costs.

Additional staff

- 172. There were over 140 Subject Matter Experts who worked on the project, attending various workshops as well as developing the requirements. None of these were booked to the project as a cost (partly because the Force does not maintain a time booking system which would have facilitated this process). In addition, we examined the Project Organisation chart (Jan 2012) and found that not all staff allocated to the project were included as part of the cost for that period. Several others were allocated to the project on light duties free of charge and anecdotally there were other IT resources dedicated to SIREN but whose costs remained within the IT budget (rather than being apportioned to the project). It is not possible to accurately quantify these additional costs in the absence of sufficient records, such as those that could have been provided by a time booking system.

Opportunity costs

173. The Business Case states a loss of interest charge (section 5.4) of circa £1m was estimated for a 5 year period due to the capital funding requirement. This was not included in the figures but agreed by the CFO that it should be. This is interest forgone as a result of the Authority's money being used to fund SIREN rather than earn interest from being invested. It is worth noting that, in actuality, interest rates over the period were lower than anticipated in the business case so the loss is likely to be much lower than the £1m envisioned.
174. As explored under the 'Benefits' section earlier in the report, £3.2m of benefits planned for the period 2009-2013 (following the original planned implementation date) were never realised. The Force has confirmed that £1m of further cashable savings were required to offset the non-delivery of anticipated benefits from the SIREN project included in the Authority's financial plans.

Control of costs

175. There was a lack of control of cost throughout the project with monthly reports only providing annual, not monthly, cost forecasts, combined with numerous unseen costs during the life of the project. Had the 'real' on-going cost been understood and reported, it might have prompted senior staff to take earlier action to address problems.
176. In addition, a significant de-scoping exercise was undertaken in 2011, necessary to attempt to bring the project and its scope back under control, but which removed a substantial amount of the previous scope. Some of the removed scope was deferred to an unspecified future delivery point. This and changes that occurred during the project life meant that Memex were paid the full contractually agreed amount for development work upon settlement (£3.3m) but for 'delivering' substantially less than the original scope (which would in itself have further undermined the envisaged benefits).
177. It should be noted, in support of the action taken, that stripping back the project to its core functionality was in line with best practice as one of the essential actions to take to recover a failing project.
178. Throughout the project life there is evidence to suggest that cost was not under control. A significant element of this was the internal team costs, which grew in line with the slippage of the project. The lack of a time recording system for staff working on the project may have hindered the monitoring of exactly how much time and staff costs were incurred on the project on an on-going basis.
179. Another area of concern from senior management was the true cost of the interfaces. By July 2010 there were 21 interfaces identified (predominantly to national systems) which did not have estimates in terms of cost. These costs were subsequently estimated at £305k at a Finance and Performance panel meeting on 2 Sept 2010. Overall the capital variation stood at £533k, as stated at the same meeting. At the Finance and Performance panel meeting of 7 July 2011, the panel approved an additional £1m as a **"best guess"** as **"the force was not yet in a position to know exact cost"**. A paper produced on 18 August 2011 appears to clarify this as an increase of £615k capital and £1,088k revenue from that date through to financial year 2013/14. The same paper assessed benefits of only £2m as still being achievable over the period 2012-2016. This was a significant reduction compared to the estimated benefits set out in the Business Case in November 2008.

Conclusions

180. Cost was poorly controlled within the project. The true cost of the project was not well understood and did not include all overhead costs. This was partly because the Force did not maintain adequate time recording or other systems to accurately capture all attributable costs and record time spent by all individuals on the project.

Recommendations

- 15. ***The Force should review and amend its policy on costing programmes and projects. This should align more with the way private hire is calculated, for a more accurate representation of true cost.***
- 16. ***To further improve on management accounting the Force should consider introducing a time booking/recording system.***

Termination

181. Serious consideration with respect to terminating the project was first raised with the Authority by the Force informally in August 2012 and formally in September 2012. Prior to this point, despite numerous setbacks in terms of cost and timescale, the team and leadership continued to believe that the SIREN project could be delivered, albeit much later than first envisaged. Right up until the termination date in April 2013, the project team and Memex continued to believe the project was deliverable, although the target date had now moved back to August 2013.

182. The current Chief Constable joined The Force in February of 2012 and was briefed on SIREN. Events unfolded from that point as follows:

- In the early part of 2012 the Business Partnering Programme (BPP) and the Olympics were the main focus and priorities for the organisation.
- Around the time of the May/June Chief Officer Group meeting it was announced that SIREN would not now be ready to go live before the Olympics. However, the belief was that it would still deliver and the additional time over the summer would enable specific user requirements to be met.
- In June 2012 the BPP was suspended (and subsequently terminated in September 2012) and collaboration with Sussex Police became the preferred route for the Force. (It should be noted that during the original procurement of SIREN closer working between Surrey and Sussex was not seen as feasible because the two forces had recently been party to an aborted merger process).
- During the same time, Sussex had embarked on their own procurement action to replace similar systems to Surrey's. Early in this process it became evident that Sussex would not be following the same supplier route. Memex was eliminated as a potential supplier to Sussex because they did not have an existing commercial 'off the shelf' system.
- As at 2012, Memex had been unsuccessful in securing any further participating Forces for their product (thus reducing the potential to cost share going forward) and, critically, they lost the opportunity to bid for the Scottish Police Force contract.

183. The culmination of these events meant that the Force was beginning to take the view that the Memex system, even if delivered, would not meet their longer term vision of closer collaboration with Sussex Police and other regional forces. Taking into account the delays and problems to date, and their new regional collaboration focus, the Force began to look at alternative options. This was discussed with the Chair of the Authority and the Chief Executive in August 2012. The Chair of the Authority was clear that a full business case would be required to terminate SIREN. An options paper (but not a full business case) recommending the termination of SIREN was prepared and shared with the Chair of the Authority, the Chief Executive and the Treasurer in October 2012, but this fell during the purdah period prior to the PCC elections. Following legal advice taken by the Authority and The Force independently of each other, the decision was taken by the Chief Executive of the Authority that the options paper would not be put in front of the Authority for consideration or decision prior to its dissolution in November 2012.
184. Following the election of the PCC the options paper was further refined (4 December 2012) to examine wider options and financial implications. Key points that were articulated which favoured a move to Niche were:
- Continuing with CIS was not considered feasible as the same risk of obsolescence remained.
 - The cost of support of the Memex solution was being driven higher by a need to significantly enhance the skill and support base for Surrey ICT, an increase estimated to be in the order of £600k to £1m per annum. This meant the cost of moving to Niche was potentially only marginally different from the cost of continuing with Memex.
 - The cost of future change and enhancements to the Memex system would be borne predominantly by Surrey as Memex had not been able to secure any further UK customers for the same product. Conversely, Niche was already being used by several Forces and costs could be shared.
 - Being on the same Niche system with neighbouring forces would make closer collaboration easier to achieve and bring (as yet un-quantified) operational benefits.
185. The financial benefits of implementing the Niche system were not fully articulated in the options paper other than those which related to the costs of the system.
186. Whilst the other options were being considered the SIREN project remained red rated and continued to encounter difficulties. In late November 2012 the latest version of the intelligence module was tested and could not support more than 40 users in a live environment. As a result the project manager issued an exception report early in December 2012. No immediate fix was identified by Memex and a decision over a revision to the project's go live date was held pending a quantification of the performance issues the product was experiencing at the time.
187. Memex identified major system changes were required to resolve the performance issues and, based on the assumption the January and February releases would pass testing, a revised go live date of July/August was proposed. At the same point the project reached the edge of its funding envelope and required bids for additional capital and revenue funding to continue. There were also emerging concerns about the on-going support costs of the product. It is understandable that much of what transpired late in 2012 and early in 2013 would have reinforced concerns about the ability of SIREN to deliver. This uncertainty and the concerns prompted a number of actions:

- The project entered a further phase of re-planning.
 - The Programme Board approached Triaxia Ltd. with a view to obtaining some assurances about the robustness of future plans and to advise on future options.
 - The Deputy Chief Constable wrote to Memex to set out the Force's expectations for the next releases. The PCC also reinforced this with his own communications.
188. These actions, taken toward the end of the project's life, were appropriate. To re-plan the project and to seek some assurances about the robustness of these plans, and re-assessing the justification for the project, represent sensible steps. Clarifying expectations with the supplier was also an important step. However, some of this activity appears to have been prompted by a desire to move from SIREN to Niche. In many ways it is a shame that the rigour applied in manoeuvring to exit from SIREN was not applied earlier in the project's life to ensure its success.
189. In January 2013 the Force commissioned Triaxia Ltd. to carry out an independent review of options regarding SIREN. This report recommended that the contract with Memex was cancelled and that Niche was procured under a framework with Sussex Police. At the same time legal advice was sought over the contractual position and liability to which the PCC may be exposed should he take the decision to terminate the contract with Memex. Legal advice provided in February 2013 could not recommend termination for cause (i.e. fault with the supplier) and, as there was no termination for convenience clause built into the contract, stated a negotiated termination would be required should the PCC wish to leave the contract.
190. In February 2013 the PCC commissioned Mazars LLP to carry out a further independent review of Project Enterprise and to consider the way forward for the project. This review was also extended to include an understanding of the potential costs and benefits of procuring Niche in partnership with Sussex.
191. The report concluded that the following were not good reasons for terminating the Memex contract:
- current issues and concerns around whether SIREN will work (in terms of functional requirements).
 - current issues and concerns around whether SIREN will work (in terms of non-functional requirements).
 - current people issues and concerns around continuing with SAS/Memex and SIREN.
 - current perception concerns around continuing with SAS/Memex and SIREN.
192. However the report does identify potential cost and operational benefits which could be realised by terminating the contract with SAS/Memex and moving to the Niche solution in partnership with Sussex Police.

193. The decision to terminate was informed by the Mazars LLP report and the advice provided by the Force, which at this stage was clearly advocating a move to Niche. Whilst this provided the PCC with what he considered to be a compelling case in respect of the downside to continuing with SIREN and the potential benefits of pursuing a Niche solution, it did not explore all potential options in the way that a full business case would have done. It is a concern that a full business case was not required to support the decision to write off the significant sum of public funds which had been spent on SIREN to date. Moreover, it is arguable the PCC was taking a significant risk in terminating the SIREN project before the business case for the Niche replacement was fully developed. Had the Niche business case turned out to be, in fact, more expensive than continuing with Memex, the writing off of a significant sum of public money could have been compounded by having to replace the Memex system with an even more expensive solution.
194. The termination decision was made on 9 April 2013 (PCC Decision making Record 025/2013). A negotiated settlement with Memex, led by the Office of the PCC, was agreed in the following terms:
- The PCC would pay the residual balance of the contractually agreed development fees; and
 - Memex would agree to forego their contractual right to all future support costs.
195. In total, the full contractually agreed development cost of £3.3m was paid to Memex.
196. Whilst presented as separate decisions, the decision to terminate the SIREN project and the decision to procure Niche with Sussex Police are clearly linked. Procuring Niche was the only alternative option which was considered during the decision to exit from SIREN. To make a judgement about the course of action taken by the PCC in exiting SIREN it is necessary to look at the business case which supported the decision to procure Niche and, where appropriate, consider how this compared with the option to continue with SIREN.
197. The overall comparison of the costs of the two options was provided by Mazars LLP. Their report to the PCC presented the option to continue with SIREN as marginally cheaper than moving to Niche over a 5 year period, but with Niche producing longer term cost benefits by being cheaper to run from year 6 onwards. The Niche case makes worst case scenario assumptions about the exit costs of SIREN and set up costs for Niche (in fact, the negotiation with Memex, led by the Office of the PCC, resulted in a more favourable position than the worst case scenario in the Mazars report, with the agreement that Memex would relinquish their contractual claim to all future support costs). The information provided to the PCC made it clear that neither option (remaining with Memex or moving to Niche) was significantly more costly than the other, especially when some allowance is made for a margin of error. This, and the non-financial factors under consideration (such as the desire for closer regional collaboration with Sussex) would have been important and reasonable factors to take into account when making the decision.

The Niche replacement

198. A business case was produced by the Force in May 2013 which dealt specifically with the implementation of Niche over the five years to March 2018. The strategic and operational benefits make a strong case in favour, particularly when taking into account views from senior stakeholders on the future roadmap towards collaboration. However, in our view the quality of the business case could have been strengthened and there are some key factors that should be considered to ensure the success of the Niche replacement:

- The plan aims to implement Niche in two phases – Crime and Intel Q4, 2013, followed by Case and Custody in Q1 2014. Residual activities continue on the plan (Appendix A) until December 2014. There is also, we understand from speaking to the Sussex team, a road map beyond these dates for further data transfer/configuration/optimisation of business process. However, the business case only provides for a project team and capital items up to the end of the 2013/14 financial year. The Force is clear a further business case is required to fully implement these changes.
- The benefits, citing quantifiable estimates of only £1.5m for replacing CIS and NSPIS, are very light on detail and required much more work (a point that was recognised in the business case).
- The governance structure has two separate programme organisations (The Force and Sussex Police) which come together at an Executive group chaired by the lead Deputy Chief Constable (DCC) for Sussex. In the case of the Surrey Board, chaired by the Programme Director, this also reports into the Surrey Strategic Change Board. There are a further two boards above the Executive group. The team is a mixed team, with some of the critical posts filled by the third party provider, and there is also a Business Change Lead identified from within the Force. These appointments address some of the weaknesses identified with the SIREN project. Given the complexity of the structure the PCC and COG may want to assure themselves that delegations are appropriate and, at a lower level, the assurance and testing functions are in the optimum place.
- There are two financial risks (out of nine overall):
 - The first of these identifies the risk to contingency if decisions, either to mobilise initially or taken further down the line, are delayed. The successful implementation of Niche suggests the risk over delayed mobilisation decisions has not been realised. However, the complex decision making structure may have a bearing on the speed of future decision making.
 - The second financial risk is that detailed scoping of the next phase may reveal significant additional financial requirements. Again it is assumed at this point in time that this risk has diminished. However, given the aggressive timescale and significance of the change required, the need for funding beyond March 2014 is a very realistic risk, if not an issue, in this programme. This may have wider implications on the retention of key team members recruited in the latter stages of SIREN.

199. As an off the shelf system which already has a significant user base (15 other Forces) Niche represents a much lower risk approach. The experience of Sussex Police with their third party provider partner has been very positive with delivery of the first phase successfully complete. With the same resourcing model now implemented by Surrey, significant skills gaps present during SIREN would appear to have been addressed for the specific implementation of Niche.

200. All technical staff interviewed agreed that the Niche product should be a more reliable system and will deliver at least the same functionality that would have been given by the de-scoped Memex product. No custom support will be needed as the current Force strategy is that solutions will now be bought 'off the shelf' wherever possible.
201. The business case for Niche could have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and by much more detailed work on the benefits. The strategic vision of closer collaboration with Sussex Police is compelling, although it has been articulated only in part in the business case for Niche. There is a longer road map for Niche and a bigger vision for closer collaboration. Articulating this in the business case would have strengthened the reasoning supporting this course of action. Dedicated resource needs to be appointed to ensure delivery of these benefits and road map from 2014/15 onwards. This is now being considered as part of a separate business case.
202. Nevertheless, taking in to account the comparative future costs of both options (completion of SIREN or procurement of Niche), the amount of work still required to ensure SIREN was functioning, the previous uncertainty over the August 2013 implementation date, the current strategic vision of the Force to work more closely with regional partners, and the relative risks presented by implementing Niche, in our view the decisions to terminate SIREN and proceed with a different solution are reasonable.
203. However, these decisions are only reasonable as an exit strategy from a poorly managed project which, due to the delays encountered, was overtaken by changing external and strategic considerations. The fact remains that the termination decision results in the write off of a significant amount of public money which has been spent on the SIREN project and which has ultimately delivered no benefit to the taxpayer or the people of Surrey. It would have been preferable had the money and resources committed to the SIREN project in the first place been managed and governed effectively such that the intended benefits were delivered and consideration of termination need never have arisen.


Conclusions

204. In our view the decisions to terminate SIREN and proceed with a different solution are reasonable, but only as an exit strategy from a poorly managed project which, due to the delays encountered, was overtaken by changing external and strategic considerations.
205. It is a concern that a full business case was not required to support the decision to write off the significant sum of public funds which had been spent on SIREN to date. It is arguable the PCC was taking a significant risk in terminating the SIREN project before the business case for the Niche replacement was fully developed. Had the Niche business case turned out to be, in fact, more expensive than continuing with Memex, the writing off of a significant sum of public money could have been compounded by having to replace the Memex system with an even more expensive solution.
206. The business case for Niche could have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and by much more detailed work on the benefits.

Recommendations

- 17. *The business case for Niche would have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and more detailed work on the benefits to be gained. Future business cases should include a more comprehensive assessment of all strategic, financial and non-financial factors.***
- 18. *Given the complexity of the governance structure for the Niche system, the PCC and COG should assure themselves that delegations are appropriate and, at a lower level, the assurance and testing functions are in the optimum place.***

Appendix 1: Project timeline



Appendix 2: Summary of recommendations

Initiation

1. Ensure risk is evaluated appropriately when considering tender options.
2. Ensure appropriate procurement routes are used, aligned with the nature and complexity of the procurement being sought.
3. Ensure contractual clauses for termination on grounds of convenience are considered for large scale, long term procurements.
4. Ensure anticipated benefits are realistic, robustly challenged, fairly stated and achievable.

Programme and project management

5. The Force should ensure that it has properly considered what skills, resources and expertise it has at its disposal to procure and deliver large scale, complex programmes, acknowledging that Police Officers cannot simply be parachuted into a role they have no experience of and be expected to perform. Consideration should be given to:
 - a. engaging a third party provider;
 - b. engaging with external partners; and
 - c. seeking external procurement expertise for elements outside the normal force experience.
6. Given change is a constant in the current policing environment the Force should ensure some of their senior officers and staff are formally trained in change management.
7. Having undertaken a number of 'lessons learned exercises for SIREN, an independent review of whether learning has been implemented needs to be undertaken.

Governance

8. The 'healthy tensions' between roles required for effective project governance should not be undermined or diluted during project delivery. The Project Management Office should be independent from day to day project activity and play an active role in assuring information is accurate and supported before it is presented to the programme board.
9. There should be clarity over what constitutes an issue or a risk. This allows issues to be identified as such and escalated into the wider organisation for resolution.

Reporting

10. The Force and PCC must be clear that senior management want to and need to hear bad as well as good news, and explore cultural issues which may be a barrier to open and transparent reporting of progress.
11. Budget, forecast, actuals and variance financial reports for projects should be aligned with the reporting period i.e. have monthly granularity.
12. For future projects of similar scale and complexity, the Office of the PCC should recruit an experienced programme and project management specialist to represent them on the programme and project board.
13. Where current and future programme and project boards include employees of the Office of the PCC as members, their roles and responsibilities in the governance and accountability of the project/programme should be clearly articulated.
14. Project delivery processes need to mitigate the potential impact of a 'can do' and positive reporting culture. Appropriate Project Management Resource should be allocated to projects and routine gateway reviews should be undertaken throughout the progress of the project.

Cost

15. The Force should review and amend its policy on costing programmes and projects. This should align more with the way private hire is calculated, for a more accurate representation of true cost.
16. To further improve on management accounting the Force should consider introducing a time booking/recording system.

Termination and the Niche replacement

17. The business case for Niche would have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and more detailed work on the benefits to be gained. Future business cases should include a more comprehensive assessment of all strategic, financial and non-financial factors.
18. Given the complexity of the governance structure for the Niche system, the PCC and COG should assure themselves that delegations are appropriate and, at a lower level, the assurance and testing functions are in the optimum place.

Appendix 3: Interviewees

Key individuals interviewed:

Current office Holders

Police and Crime Commissioner
Chief Constable

Current officers

Deputy Police and Crime Commissioner
Chief Executive for the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner
Chief Superintendent and Programme Director (2011 until termination)
Treasurer and Chief Finance Officer for the Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner
Head of Finance and Services and Chief Finance Officer for Surrey Police
Head of Force Improvement for Surrey Police
ICT Technical Manager
Human Resources Officer
ICT Supplier Relationship Manager

Former office holders and officers

Former Chief Constable (March 2009 – February 2012) and Project SRO (2007 – 2008)
Former Deputy Chief Constable and Project SRO (Dec 2010 until termination)
Former Assistant Chief Constable and Project SRO (Dec 2008 – Sept 2010)
Former Authority Members
Former Chairs of the Police Authority
Former Head of ICT
Former Project Consultant and Deputy Programme Manager
Former Test Manager (Sept 2011 until termination)
Former Senior Procurement Officer
Former Programme Resource Manager

Others

Chief Executive Officer, Memex Technology Ltd
Programme Manager at SAS Memex
Paul Gilmour, Partner at Mazars LLP
Niche Programme Director for Sussex Police
Niche Programme Consultant from PA Consulting

The programme Manager from July 2011 until termination declined to be interviewed or respond directly to the draft report but made comments after having seen a final copy of the report. Other individuals also made comments after having seen a draft copy of the report.

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SIREN - Surrey Police Draft Response to Grant Thornton audit report recommendations, pending consultation at the public meeting (as required by legislation) and internally.

No.	Recommendation	Action taken	Action to be taken	Date for completion/rev iew
Initiation				
1	Ensure risk is evaluated appropriately when considering tender options	Proposal to go to Joint Procurement Board for tenders which are over the European procurement threshold (OJEU level) to be evaluated with a risk register prior to further consideration. Procurement Board is chaired by Assistant Chief Officer to ensure challenge, scrutiny and appropriate process is followed.	Develop and implement risk register for tender approach. Evaluation criteria/matrix for scoring such tenders to include a scoring of risk. Link to force risk register and the strategic change risk register.	Secure agreement at Joint Procurement Board to revised approach
2	Ensure appropriate procurement routes are used, aligned with the nature and complexity of the procurement being sought	Professional joint procurement team and process in place across Surrey /Sussex. Procurement Officers are now aligned to key stakeholder departments (i.e. Fleet, Estates and ICT) to provide professional advice on correct procurement processes and ensure best value. Advice for users also in place.		In Place
3	Ensure contractual clauses for termination on grounds of convenience are considered for large scale, long term procurements.	More focus on termination clauses within contracts (where appropriate a convenience break will be incorporated). Each contract to be assessed on need as some projects may require investment upfront or at an early stage such as big infrastructure purchases.	Assessment of cost implications for adding termination clauses into contracts to be made. This needs to be based on size and complexity of the contract to ensure any extra cost to contracts as a result of having a termination clause is balanced with the risk and size of spend on the contract / project.	
4	Ensure anticipated benefits are realistic, robustly challenged, fairly stated	Change programmes currently require business cases and investment proposals, and these go through a governance process for challenge. There is an existing post implementation review process for change programmes which can be built upon.	New change manager is bringing forward proposals for a joined up benefits management and benefits realisation process across both Surrey and Sussex. Review of existing progress to be made and live programmes to be aligned with new benefits realisation that being introduced.	
Programme and project management				

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SIREN - Surrey Police Draft Response to Grant Thornton audit report recommendations, pending consultation at the public meeting (as required by legislation) and internally.

5	<p>The Force should ensure that it has properly considered what skills, resources and expertise it has at its disposal to procure and deliver large scale, complex programmes, acknowledging that Police Officers cannot simply be parachuted into a role they have no experience of and be expected to perform. Consideration should be given to: engaging a third party provider; engaging with external partners; and seeking external procurement expertise for elements outside the normal force experience.</p>	<p>The Force currently has existing staff trained in Prince 2 / Managing Successful Programme (MSP) and Lean Six Sigma methodologies for programme delivery, driving out benefits and process reengineering, and will be building upon this. We now have a shared Professional lead and team for Procurement across Surrey and Sussex to provide expert advice.</p> <p>In addition we have and do use external expertise where it is needed, such as in the delivery of the Niche RMS project.</p>	<p>Training and induction process/manual to be developed and delivered for all officers/staff involved in change projects. Potential work on developing a commercial relationships tool could be useful to use when identifying the nature of relationships we want with suppliers. This should include a knowledge transfer requirement to internal staff. Review of training to include need for Prince 2 / Managing Successful Programme (MSP) methodologies, continual professional development for programme managers and consideration of specific training via the Cabinet Office for Senior Responsible Officers. New governance structures across Surrey and Sussex Police for change programmes are being introduced to ensure projects are aligned, properly prioritised and resourced.</p>	
6	<p>Given change is a constant in the current policing environment the Force should ensure some of their senior officers and staff are formally trained in change management.</p>		<p>Workforce to be scoped to identify where knowledge gaps exist. Training and induction process/manual to be developed and delivered for all officers/staff involved in change projects, we will be looking to ensure all Senior Responsible Officers in charge of programmes are appropriately trained to equip them with the skills to lead, challenge and deliver successful programmes.</p>	
7	<p>Having undertaken a number of 'lessons learned exercises for SIREN, an independent review of whether these have been implemented needs to be undertaken.</p>	<p>Initial discussions have been held with internal audit to include within a future audit plan. Internal Audit have been commissioned to review what lessons have been learned and ensure sign off in accordance with new audit processes.</p>		14/15
8	<p>The 'healthy tensions' between roles required for effective project governance should not be undermined or diluted during project delivery. The Project Management Office should be independent from day to day project activity and play an active role in assuring information is accurate and supported before it is presented to the programme board.</p>	<p>New joint Head of Change appointed with Sussex Police. New governance structures have been agreed and are currently being established across both forces with clear roles and responsibilities.</p>	<p>New change delivery mechanisms to be introduced. Specific role and remit of the new shared Surrey and Sussex project management office to be communicated and reinforced.</p>	
9	<p>There should be clarity over what constitutes an issue or a risk. This allows issues to be identified as such and escalated into the wider organisation for resolution.</p>	<p>New change governance arrangement being introduced which include issue and risk registers and strong mitigating actions which will be reviewed on a regular and routine basis.</p>		

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SIREN - Surrey Police Draft Response to Grant Thornton audit report recommendations, pending consultation at the public meeting (as required by legislation) and internally.

10	<p>The Force and PCC must be clear that senior management want to and need to hear bad as well as good news, and explore cultural issues which may be a barrier to open and transparent reporting of progress.</p>	<p>Work programmes underway that are streams under the People Strategy Work Programme include senior leaders events and embedding the Code of Ethics. Specifically senior leaders events in 2013 had a session which included the issue of escalating risk. We did a culture audit in Surrey and Sussex in April 2014 and are using the results to develop a new shared culture. Promotion of the code of ethics and force expectations re professionalism form the internal communications theme for June and July, which includes starting a programme of work to embed the Code of Ethics.</p> <p>Chief Constable engages face to face with staff on this point (individually and at senior leader events, and to newly promoted sergeants) and uses her blog to communicate this.</p> <p>There are currently numerous open and transparent engagement and reporting mechanisms within the Force.</p> <p>The internal communications to staff about the audit report specifically addresses this issue and encourages a culture of reporting of risk upwards.</p>		
11	<p>Budget, forecast, actuals and variance financial reports for projects should be aligned with the reporting period i.e. have monthly granularity.</p>	<p>This level of detail will be maintained for significant projects and provided to governance boards, including to the Police and Crime Commissioners for oversight, scrutiny and sign off.</p>		
12	<p>For future projects of similar scale and complexity, the Office of the PCC should recruit an experienced programme and project management specialist to represent them on the programme and project board.</p>		<p>Action for the OPCC rather than the force.</p>	
13	<p>Where current and future programme and project boards include employees of the Office of the PCC as members, their roles and responsibilities in the governance and accountability of the project/programme should be clearly articulated.</p>		<p>Action for the OPCC rather than the force.</p>	
14	<p>Project delivery processes need to mitigate the potential impact of a 'can do' and positive reporting culture. Appropriate Project Management Resource should be allocated to projects and routine gateway reviews should be undertaken throughout the progress of the project.</p>		<p>To be included within new Programme Management Office role and function, gateway reviews will be in introduced including external reviews where appropriate.</p>	
	<p>Cost</p>			

SIREN - Surrey Police Draft Response to Grant Thornton audit report recommendations, pending consultation at the public meeting (as required by legislation) and internally.

15	<p>The Force should review and amend its policy on costing programmes and projects. This should align more with the way private hire is calculated, for a more accurate representation of true cost. Budget, forecast, actuals and variance financial reports for projects should be aligned with the reporting period i.e. have monthly granularity.</p>		<p>Proposals to be developed and signed off by joint Deputy Chief Constables Board. This will then be reported to the Police and Crime Commissioners for oversight, scrutiny and sign off.</p>	<p>July 2014 DCC Board</p>
16	<p>To further improve on management accounting the Force should consider introducing a time booking/recording system.</p>		<p>Feasibility study to be commissioned. Options to be worked up that are commensurate with the scale of the project. Proposal to be presented to the Police and Crime Commissioners for oversight, scrutiny and sign off.</p>	<p>October 2014 DCC Board</p>
Termination and the Niche replacement				
17	<p>The business case for Niche would have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and more detailed work on the benefits to be gained. Future business cases should include a more comprehensive assessment of all strategic, financial and non-financial factors.</p>	<p>Recommendation accepted. Niche has already been already implemented, and the benefits are being assessed. Identification of risk and issues will form a core part of change management and governance.</p>		<p>In place</p>
18	<p>Given the complexity of the governance structure for the Niche system, the PCC and COG should assure themselves that delegations are appropriate and, at a lower level, the assurance and testing functions are in the optimum place.</p>			

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Public Interest Report by Grant Thornton into the Termination of the Surrey Police Siren ICT Project

Office of the PCC for Surrey, Response to Report Recommendations

The public interest report by Grant Thornton into the termination of the Siren project was published on 19th June 2014. The report was issued to the Police and Crime Commissioner (PCC) for Surrey and the Chief Constable for Surrey. The PCC and Chief Constable are then both required by audit rules to hold a public meeting to respond to the report and the recommendations made in the report. This meeting was on 27th June, 7pm at the HG Wells Conference Centre in Woking. The PCC and Chief Constable are required to publish their response to the recommendations following the meeting.

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No.	Recommendation	PCC Response
Initiation		
1	Ensure risk is evaluated appropriately when considering tender options.	The OPCC itself issues contracts for tender and oversees high cost Surrey Police tenders with Chief Executive sign-off. The OPCC will consider risk in its own tendering processes, particularly the recent Victim Commissioning, and ask Surrey Police how risk has been evaluated when signing off Surrey Police tenders.
2	Ensure appropriate procurement routes are used, aligned with the nature and complexity of the procurement being sought.	The OPCC is currently buying in procurement expertise for the Commissioning of Victims Services. The PCC supports the joint procurement team put in place for Surrey and Sussex and considers that this team is providing appropriate professional advice. The PCC will scrutinise Surrey Police procurement arrangements.
3	Ensure contractual clauses for termination on grounds of convenience are considered for large scale, long term procurements.	The PCC notes the response made by Surrey police and will ensure this is taken on board for OPCC procurements.
4	Ensure anticipated benefits are realistic, robustly challenged, fairly stated and achievable.	When involved in overseeing major Surrey Police projects, the PCC and supporting OPCC staff will challenge stated benefits, for example in the Policing Together board for Surrey and Sussex collaboration.

Programme and Project Management		
5	<p>The Force should ensure that it has properly considered what skills, resources and expertise it has at its disposal to procure and deliver large scale, complex programmes, acknowledging that Police Officers cannot simply be parachuted into a role they have no experience of and be expected to perform.</p> <p>Consideration should be given to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a) engaging a third party provider; b) engaging with external partners and c) seeking external procurement expertise for elements outside the normal force experience. 	<p>For major projects the OPCC will work with Surrey Police (and where appropriate Sussex PCC and Sussex Police) to consider what external skills are required.</p>
6	<p>Given change is a constant in the current policing environment the Force should ensure some of their senior officers and staff are formally trained in change management.</p>	<p>The PCC supports the recommendation for training in change management and would like to see all senior officers and staff understand and sign-up to principles of good project management. For the OPCC, current staff have some change management training, and experience. The OPCC Chief Executive will consider whether OPCC staff require any further training.</p>
7	<p>Having undertaken a number of 'lessons learned' exercises for SIREN, an independent review of whether these have been implemented needs to be undertaken.</p>	<p>The PCC, as part of the Joint Audit Committee for the PCC and Chief Constable, will ensure that a 'lessons learned' audit is carried out and reported upon.</p>
Governance		

8	The 'healthy tensions' between roles required for effective project governance should not be undermined or diluted during project delivery. The Project Management Office should be independent from day to day project activity and play an active role in assuring information is accurate and supported before it is presented to the programme board.	The PCC supports this recommendation and the Surrey Police response outlining the new Head of Change role with Sussex Police and new governance structures.
9	There should be clarity over what constitutes an issue or a risk. This allows issues to be identified as such and escalated into the wider organisation for resolution.	The OPCC has access to the Surrey Police risk and issues register and sits on the Surrey Police risk group and will use this role to ask questions around clarity and escalation of risk.
Reporting		
10	The Force and PCC must be clear that senior management want to and need to hear bad as well as good news, and explore cultural issues which may be a barrier to open and transparent reporting of progress.	This is recommendation that the PCC is fully committed to. He has got rid of targets in Surrey Police in the Police and Crime Plan to encourage open and transparent reporting across the board. He is also currently looking at an audit of Whistleblowing processes to ensure that staff can raise issues of concern.
11	Budget, forecast, actuals and variance financial reports for projects should be aligned with the reporting period i.e. have monthly granularity.	The PCC supports this recommendation and notes the Surrey Police update to carry this out for major projects. He will ask his Chief Finance Officer to scrutinise the financial reports for major projects.
12	For future projects of similar scale and complexity, the Office of the PCC should recruit an experienced programme and project management specialist to represent them on the programme and project board.	The OPCC will consider this recommendation and look at current and future major projects to see whether an experienced programme and project management specialist should be recruited. This will need to be considered with the budget for the OPCC and whether skills can be brought in within existing budget or whether the OPCC budget would need to increase.

13	Where current and future programme and project boards include employees of the Office of the PCC as members, their roles and responsibilities in the governance and accountability of the project/programme should be clearly articulated.	The OPCC will carry out an exercise of looking at which programme boards the OPCC are represented on and what their roles and responsibilities are.
14	Project delivery processes need to mitigate the potential impact of a 'can do' and positive reporting culture. Appropriate Project Management Resource should be allocated to projects and routine gateway reviews should be undertaken throughout the progress of the project.	The PCC supports this recommendation and notes the force response to introduce gateway reviews and the steps outlined in the Surrey Police to recommendation 10 to addresses the 'can do' and positive reporting culture. The PCC will also encourage accurate reporting at programme management meetings.
Cost		
15	The Force should review and amend its policy on costing programmes and projects. This should align more with the way private hire is calculated, for a more accurate representation of true cost.	The PCC notes that Surrey Police is developing proposals for this recommendation and has asked his Chief Finance Officer to scrutinise the proposals.
16	To further improve on management accounting the Force should consider introducing a time booking/recording system.	The PCC notes that Surrey Police is developing proposals for this recommendation and has asked his Chief Finance Officer to scrutinise the proposals.
Termination and the Niche replacement		
17	The business case for Niche would have been strengthened by better articulation of the overall vision for closer collaboration and more detailed work on the benefits to be gained. Future business cases should include a more comprehensive assessment of all strategic, financial and non-financial factors.	The PCC accepts this recommendation and will look for those areas mentioned in future businesses cases.
18	Given the complexity of the governance structure for the Niche system, the PCC and COG should assure themselves that delegations are appropriate and, at a lower level, the assurance and testing functions are in the optimum place.	The PCC will ask the Chief Constable to report on delegations that are in place and where assurance and testing functions are placed.

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